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題名 Multiple Directorships and Audit Committee Effectiveness: Evidence from Effort Allocation
作者 俞洪昭
Yu, Hung-Chao
Liu, Xinming;Lobo, Gerald J.;Zheng, Zhen
貢獻者 會計系
關鍵詞 Audit committee; Audit fees; Auditor choice; Multiple directorship
日期 2023-10
上傳時間 7-七月-2022 14:50:23 (UTC+8)
摘要 Recent post-SOX studies have consistently found that the presence of audit committee (AC) directors with multiple directorships is associated with lower financial reporting quality. An implicit assumption of these studies is that AC directors distribute their effort equally across all their directorships. Using a firm size-based proxy and firm risk-based (i.e. probabilities of litigation and of misstatements) proxies to measure relative directorship importance, we investigate (1) whether and how AC directors who serve on multiple AC directorships allocate their effort to different directorships unequally, and (2) whether the unequal prioritization of effort across multiple AC directorships relates to AC monitoring effectiveness. We find a positive (no) relation between the risk-based (firm size-based) directorship importance measures and AC effectiveness, suggesting that AC directors serving on multiple boards unequally allocate their effort to different directorships based on incentives related to firm risk and not to firm size. Our results have relevance for regulators, boards of directors, investors, and other stakeholders.
關聯 European Accounting Review, Vol.32, No.5, pp.1273-1306
資料類型 article
DOI https://doi.org/10.1080/09638180.2022.2057346
dc.contributor 會計系-
dc.creator (作者) 俞洪昭-
dc.creator (作者) Yu, Hung-Chao-
dc.creator (作者) Liu, Xinming;Lobo, Gerald J.;Zheng, Zhen-
dc.date (日期) 2023-10-
dc.date.accessioned 7-七月-2022 14:50:23 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.available 7-七月-2022 14:50:23 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.issued (上傳時間) 7-七月-2022 14:50:23 (UTC+8)-
dc.identifier.uri (URI) http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/140839-
dc.description.abstract (摘要) Recent post-SOX studies have consistently found that the presence of audit committee (AC) directors with multiple directorships is associated with lower financial reporting quality. An implicit assumption of these studies is that AC directors distribute their effort equally across all their directorships. Using a firm size-based proxy and firm risk-based (i.e. probabilities of litigation and of misstatements) proxies to measure relative directorship importance, we investigate (1) whether and how AC directors who serve on multiple AC directorships allocate their effort to different directorships unequally, and (2) whether the unequal prioritization of effort across multiple AC directorships relates to AC monitoring effectiveness. We find a positive (no) relation between the risk-based (firm size-based) directorship importance measures and AC effectiveness, suggesting that AC directors serving on multiple boards unequally allocate their effort to different directorships based on incentives related to firm risk and not to firm size. Our results have relevance for regulators, boards of directors, investors, and other stakeholders.-
dc.format.extent 109 bytes-
dc.format.mimetype text/html-
dc.relation (關聯) European Accounting Review, Vol.32, No.5, pp.1273-1306-
dc.subject (關鍵詞) Audit committee; Audit fees; Auditor choice; Multiple directorship-
dc.title (題名) Multiple Directorships and Audit Committee Effectiveness: Evidence from Effort Allocation-
dc.type (資料類型) article-
dc.identifier.doi (DOI) 10.1080/09638180.2022.2057346-
dc.doi.uri (DOI) https://doi.org/10.1080/09638180.2022.2057346-