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題名 評估中國在東歐的影響力通過16+1機制 以羅馬尼亞、匈牙利和立陶宛為個案研究
Assessing China’s influence in Eastern Europe through the 16+1 Mechanism: A case study of Romania, Hungary and Lithuania作者 丹尼
Morar, Daniel Nicolae貢獻者 吳建輝
Wu, Chien-Huei
丹尼
Morar, Daniel Nicolae關鍵詞 16+1機制
中國
北約
中國-中東歐國家合作
16+1 mechanism
China
NATO
China-CEEC Cooperation日期 2024/07/14 上傳時間 5-八月-2024 13:00:59 (UTC+8) 摘要 本論文表明，中華人民共和國（PRC，或中國）利用16+1機制擴大其在歐洲影響力的努力目前尚未取得決定性成果，主要因為本文所選擇的三個研究對象中仍然有其中兩者對北大西洋公約組織（NATO）和美國（US）表現出依賴。本文的研究個案有三：選擇加強與中國關係的匈牙利、試圖在經濟夥伴關係和安全承諾之間取得平衡的羅馬尼亞、以及與中國保持距離的立陶宛。本文主要以外部和內部壓力為切入點，探究致使三國在作為其安全保障者的北約與作為其重要經濟夥伴的中國之間搖擺不定的原因，並認為三國所面臨到的不同內外壓力構成形塑了其不同的決策模式與自主性需求。透過比較歷史分析，本文重點分析了這三個國家為履行其安全承諾而必須做出的決定，以及他們在履行安全承諾的情況下所做的決定，並最終表明16+1機制對中東歐國家，特別是匈牙利、立陶宛和羅馬尼亞的外交政策、特別是安全承諾的影響微乎其微。
This thesis shows that the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC, or China) attempt of using the 16+1 mechanism to spread its influence in Europe has not yet succeeded; as two of the three countries analyzed here still show promising allegiance towards North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the United States (US). It will explain how external and domestic pressures made three countries of the 16+1 mechanism oscillate between NATO as their security guarantor and China as their promising economic partner. The thesis focuses on Hungary, which is strengthening its ties with China; Romania, which tries to balance its economic partnership and security commitments; and Lithuania, which is distancing itself from China. These countries are dynamic players that face a multitude of pressures from within and without. They have agency, and they build their relationship with China and NATO on their own. They are not just small passive players with no power in front of the Chinese influence. Through a comparative historical analysis, the thesis will present the decisions the three countries have to make in order to satisfy their security commitments. Also, the decisions they make despite their security commitments will be presented as well. This thesis shows that the impact of the 16+1 Mechanism on the foreign policy of the CEE countries, specifically on the security commitments of Hungary, Lithuania and Romania is negligible.參考文獻 Anušauskas, A. (2024). Lithuania’s 20th anniversary in NATO: from exhibitions to commemoration run on jet runway. Ministry of National Defense- Republic of Lithuania. Retrieved from https://kam.lt/en/lithuanias-20th-anniversary-in-nato-from-exhibitions-to-commemoration-run-on-jet-runway/ . Associated Press. (February, 2024). Timeline of Sweden’s bid to join the NATO alliance. Retrieved from https://apnews.com/article/sweden-turkey-nato-timeline-hungary-fe9560e80b1a43c4037eea7c6f5176bd. 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國立政治大學
亞太研究英語碩士學位學程(IMAS)
111926030資料來源 http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0111926030 資料類型 thesis dc.contributor.advisor 吳建輝 zh_TW dc.contributor.advisor Wu, Chien-Huei en_US dc.contributor.author (作者) 丹尼 zh_TW dc.contributor.author (作者) Morar, Daniel Nicolae en_US dc.creator (作者) 丹尼 zh_TW dc.creator (作者) Morar, Daniel Nicolae en_US dc.date (日期) 2024/07/14 en_US dc.date.accessioned 5-八月-2024 13:00:59 (UTC+8) - dc.date.available 5-八月-2024 13:00:59 (UTC+8) - dc.date.issued (上傳時間) 5-八月-2024 13:00:59 (UTC+8) - dc.identifier (其他 識別碼) G0111926030 en_US dc.identifier.uri (URI) https://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/152631 - dc.description (描述) 碩士 zh_TW dc.description (描述) 國立政治大學 zh_TW dc.description (描述) 亞太研究英語碩士學位學程(IMAS) zh_TW dc.description (描述) 111926030 zh_TW dc.description.abstract (摘要) 本論文表明，中華人民共和國（PRC，或中國）利用16+1機制擴大其在歐洲影響力的努力目前尚未取得決定性成果，主要因為本文所選擇的三個研究對象中仍然有其中兩者對北大西洋公約組織（NATO）和美國（US）表現出依賴。本文的研究個案有三：選擇加強與中國關係的匈牙利、試圖在經濟夥伴關係和安全承諾之間取得平衡的羅馬尼亞、以及與中國保持距離的立陶宛。