dc.contributor | 統計系 | |
dc.creator (作者) | 余清祥 | |
dc.creator (作者) | Yue, Jack C. | |
dc.creator (作者) | Jeng, Vivian | |
dc.creator (作者) | Huang, Rachel J. | |
dc.creator (作者) | Wang, Cheng-Wei | |
dc.date (日期) | 2021-09 | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2022-04-12 | - |
dc.date.available | 2022-04-12 | - |
dc.date.issued (上傳時間) | 2022-04-12 | - |
dc.identifier.uri (URI) | http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/139840 | - |
dc.description.abstract (摘要) | Using 2008–2018 data for all publicly-listed firms in Taiwan, this paper tests for asymmetric information in the Directors` and Officers` (D&O) liability insurance market. We argue that size and book-to-market ratio contain information such as managerial risk preferences and their intention to reduce litigation risk. Our results show that a negative relationship exists between litigation risk and insurance purchase among small and low book-to-market firms. Our findings pinpoint out the importance of using size and the book-to-market ratio when detecting asymmetric information in the corporate level. | |
dc.format.extent | 827742 bytes | - |
dc.format.mimetype | application/pdf | - |
dc.relation (關聯) | Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Vol.68, pp.101560 | |
dc.subject (關鍵詞) | Size;Book-to-market;Directors` and officers` liability insurance;Advantageous selection;Intangible information;Adverse selection | |
dc.title (題名) | Does Size and Book-to-Market Contain Intangible Information about Managerial Incentives? Learning from Corporate D&O Insurance Purchase | |
dc.type (資料類型) | article | |
dc.identifier.doi (DOI) | 10.1016/j.pacfin.2021.101560 | |
dc.doi.uri (DOI) | https://doi.org/10.1016/j.pacfin.2021.101560 | |