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題名 貧困縣政策是否間接產生地方的財政濫用 —以中國汽車市場為例
Does the poverty alleviation policy indirectly lead to local fiscal abuse? —Evidence from Chinese automotive market作者 詹沐融
Chan, Mu-Jung貢獻者 胡偉民<br>黃柏鈞
Hu, Wei-Min<br>Huang, Po-Chun
詹沐融
Chan, Mu-Jung關鍵詞 貧困縣政策
財政貪腐
雙重差分法
Poverty alleviation policies
Corruption
Difference-in-difference method日期 2024 上傳時間 5-八月-2024 14:46:22 (UTC+8) 摘要 據聯合國2015年通過的永續發展目標（SDGs）所述，全球領導人被要求在2030年前消除貧窮。然而，貪腐可能成為實現此目標的重要障礙，因為貪腐不僅會阻礙經濟發展，還可能加劇政治和社會的不穩定。儘管中國在2020年提前宣布實現全面脫貧，擺脫了絕對貧窮，然而有許多報導揭露了貧困縣可能存在貪腐問題，這也引發了民眾的不滿。本研究旨在探討貧困縣政策的灰色地帶，以觀察是否有證據證實這種現象的存在。 本研究以中國40多年的貧困縣政策作為研究主題，將第三次貧困縣調整視為政策時間節點，探討「近貧困縣」在升格為國家級貧困縣後，獲得大量財政扶持資金是否會影響其原有行為。我們從汽車市場的角度切入，利用雙重差分法(Difference-in-Difference)結合傾向分數配對法(PSM)、反向機率加權法(IPW)進行估計。結果顯示，實驗組相對於對照組顯著增加了對公務用車的購買，且更偏好購買進口車系和非中央政府規定的車型，這些跡象顯示出了地方政府存在財政濫用的證據。另外，我們也在穩健性測試中使用了PSM搭配Synthetic Difference-in-Difference的方法(Arkhangelsky et al.2021)，結果也十分穩健，各種情形下也滿足了平行趨勢。研究的結論指出，上級的移轉支付可能導致地方產生財政濫用，尤其是隱性濫用。
The Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), adopted by the United Nations in 2015, call on world leaders to eradicate poverty by 2030. However, corruption poses a significant challenge to achieving this goal, as it hampers economic development, exacerbates poverty, and intensifies political and social instability. Although China declared complete eradication of absolute poverty ahead of schedule in 2020, there continue to be reports of corruption in poverty-stricken counties. This study explores the grey areas of corruption in poverty-stricken counties and investigates empirically whether there is evidence to support the occurrence of this phenomenon. Drawing on China's poverty alleviation policies spanning over 40 years, this study focuses on the third adjustment of poverty-stricken counties as the policy time point. We evaluate whether the behavior of "near-poverty counties" changes after they become National Poor Counties (hereafter NPCs) and receive significant financial support. Taking the perspective of the automotive market, we employ the Difference-in-Difference (DID) method combined with Propensity Score Matching (PSM) and Inverse Probability Weighting (IPW) to estimate the main results. We find that the treatment group significantly purchases more official vehicles compared to the control group. Additionally, they prefer to purchase imported car series and models not mandated by the central government, indirectly indicating evidence of local government financial misuse. Furthermore, in robustness tests, we use PSM combined with the Synthetic Difference-in-Difference method (Arkhangelsky et al., 2021), and consistently find results aligning with the main findings, with all scenarios passing the parallel trends test. This result suggests that transfers from higher levels of government may lead to fiscal abuse at the local level, particularly in the form of implicit misuse.參考文獻 陳剛, 李樹, & 尹希果. (2008). 腐敗與中國經濟增長——實證主義的視角. 經濟社會體制比較, 3, 59–68. https://doi.org/10.3969/j.issn.1003-3947.2008.03.010 仇童偉, & 彭嫦燕. (2023). 脫貧摘帽的經濟影響及財政扶持績效——來自中國地方政府財政預決算的證據. 中國經濟學, 1(5), 104-139. 馮振強. (2016). 貪腐原因探究. 中外企業家, 4X, 253–254. 何強. (2016). 國家級貧困縣都出了哪些巨貪. 雜文選刊：上半月, 6, 56–57. 黃志平. (2018). 