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題名 Merger simulation based on survey–generated diversion ratios
作者 胡偉民
Hu, Wei‐Min
Tsay, Wen-Jen
貢獻者 財政系
關鍵詞 Merger simulation; upward pricing pressure; diversion ratios
日期 2021-10
上傳時間 6-七月-2022 15:33:01 (UTC+8)
摘要 This research modifies the well-known three-stage merger simulation procedure of Nevo (2000) by replacing demand analysis in the first stage with survey-generated diversion ratios and own-price elasticities. We also provide a post-merger price formula under the scenario of two firms competing in the same relevant market and operating independently of the other firms in the relevant market. The same scenario is considered in upward pricing pressure (UPP) and commonly observed in most filing cases for mergers, where the competition enforcers can only have access to these two firms’ data most of the time. Since the formula is exact and requires only data on price and own-price elasticity of each firm and the diversion ratios between these two firms, our approach’s implementation cost is almost identical to that used in critical loss analysis, the diversion ratio, and UPP. The formula thus is informative and convenient for competition enforcement when dealing with merger cases.
關聯 European Competition Journal, pp.1-16
資料類型 article
DOI https://doi.org/10.1080/17441056.2021.1984012
dc.contributor 財政系
dc.creator (作者) 胡偉民
dc.creator (作者) Hu, Wei‐Min
dc.creator (作者) Tsay, Wen-Jen
dc.date (日期) 2021-10
dc.date.accessioned 6-七月-2022 15:33:01 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.available 6-七月-2022 15:33:01 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.issued (上傳時間) 6-七月-2022 15:33:01 (UTC+8)-
dc.identifier.uri (URI) http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/140808-
dc.description.abstract (摘要) This research modifies the well-known three-stage merger simulation procedure of Nevo (2000) by replacing demand analysis in the first stage with survey-generated diversion ratios and own-price elasticities. We also provide a post-merger price formula under the scenario of two firms competing in the same relevant market and operating independently of the other firms in the relevant market. The same scenario is considered in upward pricing pressure (UPP) and commonly observed in most filing cases for mergers, where the competition enforcers can only have access to these two firms’ data most of the time. Since the formula is exact and requires only data on price and own-price elasticity of each firm and the diversion ratios between these two firms, our approach’s implementation cost is almost identical to that used in critical loss analysis, the diversion ratio, and UPP. The formula thus is informative and convenient for competition enforcement when dealing with merger cases.
dc.format.extent 109 bytes-
dc.format.mimetype text/html-
dc.relation (關聯) European Competition Journal, pp.1-16
dc.subject (關鍵詞) Merger simulation; upward pricing pressure; diversion ratios
dc.title (題名) Merger simulation based on survey–generated diversion ratios
dc.type (資料類型) article
dc.identifier.doi (DOI) 10.1080/17441056.2021.1984012
dc.doi.uri (DOI) https://doi.org/10.1080/17441056.2021.1984012