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題名 ESG表現與性別議題於公司治理決策
ESG Performance and Gender Issues in Corporate Policy Making
作者 林佳賢
Lin, Chia-Hsien
貢獻者 陳嬿如
Chen, Yenn-Ru
林佳賢
Lin, Chia-Hsien
關鍵詞 股東提案
股東積極主義
性別
Shareholder proposal
Shareholder activism
Gender
日期 2022
上傳時間 1-六月-2022 16:26:23 (UTC+8)
摘要 女性執行長相較於男性執行長更容易收到股東提案，尤其是質量較差的股東提案。原因在於機構投資人會因為認為女性執行長有較高的社會偏好所以投更多跟環境及社會議題相關的股東提案；而個人投資人則傾向於投更多跟公司治理相關的股東議案，原因在於他們會受到性別刻板印象的影響認為女性較難以適任執行長的公司。然而，更進一步的研究結果指出，雖然投資人會受到性別刻板印象的影響，這樣的刻板印象會隨著女性執行長有較佳的表現而降低，證明了資訊不對稱的狀況也會造成女性在職場上面對的玻璃天花板問題。
Firms with female CEOs receive more shareholder proposals, especially lower-quality proposals, than firms with male CEOs. Institutional investors are more likely to sponsor environmental/social proposals that are ultimately withdrawn after private negotiations, while individual investors sponsor more governance proposals, targeting female CEOs’ performance. These results indicate individual investors tend to perceive female CEOs as less competent, while institutional investors target their more democratic leadership style. Further results suggest the differential treatment toward female CEOs is mitigated when they outperform their peers and when female CEO representation is greater, highlighting how information asymmetry contributes to the glass ceiling female CEOs face.
參考文獻 Adams, R.B., and Ferreira, D., 2009. Women in the Boardroom and Their Impact on Governance and Performance. Journal of Financial Economics, 94(2), 291-309.
Adams, R.B., and Funk, P., 2012. Beyond the Glass Ceiling: Does Gender Matter? Management Science, 58(2), 219-235.
Arrow, K., 1973. The Theory of Discrimination. Discrimination in Labor Markets, 3(10), 3-33.
Barber, B., and Odean, T., 2013. Chapter 22. The Behavior of Individual Investors*, 2, 1533-1570, Elsevier, Amsterdam, North Holland.
Beaman, L., Chattopadhyay, R., Duflo, E., Pande, R., and Topalova, P., 2009. Powerful Women: Does Exposure Reduce Bias? Quarterly Journal of Economics, 124(4), 1497–1540.
Becker, G.S., 1957. The Economics of Discrimination. University of Chicago Press, Chicago, Illinois.
Bertrand, M., 2011. New Perspectives on Gender. In Handbook of Labor Economics, 4, 1543-1590. Elsevier, Amsterdam, North Holland.
Bertrand, M., Chugh, D., and Mullainathan, S., 2005. Implicit Discrimination. American Economic Review, 95(2), 94-98.
Bertrand, M., and Duflo, E., 2017. Field Experiments on Discrimination. Handbook of Economic Field Experiments, 1, 309-393.
Bertrand, M., and Hallock, K.F., 2001, The Gender Gap in Top Corporate Jobs. ILR Review, 55(1), 3-21.
Bertrand, M., Kamenica, E., and Pan, J., 2015. Gender Identity and Relative Income within Households. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 130(2), 571-614.
Bohren, J.A., Imas, A., and Rosenberg, M., 2019. The Dynamics of Discrimination: Theory and Evidence. American Economic Review, 109(10), 3395-3436.
Bordalo, P., Coffman, K., Gennaioli, N., and Shleifer, A., 2016. Stereotypes. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 131(4), 1753–1794.
Borghesi, R., Houston, J.F., and Naranjo, A., 2014. Corporate Socially Responsible Investments: CEO Altruism, Reputation, and Shareholder Interests. Journal of Corporate Finance, 26, 164-181.
Brahnam, S. D., Margavio, T. M., Hignite, M. A., Barrier, T. B., and Chin, J. M., 2005, A Gender‐based Categorization for Conflict Resolution. Journal of Management Development, 24(3), 197-208.
Bugeja, M., Matolcsy, Z.P., and Spiropoulos, H., 2012, Is There a Gender Gap in CEO Compensation? Journal of Corporate Finance, 18(4), 849-859.
