學術產出-學位論文
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題名 開放銀行框架研究
Open Road to Banking作者 黃冠叡
Huang, Kuan-Jui貢獻者 姜國輝
Kuo-Huie Chiang
黃冠叡
Huang, Kuan-Jui關鍵詞 開放銀行
開放API
開放金融
博弈理論
銀行即服務
開放即共識
Open Banking
Open API
Open Finance
Game Theory
Banking as a Service
Open as a Consensus日期 2020 上傳時間 4-一月-2021 10:47:18 (UTC+8) 摘要 開放銀行(Open Banking) 無疑是全球金融業在近年的大事件之一，金融發展先進地區無不推出相應的開放API 政策，本研究針對開放銀行發展方式提出基於博弈理論(Game Theory) 與技術實現觀點的架構論述。從聯盟賽局Coalition Game Theory 的分析中，得知若為銀行公協會主導的合作賽局，推出之架構框架易傾斜於強勢業者利益，否則聯盟將無法取得穩定解，且決策共識可能無法達成，此情況並可導致公平利益分配的困難。而若業者間對於聯盟運作進行一定讓步，彼此聯盟產生之利益得以減除雙方原本業務交集，則仍能產生穩定且公平的分配效率。另以金融機構與第三方服務提供業者的聯盟而論，雙方可能基於報酬矩陣(Payoff matrix) 產生四種不同合作結果：合作互惠(cooperation)，惡意對立(spite)，自我中心(selfishness) 與支持發展(altruism) 等，平等基礎有利於合作推展， 而強勢方的主動付出(altruism) 正是互惠(reciprocation) 的起點。另為了達成較大社會福祉(social welfare)，根據Arrow Paradox 原理，若成員數不小於兩個，可選擇方案大於三個時，不可能產生一個同時兼顧成員偏好，無強力獨裁者，或方案彼此獨立性的選舉機制設計。因此，主管機關有介入開放銀行機制設計之必要。在技術實現上，本論文從銀行核心系統特性與安全網路階層出發，探討開放應用程式種類、服務導向功能化，資安要求與階層式通訊架構的銜接設計，為不同標準化程度的拓樸結構(topology) 進行總體時間複雜度探討，分析認為，透過有力的中央處理機構，中立緩衝區設計，藉以橋接安全金融與開放交易環境，將有助於簡化網路拓樸，便利達成技術與商業協定，提升資料交換效率。依照不同標準化程度，此中介機構可扮演API交換平台，憑證Token 驗證中心，以及API 規格制訂等功能。進階運用上，可再作為資訊整合提供、資料加值服務、即時監理與犯罪偵防的平台。此外，開放生態系應發展相關周邊機構，以協助技術服務、資料應用加值與監理實施。基於推論結果，本研究總結開放銀行生態系的有續發展模式，安全高效的工程管理模式，並歸納出”Banking as a Service” 與”Open as a Consensus” 兩大方向做為未來的發展建議。期以博弈策略、技術實現與生態競合觀點，提供政策研究與機制設計參考，協助實現金融普惠目標。
Open banking is an initiative aiming to increase financial data sharing and service customization by connecting the traditional financial industry and Fintech under the premise of customer authorization of predefined scopes. Although there have been some implementing cases, more economies and prospective participants are still waiting on the sidelines as they closely watch the evolvement alongside the new collaborative patterns. More analyses explaining the reasons behind existing different designs and their limitations are eagerly desired. This research aims to this purpose. Grounded on Pareto efficiency and coalition game theory, this study analyzes the collective decision to justify the necessity of interference from the authority, the compulsory attendance of leading financial institutions, and the altruistic behavior from these institutions to third party service providers.In the analysis of Coalition Game, it suggests that in a union (such as a bank association) where members in higher position or a strong subgroup collectively conclude the important decisions for the organization, the Core set would focus on stability, rather than on the impartiality of all participants. For the coalition between financial institutes and third party providers, the reciprocation originates from the altruism of the dominant party. For the social welfare, the Arrow Paradox asserts that under such condition, it is impossible to design a fair electoral system that satisfies unanimity, non-dictatorship, and independence of irrelevant alternatives at the same time. Therefore, the authority should actively get involved in mechanism design of open banking.From the engineering perspective, it discusses data governance related issues, types and characteristics of open APIs, blind spots and influences that are easily overlooked, as well as API security and the required hierarchical communication structure design. By the above framework, it explains topological complexity of different open banking development approaches, and the societal computational efficiency they affect.On these bases, it provides advice on the orderly development model of open banking, effective management of ecosystem competition, and the efficient engineering framework design. It then summarizes two suggestions: "Banking as a Service" and "Open as a Consensus" for future development of Open Banking. This research hopes to provide policymakers, researchers and mechanism designers with referential directions based on ecological competition and engineering realization perspectives, so as to help society achieve the goal of financial inclusion.