國家級貧困縣的設立推動了當地經濟發展嗎?——基於 PSM-DID 方法的實證研究. 中國農村經濟, 5, 98–111. 人民網. (2018, January 14). 貧困縣成為扶貧貪腐重災區 村幹部違紀縣紀委壓案不辦. http://politics.people.com.cn/BIG5/n1/2018/0114/c1001-29763187.html 人民網. (2019, July 30). 主政深度貧困縣五年受賄1400多萬. http://fanfu.people.com.cn/BIG5/n1/2019/0730/c64371-31264329.html 宋小寧, & 佟健. (2013). 財政轉移支付資金被濫用的原因分析. 經濟經緯, 3, 141–144. 王煥剛, 張程, & 聶常虹. (2021). 我國扶貧政策演進歷程與農村社會的多維度變遷: 分析與啟示. 中國科學院院刊, 36(7), 787-796. 謝來位. (2014). 推進公務用車管理改革的對策研究. 理論與改革, 2, 88–91. 嚴仍昱. (2013). “三公經費”公開：意義、現狀及完善——以中央部門“三公經費”公開為例. 廣州大學學報（社會科學版）, 12(6), 12–16. 周浩. (2012). “三公經費”管理存在的問題及對策. 交通財會, 6, 35–38. https://doi.org/10.3969/j.issn.1005-9016.2012.06.012 袁飛, 陶然, 徐志剛, & 劉明興. (2008). 財政集權過程中的轉移支付和財政供養人 口規模膨脹. 經濟研究, 5, 70–80. 徐彥平. (2014). 國家貧困縣政策改革的路徑依賴及其破解之道. 理論導刊, 9, 14–16. 宣講家網. (2014, February 27). 為什麼爭當貧困縣？http://www.71.cn/2014/0227/760403.shtml 環球網. (2015, October 09). 審計署公告：廣西部分貧困縣「窮人」買車2645輛. https://china.huanqiu.com/article/9CaKrn 王愛雲.（2019）. 改革開放40年中國農村扶貧開發歷程與經驗.泰山學院學報， 41（1）， 1–19. https://doi.org/10.3969/j.issn.1672-2590.2019.01.002 Angrist, J. D., Angrist, J. D., & Jörn-Steffen Pischke. (2008). Mostly harmless econometrics: An empiricist’s companion. (1st ed., pp. 1–373). Princeton University Press. https://doi.org/10.1515/9781400829828 Abadie, A., & Vives-i-Bastida, J. (2022). Synthetic controls in action. https://doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.2203.06279 Arkhangelsky, D., Athey, S., Hirshberg, D. A., Imbens, G. W., & Wager, S. (2021). Synthetic difference-in-differences. American Economic Review, 111(12), 4088–4118. Austin, P. C., & Stuart, E. A. (2015). Moving towards best practice when using inverse probability of treatment weighting (IPTW) using the propensity score to estimate causal treatment effects in observational studies. Statistics in Medicine, 34(28), 3661–3679. https://doi.org/10.1002/sim.6607 Arce, J. S. S. (2016). The political logic of poverty relief: Electoral strategies and social policy in Mexico. Foro Internacional, 56(4), 1160-. Brollo, F. (2010). The political resource curse (Issue w15705). SSRN. Clarke, D., Pailañir, D., Athey, S., & Imbens, G. (2023). Synthetic difference in differences estimation. arXiv.Org. https://doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.2301.11859 de Kadt, D., & Lieberman, E. S. (n.d.). Do citizens reward good service? Voter responses to basic service provision in Southern Africa. SSRN Electronic Journal. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2668334 Imbens, G., & Rubin, D. B. (2015). Causal inference for statistics, social, and biomedical sciences : an introduction / Guido W. Imbens (Stanford University), Donald B. Rubin (Harvard University). Cambridge University Press. Jacobs, A. (2013, March 27). Elite in China face austerity under Xi’s rule. The New York Times. Nwabuzor, A. (2005). Corruption and development: New initiatives in economic openness and strengthened rule of law. Journal of Business Ethics, 59(1–2), 121–138. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10551-005-3402-3 Qian, N., & Wen, J. Y. (2015). The impact of Xi Jinping's anti-corruption campaign on luxury imports in China (Preliminary draft). Qin, C., & Chong, T. T. L. (2018). Can poverty be alleviated in China? The Review of Income and Wealth, 64(1), 192–212. https://doi.org/10.1111/roiw.12273 Quah, D. (2003). One third of the world’s growth and inequality. In T. S. Eicher & S. J. Turnovsky (Eds.), Growth and inequality: Issues and policy implications. The CESifo Seminar Series. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press. Rosenbaum, P. R., & Rubin, D. B. (1985). Constructing a control group using multivariate matched sampling methods that incorporate the propensity score. The American Statistician, 39(1), 33-. https://doi.org/10.2307/2683903 Wang, K. (2022). Does poverty relief breed corruption? An evaluation of China’s poverty alleviation program. Chinese Journal of Political Science, 27(2), 341–374. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11366-021-09785-w 描述 碩士
國立政治大學
財政學系
111255025資料來源 http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0111255025 資料類型 thesis dc.contributor.advisor 胡偉民<br>黃柏鈞 zh_TW dc.contributor.advisor Hu, Wei-Min<br>Huang, Po-Chun en_US dc.contributor.author (作者) 詹沐融 zh_TW dc.contributor.author (作者) Chan, Mu-Jung en_US dc.creator (作者) 詹沐融 zh_TW dc.creator (作者) Chan, Mu-Jung en_US dc.date (日期) 2024 en_US dc.date.accessioned 5-八月-2024 14:46:22 (UTC+8) - dc.date.available 5-八月-2024 14:46:22 (UTC+8) - dc.date.issued (上傳時間) 5-八月-2024 14:46:22 (UTC+8) - dc.identifier (其他 識別碼) G0111255025 en_US dc.identifier.uri (URI) https://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/152913 - dc.description (描述) 碩士 zh_TW dc.description (描述) 國立政治大學 zh_TW dc.description (描述) 財政學系 zh_TW dc.description (描述) 111255025 zh_TW dc.description.abstract (摘要) 據聯合國2015年通過的永續發展目標（SDGs）所述，全球領導人被要求在2030年前消除貧窮。然而，貪腐可能成為實現此目標的重要障礙，因為貪腐不僅會阻礙經濟發展，還可能加劇政治和社會的不穩定。儘管中國在2020年提前宣布實現全面脫貧，擺脫了絕對貧窮，然而有許多報導揭露了貧困縣可能存在貪腐問題，這也引發了民眾的不滿。本研究旨在探討貧困縣政策的灰色地帶，以觀察是否有證據證實這種現象的存在。 本研究以中國40多年的貧困縣政策作為研究主題，將第三次貧困縣調整視為政策時間節點，探討「近貧困縣」在升格為國家級貧困縣後，獲得大量財政扶持資金是否會影響其原有行為。我們從汽車市場的角度切入，利用雙重差分法(Difference-in-Difference)結合傾向分數配對法(PSM)、反向機率加權法(IPW)進行估計。結果顯示，實驗組相對於對照組顯著增加了對公務用車的購買，且更偏好購買進口車系和非中央政府規定的車型，這些跡象顯示出了地方政府存在財政濫用的證據。另外，我們也在穩健性測試中使用了PSM搭配Synthetic Difference-in-Difference的方法(Arkhangelsky et al.2021)，結果也十分穩健，各種情形下也滿足了平行趨勢。研究的結論指出，上級的移轉支付可能導致地方產生財政濫用，尤其是隱性濫用。 zh_TW dc.description.abstract (摘要) The Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), adopted by the United Nations in 2015, call on world leaders to eradicate poverty by 2030. However, corruption poses a significant challenge to achieving this goal, as it hampers economic development, exacerbates poverty, and intensifies political and social instability. Although China declared complete eradication of absolute poverty ahead of schedule in 2020, there continue to be reports of corruption in poverty-stricken counties. This study explores the grey areas of corruption in poverty-stricken counties and investigates empirically whether there is evidence to support the occurrence of this phenomenon. Drawing on China's poverty alleviation policies spanning over 40 years, this study focuses on the third adjustment of poverty-stricken counties as the policy time point. We evaluate whether the behavior of "near-poverty counties" changes after they become National Poor Counties (hereafter