Choi, S., Fisch, J., and Kahan, M., 2009. The Power of Proxy Advisors: Myth or Reality. Emory LJ, 59, 869-918.
Cuñat, V., Gine, M., and Guadalupe, M., 2012, The Vote Is Cast: The Effect of Corporate Governance on Shareholder Value. The Journal of Finance, 67(5), 1943-1977.
Denes, M.R., Karpoff, J.M., McWilliams, V.B., 2017. Thirty Years of Shareholder Activism: A Survey of Empirical Research. Journal of Corporate Finance, 44, 405-424.
Duchin, R., Simutin, M., and Sosyura, D., 2021, The Origins and Real Effects of the Gender Gap: Evidence from CEOs’ Formative Years. The Review of Financial Studies, 34(2), 700-762.
Eagly, A.H., and Carli, L.L., 2003, The Female Leadership Advantage: An Evaluation of the Evidence. The Leadership Quarterly, 14(6), 807-834.
Eagly, A.H., and Karau, S.J., 2002, Role Congruity Theory of Prejudice Toward Female Leaders. Psychological Review, 109(3), 573-598.
Egan, M., Matvos, G., and Seru, A., 2019, The Market for Financial Adviser Misconduct. Journal of Political Economy, 127(1), 233-295
Elsesser, K.M., and Lever, J., 2011, Does Gender Bias Against Female Leaders Persist? Quantitative and Qualitative Data from a Large-scale Survey. Human Relations, 64(12), 1555-1578.
Engelberg, J., Gao, P., and Parsons, C.A., 2013, The Price of a CEO`s Rolodex. The Review of Financial Studies, 26(1), 79-114.
Ertimur, Y., Ferri, F., and Muslu, V., 2011. Shareholder Activism and CEO Pay. The Review of Financial Studies, 24(2), 535-592.
Ertimur, Y., Ferri, F., and Stubben, S.R., 2010, Board of Directors` Responsiveness to Shareholders: Evidence from Shareholder Proposals. Journal of Corporate Finance, 16(1), 53-72.Ewens, M., and Townsend, R.R., 2020, Are Early Stage Investors Biased against Women? Journal of Financial Economics, 135(3), 653-677.
Faccio, M., Marchica, M.-T., and Mura, R., 2016. CEO Gender, Corporate Risk-taking, and the Efficiency of Capital Allocation. Journal of Corporate Finance, 39, 193-209.
Francis, B.B., Hasan, I., Shen, Y.V., Wu, Q., 2021. Do Activist Hedge Funds Target Female CEOs? The Role of CEO Gender in Hedge Fund Activism. Journal of Financial Economics, 141(1), 372-393.
Gantchev, N., and Giannetti, M., 2020, The Costs and Benefits of Shareholder Democracy: Gadflies and Low-Cost Activism. Review of Financial Studies, f34(12), 5629–5675.
Gupta, V.K., Han, S., Mortal, S.C., Silveri, S. D., and Turban, D.B., 2018. Do Women CEOs Face Greater Threat of Shareholder Activism Compared to Male CEOs? A Role Congruity Perspective. Journal of Applied Psychology, 103(2), 228–236.
He, Y., Kahraman, B., and Lowry, M., 2020, ES Risks and Shareholder Voice, Working Paper, European Corporate Governance Institute
Huang, J., and Kisgen, D.J., 2013, Gender and Corporate Finance: Are Male Executives Overconfident Relative to Female Executives? Journal of Financial Economics, 108(3), 822-839.
Jung, J.H., Kumar, A., and Lim, S.S., and Yoo, C.Y., 2019, An Analyst by Any Other Surname: Surname Favorability and Market Reaction to Analyst Forecasts. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 67(2)-67(3), 306-335.
Karpoff, J.M., 2001, The Impact of Shareholder Activism on Target Companies: A Survey of Empirical Findings, Working Paper, European Corporate Governance Institute
Karpoff, J.M., Malatesta, P.H., and Walkling, R.A., 1996. Corporate Governance and Shareholder Initiatives: Empirical Evidence. Journal of Financial Economics, 42(3),365-395.
Kumar, A., Niessen-Ruenzi, A., and Spalt, O.G., 2015, What`s in a Name? Mutual Fund Flows When Managers Have Foreign-Sounding Names. The Review of Financial Studies, 28(8), 2281–2321.