參考文獻 [1] I. Milchtaich, “Comparative statics of altruism and spite,” Games and Economic Behavior, vol. 75, no. 2, pp. 809 – 831, 2012.[2] C. McLeod, “Trust,” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (E. N. Zalta, ed.), Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University, fall 2015 ed., 2015.[3] J. Fox, “The uncertain relationship between transparency and accountability,” Development in practice, vol. 17, no. 45, pp. 663–671, 2007.[4] J. McWaters and R. Galaski, “Beyond fintech: a pragmatic assessment of disruptive potential in financial services,” in Part of the future of financial services series / Prepared in collaboration with Deloitte. WORLD ECONOMIC FORUM, 2017.[5] K. M. Eisenhardt, “Agency theory: An assessment and review,” Academy of management review, vol. 14, no. 1, pp. 57–74, 1989.[6] R. A. Pollak, “Bergsonsamuelson social welfare functions and the theory of social choice,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 93, no. 1, pp. 73–90, 1979.[7] HKICL, “Faster payment system,” 2019.[8] IBM, SNA Advanced PeertoPeer Networking (APPN). IBM Corporation, 2010.[9] J. W. Schindler, “Fintech and financial innovation: Drivers and depth,” 2017.[10] L. Brodsky and L. Oakes, “Data sharing and open banking,” McKinsey & Company, 2017.[11] A. W. A. Mullineux, “Financial innovation and social welfare,” Journal of Financial Regulation and Compliance, 2010.[12] J. E. Stiglitz and P. Dasgupta, “Potential competition, actual competition, and economic welfare,”1988.[13] M. O.Jackson, “Chapter 7: Coalition game,” in Game Theory Online, 2018. Stanford Opencourse.[14] L. S. Shapley, “The shapley value: A value for n person games,” Contributions to the Theory of Games, 1988.[15] E. Winter et al., “The shapley value,” Handbook of game theory with economic applications, vol. 3, no. 2, pp. 2025–2054, 2002.[16] D. B. Gillies, “Solutions to general nonzerosum games,” Contributions to the Theory of Games, vol. 4, pp. 47–85, 1959.[17] R. L. Trivers, “The evolution of reciprocal altruism,” The Quarterly review of biology, vol. 46, no. 1, pp. 35–57, 1971.[18] R. Axelrod and W. D. Hamilton, “The evolution of cooperation,” science, vol. 211, no. 4489, pp. 1390– 1396, 1981.[19] W. D. Hamilton, “The genetical evolution of social behaviour. ii,” Journal of theoretical biology, vol. 7, no. 1, pp. 17–52, 1964.[20] K. J. Arrow, “A difficulty in the concept of social welfare,” Journal of political economy, vol. 58, no. 4, pp. 328–346, 1950.[21] V. Khatri and C. V. Brown, “Designing data governance,” Communications of the ACM, vol. 53, no. 1, pp. 148–152, 2010.[22] K. Weber, B. Otto, and H. Österle, “One size does not fit all—a contingency approach to data governance,”Journal of Data and Information Quality (JDIQ), vol. 1, no. 1, pp. 1–27, 2009.[23] I. Alhassan, D. Sammon, and M. Daly, “Data governance activities: an analysis of the literature,”Journal of Decision Systems, vol. 25, no. sup1, pp. 64–75, 2016.[24] P. Voigt and A. Von dem Bussche, “The eu general data protection regulation (gdpr),” A Practical Guide, 1st Ed., Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2017.[25] M. Amy, O. Di Matteo, V. Gheorghiu, M. Mosca, A. Parent, and J. Schanck, “Estimating the cost of generic quantum preimage attacks on sha2 and sha3,”in International Conference on Selected Areas in Cryptography, pp. 317–337, Springer, 2016.[26] S. Jacobs, Engineering information security: The application of systems engineering concepts to achieve information assurance, vol. 14. John Wiley & Sons, 2011.[27] M. Cheminod, L. Durante, and A. Valenzano, “Review of security issues in industrial networks,” IEEE transactions on industrial informatics, vol. 9, no. 1, pp. 277–293, 2012.[28] T. Williams, “The purdue enterprise reference architecture and methodology (pera),” Handbook of lifecycle engineering: concepts, models, and technologies, vol. 289, 1998.[29] D. F. Spulber and C. S. Yoo, Networks in telecommunications: Economics and law. Cambridge University Press, 2009.[30] Backbase, “Banking 2025, four pillars of the digitalfirst bank,” 2018. 描述 博士