本文主要以外部和內部壓力為切入點，探究致使三國在作為其安全保障者的北約與作為其重要經濟夥伴的中國之間搖擺不定的原因，並認為三國所面臨到的不同內外壓力構成形塑了其不同的決策模式與自主性需求。透過比較歷史分析，本文重點分析了這三個國家為履行其安全承諾而必須做出的決定，以及他們在履行安全承諾的情況下所做的決定，並最終表明16+1機制對中東歐國家，特別是匈牙利、立陶宛和羅馬尼亞的外交政策、特別是安全承諾的影響微乎其微。 zh_TW dc.description.abstract (摘要) This thesis shows that the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC, or China) attempt of using the 16+1 mechanism to spread its influence in Europe has not yet succeeded; as two of the three countries analyzed here still show promising allegiance towards North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the United States (US). It will explain how external and domestic pressures made three countries of the 16+1 mechanism oscillate between NATO as their security guarantor and China as their promising economic partner. The thesis focuses on Hungary, which is strengthening its ties with China; Romania, which tries to balance its economic partnership and security commitments; and Lithuania, which is distancing itself from China. These countries are dynamic players that face a multitude of pressures from within and without. They have agency, and they build their relationship with China and NATO on their own. They are not just small passive players with no power in front of the Chinese influence. Through a comparative historical analysis, the thesis will present the decisions the three countries have to make in order to satisfy their security commitments. Also, the decisions they make despite their security commitments will be presented as well. This thesis shows that the impact of the 16+1 Mechanism on the foreign policy of the CEE countries, specifically on the security commitments of Hungary, Lithuania and Romania is negligible. en_US dc.description.tableofcontents 1. INTRODUCTION: THE 16+1 MECHANISM 1 1.1 Background 1 1.2 State of affairs 4 1.3 Implications for security 11 1.4 Research question 14 2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 17 2.1 Popular theories and their limitations 17 2.1.1 Institutionalism and liberalism 18 2.1.2 Constructivism 19 2.1.3 Innenpolitik 20 2.1.4 Realism and neorealism 21 2.2 Neoclassical realism 22 3. METHODOLOGY 25 4.COMPARATIVE HISTORICAL ANALYSIS 29 4.1 ROMANIA 29 4.1.1 External pressures: Relations with China and NATO 29 4.1.2 Domestic pressure: political elites and public sentiment 45 4.2 HUNGARY 52 4.2.1 External pressures: Relations with China and NATO 52 4.2.2 Domestic pressures: Political elites and public sentiment 66 4.3 LITHUANIA 73 4.3.1 External pressures: Relations with China and NATO 73 4.3.2 Domestic pressures: Political elites and public sentiment 82 5. PATTERNS, TRENDS AND CONCLUSIONS 88 REFERENCES 95 zh_TW dc.format.extent 4675352 bytes - dc.format.mimetype application/pdf - dc.source.uri (資料來源) http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0111926030 en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) 16+1機制 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) 中國 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) 北約 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) 中國-中東歐國家合作 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) 16+1 mechanism en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) China en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) NATO en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) China-CEEC Cooperation en_US dc.title (題名) 評估中國在東歐的影響力通過16+1機制 以羅馬尼亞、匈牙利和立陶宛為個案研究 zh_TW dc.title (題名) Assessing China’s influence in Eastern Europe through the 16+1 Mechanism: A case study of Romania, Hungary and Lithuania en_US dc.type (資料類型) thesis en_US dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Anušauskas, A. (2024). Lithuania’s 20th anniversary in NATO: from exhibitions to commemoration run on jet runway. Ministry of National Defense- Republic of Lithuania. 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