Matsa, D.A., and Miller, A.R., 2013, A Female Style in Corporate Leadership? Evidence from Quotas. American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 5(3), 136-69.
Matsusaka, J.G., Ozbas, O., and Yi, I., 2019. Opportunistic Proposals by Union Shareholders. The Review of Financial Studies, 32, 3215-3265.
Matsusaka, J.G., Ozbas, O., and Yi, I., 2021. Can Shareholder Proposals Hurt Shareholders? Evidence from SEC No-Action Letter Decisions. The Journal of Law and Economics, 64(1), 107-152.
McCahery, J.A., Sautner, Z., and Starks, L.T., 2016. Behind the Scenes: The Corporate Governance Preferences of Institutional Investors. The Journal of Finance, 71(6), 2905-2932.
Niederle, M., and Vesterlund, L., 2007, Do Women Shy Away from Competition? Do Men Compete Too Much? Quarterly Journal of Economics, 122(3), 1067-1101.
Niessen-Ruenzi, A., and Ruenzi, S., 2019, Sex Matters: Gender Bias in the Mutual Fund Industry. Management Science, 65(7), 3001-3025.
Petersen, M.A., 2009, Estimating Standard Errors in Finance Panel Data Sets: Comparing Approaches. The Review of Financial Studies, 22(1), 435-480.
Phelps, E.S., 1972, The Statistical Theory of Racism and Sexism. American Economic Review, 62(4), 659-661.
Prevost, A.K., and Rao, R.P., 2000, Of What Value Are Shareholder Proposals Sponsored by Public Pension Funds. The Journal of Business, 73(2), 177-204.
Renneboog, L., and Szilagyi, P.G., 2011, The Role of Shareholder Proposals in Corporate Governance. Journal of Corporate Finance, 17(1), 167-188.
Reuben, E., Sapienza, P., and Zingales, L., 2014. How Stereotypes Impair Women`s Careers in Science. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 111(12), 4403-4408.
Ryan, M.K., Haslam, S.A., Morgenroth, T., Rink, F., Stoker, J., and Peters, K., 2016. Getting on Top of the Glass Cliff: Reviewing a Decade of Evidence, Explanations, and Impact. The Leadership Quarterly, 27(3), 446-455.
Solnick, S.J., and Schweitzer, M.E., 1999. The Influence of Physical Attractiveness and Gender on Ultimatum Game Decisions. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 79(3), 199-215.
Stock, J.H., Wright, J.H., and Yogo, M., 2002. A Survey of Weak Instruments and Weak Identification in Generalized Method of Moments. Journal of Business & Economic Statistics, 20(4), 518-529.
Strine, L., 2014. Can We Do Better by Ordinary Investors? A Pragmatic Reaction to the Dueling Ideological Mythologists of Corporate Law. Columbia Law Review, 114(2), 449-502.
Tate, G., and Yang, L., 2015. Female Leadership and Gender Equity: Evidence from Plant Closure. Journal of Financial Economics, 117(1): 77-97.
Thomas, R.S., and Cotter, J.F., 2007, Shareholder Proposals in the New Millennium: Shareholder Support, Board Response, and Market Reaction. Journal of Corporate Finance, 13(2-3), 368-391.
World Economic Forum, 2018, The Global Gender Gap Report, available at: https://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_GGGR_2018.pdf
Wolfers, J., 2006, Did Unilateral Divorce Laws Raise Divorce Rates? A Reconciliation and New Results. American Economic Review, 96(5), 1802-1820.