國立政治大學
資訊管理學系
103356501資料來源 http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0103356501 資料類型 thesis dc.contributor.advisor 姜國輝 zh_TW dc.contributor.advisor Kuo-Huie Chiang en_US dc.contributor.author (作者) 黃冠叡 zh_TW dc.contributor.author (作者) Huang, Kuan-Jui en_US dc.creator (作者) 黃冠叡 zh_TW dc.creator (作者) Huang, Kuan-Jui en_US dc.date (日期) 2020 en_US dc.date.accessioned 4-一月-2021 10:47:18 (UTC+8) - dc.date.available 4-一月-2021 10:47:18 (UTC+8) - dc.date.issued (上傳時間) 4-一月-2021 10:47:18 (UTC+8) - dc.identifier (其他 識別碼) G0103356501 en_US dc.identifier.uri (URI) http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/133412 - dc.description (描述) 博士 zh_TW dc.description (描述) 國立政治大學 zh_TW dc.description (描述) 資訊管理學系 zh_TW dc.description (描述) 103356501 zh_TW dc.description.abstract (摘要) 開放銀行(Open Banking) 無疑是全球金融業在近年的大事件之一，金融發展先進地區無不推出相應的開放API 政策，本研究針對開放銀行發展方式提出基於博弈理論(Game Theory) 與技術實現觀點的架構論述。從聯盟賽局Coalition Game Theory 的分析中，得知若為銀行公協會主導的合作賽局，推出之架構框架易傾斜於強勢業者利益，否則聯盟將無法取得穩定解，且決策共識可能無法達成，此情況並可導致公平利益分配的困難。而若業者間對於聯盟運作進行一定讓步，彼此聯盟產生之利益得以減除雙方原本業務交集，則仍能產生穩定且公平的分配效率。另以金融機構與第三方服務提供業者的聯盟而論，雙方可能基於報酬矩陣(Payoff matrix) 產生四種不同合作結果：合作互惠(cooperation)，惡意對立(spite)，自我中心(selfishness) 與支持發展(altruism) 等，平等基礎有利於合作推展， 而強勢方的主動付出(altruism) 正是互惠(reciprocation) 的起點。另為了達成較大社會福祉(social welfare)，根據Arrow Paradox 原理，若成員數不小於兩個，可選擇方案大於三個時，不可能產生一個同時兼顧成員偏好，無強力獨裁者，或方案彼此獨立性的選舉機制設計。因此，主管機關有介入開放銀行機制設計之必要。在技術實現上，本論文從銀行核心系統特性與安全網路階層出發，探討開放應用程式種類、服務導向功能化，資安要求與階層式通訊架構的銜接設計，為不同標準化程度的拓樸結構(topology) 進行總體時間複雜度探討，分析認為，透過有力的中央處理機構，中立緩衝區設計，藉以橋接安全金融與開放交易環境，將有助於簡化網路拓樸，便利達成技術與商業協定，提升資料交換效率。依照不同標準化程度，此中介機構可扮演API交換平台，憑證Token 驗證中心，以及API 規格制訂等功能。進階運用上，可再作為資訊整合提供、資料加值服務、即時監理與犯罪偵防的平台。此外，開放生態系應發展相關周邊機構，以協助技術服務、資料應用加值與監理實施。基於推論結果，本研究總結開放銀行生態系的有續發展模式，安全高效的工程管理模式，並歸納出”Banking as a Service” 與”Open as a Consensus” 兩大方向做為未來的發展建議。期以博弈策略、技術實現與生態競合觀點，提供政策研究與機制設計參考，協助實現金融普惠目標。 zh_TW dc.description.abstract (摘要) Open banking is an initiative aiming to increase financial data sharing and service customization by connecting the traditional financial industry and Fintech under the premise of customer authorization of predefined scopes. Although there have been some implementing cases, more economies and prospective participants are still waiting on the sidelines as they closely watch the evolvement alongside the new collaborative patterns. More analyses explaining the reasons behind existing different designs and their limitations are eagerly desired. This research aims to this purpose. Grounded on Pareto efficiency and coalition game theory, this study analyzes the collective decision to justify the necessity of interference from the authority, the compulsory attendance of leading financial institutions, and the altruistic behavior from these institutions to third party service providers.In the analysis of Coalition Game, it suggests that in a union (such as a bank association) where members in higher position or a strong subgroup collectively conclude the important decisions for the organization, the Core set would focus on stability, rather than on the impartiality of all participants. For the coalition between financial institutes and third party providers, the reciprocation originates from the altruism of the dominant party. For the social welfare, the Arrow Paradox asserts that under such condition, it is impossible to design a fair electoral system that satisfies unanimity, non-dictatorship, and independence of irrelevant alternatives at the same time. Therefore, the authority should actively get involved in mechanism design of open banking.From the engineering perspective, it discusses data governance related issues, types