描述 博士
國立政治大學
財務管理學系
106357501
資料來源 http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0106357501
資料類型 thesis
dc.contributor.advisor 陳嬿如zh_TW
dc.contributor.advisor Chen, Yenn-Ruen_US
dc.contributor.author (作者) 林佳賢zh_TW
dc.contributor.author (作者) Lin, Chia-Hsienen_US
dc.creator (作者) 林佳賢zh_TW
dc.creator (作者) Lin, Chia-Hsienen_US
dc.date (日期) 2022en_US
dc.date.accessioned 1-六月-2022 16:26:23 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.available 1-六月-2022 16:26:23 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.issued (上傳時間) 1-六月-2022 16:26:23 (UTC+8)-
dc.identifier (其他 識別碼) G0106357501en_US
dc.identifier.uri (URI) http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/140201-
dc.description (描述) 博士zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 國立政治大學zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 財務管理學系zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 106357501zh_TW
dc.description.abstract (摘要) 女性執行長相較於男性執行長更容易收到股東提案，尤其是質量較差的股東提案。原因在於機構投資人會因為認為女性執行長有較高的社會偏好所以投更多跟環境及社會議題相關的股東提案；而個人投資人則傾向於投更多跟公司治理相關的股東議案，原因在於他們會受到性別刻板印象的影響認為女性較難以適任執行長的公司。然而，更進一步的研究結果指出，雖然投資人會受到性別刻板印象的影響，這樣的刻板印象會隨著女性執行長有較佳的表現而降低，證明了資訊不對稱的狀況也會造成女性在職場上面對的玻璃天花板問題。zh_TW
dc.description.abstract (摘要) Firms with female CEOs receive more shareholder proposals, especially lower-quality proposals, than firms with male CEOs. Institutional investors are more likely to sponsor environmental/social proposals that are ultimately withdrawn after private negotiations, while individual investors sponsor more governance proposals, targeting female CEOs’ performance. These results indicate individual investors tend to perceive female CEOs as less competent, while institutional investors target their more democratic leadership style. Further results suggest the differential treatment toward female CEOs is mitigated when they outperform their peers and when female CEO representation is greater, highlighting how information asymmetry contributes to the glass ceiling female CEOs face.en_US
dc.description.tableofcontents Chapter 1. Introduction 1
Chapter 2. Gender Differences in Shareholder Activism: Evidence from Shareholder Proposals 3
Section 1. Introduction 3
Section 2. Literature Review 8
Section 3. Data and Main Specification 12
Section 4. Empirical Analyses 15
Section 5. Conclusion 29
Reference 31
Appendix 51		zh_TW
dc.format.extent 2169887 bytes-
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf-
dc.source.uri (資料來源) http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0106357501en_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 股東提案zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 股東積極主義zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 性別zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) Shareholder proposalen_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) Shareholder activismen_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) Genderen_US
dc.title (題名) ESG表現與性別議題於公司治理決策zh_TW
dc.title (題名) ESG Performance and Gender Issues in Corporate Policy Makingen_US
dc.type (資料類型) thesisen_US
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Adams, R.B., and Ferreira, D., 2009. Women in the Boardroom and Their Impact on Governance and Performance. Journal of Financial Economics, 94(2), 291-309.
Adams, R.B., and Funk, P., 2012. Beyond the Glass Ceiling: Does Gender Matter? Management Science, 58(2), 219-235.
Arrow, K., 1973. The Theory of Discrimination. Discrimination in Labor Markets, 3(10), 3-33.
Barber, B., and Odean, T., 2013. Chapter 22. The Behavior of Individual Investors*, 2, 1533-1570, Elsevier, Amsterdam, North Holland.
Beaman, L., Chattopadhyay, R., Duflo, E., Pande, R., and Topalova, P., 2009. Powerful Women: Does Exposure Reduce Bias? Quarterly Journal of Economics, 124(4), 1497–1540.
Becker, G.S., 1957. The Economics of Discrimination. University of Chicago Press, Chicago, Illinois.
Bertrand, M., 2011. New Perspectives on Gender. In Handbook of Labor Economics, 4, 1543-1590. Elsevier, Amsterdam, North Holland.
Bertrand, M., Chugh, D., and Mullainathan, S., 2005. Implicit Discrimination. American Economic Review, 95(2), 94-98.
Bertrand, M., and Duflo, E., 2017. Field Experiments on Discrimination. Handbook of Economic Field Experiments, 1, 309-393.
Bertrand, M., and Hallock, K.F., 2001, The Gender Gap in Top Corporate Jobs. ILR Review, 55(1), 3-21.
Bertrand, M., Kamenica, E., and Pan, J., 2015. Gender Identity and Relative Income within Households. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 130(2), 571-614.
Bohren, J.A., Imas, A., and Rosenberg, M., 2019. The Dynamics of Discrimination: Theory and Evidence. American Economic Review, 109(10), 3395-3436.
Bordalo, P., Coffman, K., Gennaioli, N., and Shleifer, A., 2016. Stereotypes. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 131(4), 1753–1794.