and characteristics of open APIs, blind spots and influences that are easily overlooked, as well as API security and the required hierarchical communication structure design. By the above framework, it explains topological complexity of different open banking development approaches, and the societal computational efficiency they affect.On these bases, it provides advice on the orderly development model of open banking, effective management of ecosystem competition, and the efficient engineering framework design. It then summarizes two suggestions: "Banking as a Service" and "Open as a Consensus" for future development of Open Banking. This research hopes to provide policymakers, researchers and mechanism designers with referential directions based on ecological competition and engineering realization perspectives, so as to help society achieve the goal of financial inclusion. en_US dc.description.tableofcontents Abstract in Chinese IAbstract in English IIIAcknowledgements VContents VIList of Figures IXList of Tables XI1 Introduction 22 Review Difficulties and Challenges 62.1 Inequality position 62.2 Technological challenges 72.2.1 Core Banking Systems 72.2.2 Characteristics of modern API 92.3 Industrial Challenges 102.4 Societal challenges 142.4.1 New Pareto Frontier 142.4.2 Collective rationality 153 Research Approach 163.1 Game perspectives 163.1.1 Cooperative Game Coalition 183.1.2 Ideal state Equally share benefit 183.1.3 Feasible state stable Core 213.1.4 Dominant participants 223.1.5 Coalition of FI and TPP 243.1.6 Hidden conflicts of Selfregulation andsocial welfare 263.2 Engineering perspectives 283.2.1 Data governance and open banking 283.2.2 API in open banking 303.2.3 Accessibility under security 333.2.4 Hierarchical buffer for secureCommunication 363.2.5 Topology and ComputationalComplexity 383.2.6 Time complexity analysis 544 Discussion and Findings 574.1 Management of ecological competition 574.1.1 Compulsory attendance of leading FIs 574.1.2 Support the weak 574.1.3 Room for adaptive regulation 584.1.4 Active involvement from the authority 584.1.5 The implementation entity 594.2 Management of engineering 604.2.1 Equal development under digital divideand readiness 604.2.2 Deployment for regional integration 614.2.3 Supportive peripherals 614.2.4 API lifecycle management 624.2.5 Industrial level risk management 634.2.6 Secure data exchange and selection of protocol 634.3 Preparations for future development 654.3.1 Banking as a Service 654.3.2 Open as a Consensus 675 Conclusions 70References 71 zh_TW dc.format.extent 768929 bytes - dc.format.mimetype application/pdf - dc.source.uri (資料來源) http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0103356501 en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) 開放銀行 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) 開放API zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) 開放金融 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) 博弈理論 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) 銀行即服務 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) 開放即共識 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) Open Banking en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) Open API en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) Open Finance en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) Game Theory en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) Banking as a Service en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) Open as a Consensus en_US dc.title (題名) 開放銀行框架研究 zh_TW dc.title (題名) Open Road to Banking en_US dc.type (資料類型) thesis en_US dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) [1] I. Milchtaich, “Comparative statics of altruism and spite,” Games and Economic Behavior, vol. 75, no. 2, pp. 809 – 831, 2012.[2] C. McLeod, “Trust,” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (E. N. Zalta, ed.), Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University, fall 2015 ed., 2015.