Borghesi, R., Houston, J.F., and Naranjo, A., 2014. Corporate Socially Responsible Investments: CEO Altruism, Reputation, and Shareholder Interests. Journal of Corporate Finance, 26, 164-181.
Brahnam, S. D., Margavio, T. M., Hignite, M. A., Barrier, T. B., and Chin, J. M., 2005, A Gender‐based Categorization for Conflict Resolution. Journal of Management Development, 24(3), 197-208.
Bugeja, M., Matolcsy, Z.P., and Spiropoulos, H., 2012, Is There a Gender Gap in CEO Compensation? Journal of Corporate Finance, 18(4), 849-859.
Choi, S., Fisch, J., and Kahan, M., 2009. The Power of Proxy Advisors: Myth or Reality. Emory LJ, 59, 869-918.
Cuñat, V., Gine, M., and Guadalupe, M., 2012, The Vote Is Cast: The Effect of Corporate Governance on Shareholder Value. The Journal of Finance, 67(5), 1943-1977.
Denes, M.R., Karpoff, J.M., McWilliams, V.B., 2017. Thirty Years of Shareholder Activism: A Survey of Empirical Research. Journal of Corporate Finance, 44, 405-424.
Duchin, R., Simutin, M., and Sosyura, D., 2021, The Origins and Real Effects of the Gender Gap: Evidence from CEOs’ Formative Years. The Review of Financial Studies, 34(2), 700-762.
Eagly, A.H., and Carli, L.L., 2003, The Female Leadership Advantage: An Evaluation of the Evidence. The Leadership Quarterly, 14(6), 807-834.
Eagly, A.H., and Karau, S.J., 2002, Role Congruity Theory of Prejudice Toward Female Leaders. Psychological Review, 109(3), 573-598.
Egan, M., Matvos, G., and Seru, A., 2019, The Market for Financial Adviser Misconduct. Journal of Political Economy, 127(1), 233-295
Elsesser, K.M., and Lever, J., 2011, Does Gender Bias Against Female Leaders Persist? Quantitative and Qualitative Data from a Large-scale Survey. Human Relations, 64(12), 1555-1578.
Engelberg, J., Gao, P., and Parsons, C.A., 2013, The Price of a CEO`s Rolodex. The Review of Financial Studies, 26(1), 79-114.
Ertimur, Y., Ferri, F., and Muslu, V., 2011. Shareholder Activism and CEO Pay. The Review of Financial Studies, 24(2), 535-592.
Ertimur, Y., Ferri, F., and Stubben, S.R., 2010, Board of Directors` Responsiveness to Shareholders: Evidence from Shareholder Proposals. Journal of Corporate Finance, 16(1), 53-72.Ewens, M., and Townsend, R.R., 2020, Are Early Stage Investors Biased against Women? Journal of Financial Economics, 135(3), 653-677.
Faccio, M., Marchica, M.-T., and Mura, R., 2016. CEO Gender, Corporate Risk-taking, and the Efficiency of Capital Allocation. Journal of Corporate Finance, 39, 193-209.
Francis, B.B., Hasan, I., Shen, Y.V., Wu, Q., 2021. Do Activist Hedge Funds Target Female CEOs? The Role of CEO Gender in Hedge Fund Activism. Journal of Financial Economics, 141(1), 372-393.
Gantchev, N., and Giannetti, M., 2020, The Costs and Benefits of Shareholder Democracy: Gadflies and Low-Cost Activism. Review of Financial Studies, f34(12), 5629–5675.
Gupta, V.K., Han, S., Mortal, S.C., Silveri, S. D., and Turban, D.B., 2018. Do Women CEOs Face Greater Threat of Shareholder Activism Compared to Male CEOs? A Role Congruity Perspective. Journal of Applied Psychology, 103(2), 228–236.
He, Y., Kahraman, B., and Lowry, M., 2020, ES Risks and Shareholder Voice, Working Paper, European Corporate Governance Institute
Huang, J., and Kisgen, D.J., 2013, Gender and Corporate Finance: Are Male Executives Overconfident Relative to Female Executives? Journal of Financial Economics, 108(3), 822-839.
Jung, J.H., Kumar, A., and Lim, S.S., and Yoo, C.Y., 2019, An Analyst by Any Other Surname: Surname Favorability and Market Reaction to Analyst Forecasts. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 67(2)-67(3), 306-335.
Karpoff, J.M., 2001, The Impact of Shareholder Activism on Target Companies: A Survey of Empirical Findings, Working Paper, European Corporate Governance Institute
Karpoff, J.M., Malatesta, P.H., and Walkling, R.A., 1996. Corporate Governance and Shareholder Initiatives: Empirical Evidence. Journal of Financial Economics, 42(3),365-395.
Kumar, A., Niessen-Ruenzi, A., and Spalt, O.G., 2015, What`s in a Name? Mutual Fund Flows When Managers Have Foreign-Sounding Names. The Review of Financial Studies, 28(8), 2281–2321.
Matsa, D.A., and Miller, A.R., 2013, A Female Style in Corporate Leadership? Evidence from Quotas. American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 5(3), 136-69.
Matsusaka, J.G., Ozbas, O., and Yi, I., 2019. Opportunistic Proposals by Union Shareholders. The Review of Financial Studies, 32, 3215-3265.
Matsusaka, J.G., Ozbas, O., and Yi, I., 2021. Can Shareholder Proposals Hurt Shareholders? Evidence from SEC No-Action Letter Decisions. The Journal of Law and Economics, 64(1), 107-152.
McCahery, J.A., Sautner, Z., and Starks, L.T., 2016. Behind the Scenes: The Corporate Governance Preferences of Institutional Investors. The Journal of Finance, 71(6), 2905-2932.
Niederle, M., and Vesterlund, L., 2007, Do Women Shy Away from Competition? Do Men Compete Too Much? Quarterly Journal of Economics, 122(3), 1067-1101.
Niessen-Ruenzi, A., and Ruenzi, S., 2019, Sex Matters: Gender Bias in the Mutual Fund Industry. Management Science, 65(7), 3001-3025.
Petersen, M.A., 2009, Estimating Standard Errors in Finance Panel Data Sets: Comparing Approaches. The Review of Financial Studies, 22(1), 435-480.
Phelps, E.S., 1972, The Statistical Theory of Racism and Sexism. American Economic Review, 62(4), 659-661.
Prevost, A.K., and Rao, R.P., 2000, Of What Value Are Shareholder Proposals Sponsored by Public Pension Funds. The Journal of Business, 73(2), 177-204.
Renneboog, L., and Szilagyi, P.G., 2011, The Role of Shareholder Proposals in Corporate Governance. Journal of Corporate Finance, 17(1), 167-188.
Reuben, E., Sapienza, P., and Zingales, L., 2014. How Stereotypes Impair Women`s Careers in Science. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 111(12), 4403-4408.
Ryan, M.K., Haslam, S.A., Morgenroth, T., Rink, F., Stoker, J., and Peters, K., 2016. Getting on Top of the Glass Cliff: Reviewing a Decade of Evidence, Explanations, and Impact. The Leadership Quarterly, 27(3), 446-455.
Solnick, S.J., and Schweitzer, M.E., 1999. The Influence of Physical Attractiveness and Gender on Ultimatum Game Decisions. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 79(3), 199-215.
Stock, J.H., Wright, J.H., and Yogo, M., 2002. A Survey of Weak Instruments and Weak Identification in Generalized Method of Moments. Journal of Business & Economic Statistics, 20(4), 518-529.
Strine, L., 2014. Can We Do Better by Ordinary Investors? A Pragmatic Reaction to the Dueling Ideological Mythologists of Corporate Law. Columbia Law Review, 114(2), 449-502.
Tate, G., and Yang, L., 2015. Female Leadership and Gender Equity: Evidence from Plant Closure. Journal of Financial Economics, 117(1): 77-97.
Thomas, R.S., and Cotter, J.F., 2007, Shareholder Proposals in the New Millennium: Shareholder Support, Board Response, and Market Reaction. Journal of Corporate Finance, 13(2-3), 368-391.
World Economic Forum, 2018, The Global Gender Gap Report, available at: https://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_GGGR_2018.pdf
Wolfers, J., 2006, Did Unilateral Divorce Laws Raise Divorce Rates? A Reconciliation and New Results. American Economic Review, 96(5), 1802-1820.		zh_TW
dc.identifier.doi (DOI) 10.6814/NCCU202200446en_US