[3] J. Fox, “The uncertain relationship between transparency and accountability,” Development in practice, vol. 17, no. 45, pp. 663–671, 2007.[4] J. McWaters and R. Galaski, “Beyond fintech: a pragmatic assessment of disruptive potential in financial services,” in Part of the future of financial services series / Prepared in collaboration with Deloitte. WORLD ECONOMIC FORUM, 2017.[5] K. M. Eisenhardt, “Agency theory: An assessment and review,” Academy of management review, vol. 14, no. 1, pp. 57–74, 1989.[6] R. A. Pollak, “Bergsonsamuelson social welfare functions and the theory of social choice,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 93, no. 1, pp. 73–90, 1979.[7] HKICL, “Faster payment system,” 2019.[8] IBM, SNA Advanced PeertoPeer Networking (APPN). IBM Corporation, 2010.[9] J. W. Schindler, “Fintech and financial innovation: Drivers and depth,” 2017.[10] L. Brodsky and L. Oakes, “Data sharing and open banking,” McKinsey & Company, 2017.[11] A. W. A. Mullineux, “Financial innovation and social welfare,” Journal of Financial Regulation and Compliance, 2010.[12] J. E. Stiglitz and P. Dasgupta, “Potential competition, actual competition, and economic welfare,”1988.[13] M. O.Jackson, “Chapter 7: Coalition game,” in Game Theory Online, 2018. Stanford Opencourse.[14] L. S. Shapley, “The shapley value: A value for n person games,” Contributions to the Theory of Games, 1988.[15] E. Winter et al., “The shapley value,” Handbook of game theory with economic applications, vol. 3, no. 2, pp. 2025–2054, 2002.[16] D. B. Gillies, “Solutions to general nonzerosum games,” Contributions to the Theory of Games, vol. 4, pp. 47–85, 1959.[17] R. L. Trivers, “The evolution of reciprocal altruism,” The Quarterly review of biology, vol. 46, no. 1, pp. 35–57, 1971.[18] R. Axelrod and W. D. Hamilton, “The evolution of cooperation,” science, vol. 211, no. 4489, pp. 1390– 1396, 1981.[19] W. D. Hamilton, “The genetical evolution of social behaviour. ii,” Journal of theoretical biology, vol. 7, no. 1, pp. 17–52, 1964.[20] K. J. Arrow, “A difficulty in the concept of social welfare,” Journal of political economy, vol. 58, no. 4, pp. 328–346, 1950.[21] V. Khatri and C. V. Brown, “Designing data governance,” Communications of the ACM, vol. 53, no. 1, pp. 148–152, 2010.[22] K. Weber, B. Otto, and H. Österle, “One size does not fit all—a contingency approach to data governance,”Journal of Data and Information Quality (JDIQ), vol. 1, no. 1, pp. 1–27, 2009.[23] I. Alhassan, D. Sammon, and M. Daly, “Data governance activities: an analysis of the literature,”Journal of Decision Systems, vol. 25, no. sup1, pp. 64–75, 2016.[24] P. Voigt and A. Von dem Bussche, “The eu general data protection regulation (gdpr),” A Practical Guide, 1st Ed., Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2017.[25] M. Amy, O. Di Matteo, V. Gheorghiu, M. Mosca, A. Parent, and J. Schanck, “Estimating the cost of generic quantum preimage attacks on sha2 and sha3,”in International Conference on Selected Areas in Cryptography, pp. 317–337, Springer, 2016.[26] S. Jacobs, Engineering information security: The application of systems engineering concepts to achieve information assurance, vol. 14. John Wiley & Sons, 2011.[27] M. Cheminod, L. Durante, and A. Valenzano, “Review of security issues in industrial networks,” IEEE transactions on industrial informatics, vol. 9, no. 1, pp. 277–293, 2012.[28] T. Williams, “The purdue enterprise reference architecture and methodology (pera),” Handbook of lifecycle engineering: concepts, models, and technologies, vol. 289, 1998.[29] D. F. Spulber and C. S. Yoo, Networks in telecommunications: Economics and law. Cambridge University Press, 2009.[30] Backbase, “Banking 2025, four pillars of the digitalfirst bank,” 2018. zh_TW dc.identifier.doi (DOI) 10.6814/NCCU202001846 en_US