NPCs) and receive significant financial support. Taking the perspective of the automotive market, we employ the Difference-in-Difference (DID) method combined with Propensity Score Matching (PSM) and Inverse Probability Weighting (IPW) to estimate the main results. We find that the treatment group significantly purchases more official vehicles compared to the control group. Additionally, they prefer to purchase imported car series and models not mandated by the central government, indirectly indicating evidence of local government financial misuse. Furthermore, in robustness tests, we use PSM combined with the Synthetic Difference-in-Difference method (Arkhangelsky et al., 2021), and consistently find results aligning with the main findings, with all scenarios passing the parallel trends test. This result suggests that transfers from higher levels of government may lead to fiscal abuse at the local level, particularly in the form of implicit misuse. en_US dc.description.tableofcontents 第一章 緒論 1 第一節 研究背景與動機 1 第二節 研究目的 3 第三節 研究流程 3 第二章 文獻回顧 4 第三章 相關政策介紹 7 第一節 中國貧困縣政策沿革 7 第二節 中國大陸公務車改革政策 9 第四章 實證模型與資料分析 11 第一節 實證模型 11 第二節 資料來源及處理 15 第三節 變數選取 16 第四節 變數選取與敘述統計 18 第五章 實證結果 23 第一節 實證分析 23 第二節 平行趨勢檢定 27 第三節 穩健性分析 33 第六章 結論 36 第一節 研究結論 36 第二節 研究限制 37 第七章 參考文獻 38 zh_TW dc.format.extent 1451520 bytes - dc.format.mimetype application/pdf - dc.source.uri (資料來源) http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0111255025 en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) 貧困縣政策 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) 財政貪腐 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) 雙重差分法 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) Poverty alleviation policies en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) Corruption en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) Difference-in-difference method en_US dc.title (題名) 貧困縣政策是否間接產生地方的財政濫用 —以中國汽車市場為例 zh_TW dc.title (題名) Does the poverty alleviation policy indirectly lead to local fiscal abuse? —Evidence from Chinese automotive market en_US dc.type (資料類型) thesis en_US dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) 陳剛, 李樹, & 尹希果. (2008). 腐敗與中國經濟增長——實證主義的視角. 經濟社會體制比較, 3, 59–68. https://doi.org/10.3969/j.issn.1003-3947.2008.03.010 仇童偉, & 彭嫦燕. (2023). 脫貧摘帽的經濟影響及財政扶持績效——來自中國地方政府財政預決算的證據. 中國經濟學, 1(5), 104-139. 馮振強. (2016). 貪腐原因探究. 中外企業家, 4X, 253–254. 何強. (2016). 國家級貧困縣都出了哪些巨貪. 雜文選刊：上半月, 6, 56–57. 黃志平. (2018). 國家級貧困縣的設立推動了當地經濟發展嗎?——基於 PSM-DID 方法的實證研究. 中國農村經濟, 5, 98–111. 人民網. (2018, January 14). 貧困縣成為扶貧貪腐重災區 村幹部違紀縣紀委壓案不辦. http://politics.people.com.cn/BIG5/n1/2018/0114/c1001-29763187.html 人民網. (2019, July 30). 主政深度貧困縣五年受賄1400多萬. http://fanfu.people.com.cn/BIG5/n1/2019/0730/c64371-31264329.html 宋小寧, & 佟健. (2013). 財政轉移支付資金被濫用的原因分析. 經濟經緯, 3, 141–144. 王煥剛, 張程, & 聶常虹. (2021). 我國扶貧政策演進歷程與農村社會的多維度變遷: 分析與啟示. 中國科學院院刊, 36(7), 787-796. 謝來位. (2014). 推進公務用車管理改革的對策研究. 理論與改革, 2, 88–91. 嚴仍昱. (2013). “三公經費”公開：意義、現狀及完善——以中央部門“三公經費”公開為例. 廣州大學學報（社會科學版）, 12(6), 12–16. 周浩. (2012). “三公經費”管理存在的問題及對策. 交通財會, 6, 35–38. https://doi.org/10.3969/j.issn.1005-9016.2012.06.012 袁飛, 陶然, 徐志剛, & 劉明興. (2008). 財政集權過程中的轉移支付和財政供養人 口規模膨脹. 經濟研究, 5, 70–80. 徐彥平. (2014). 國家貧困縣政策改革的路徑依賴及其破解之道. 理論導刊, 9, 14–16. 宣講家網. (2014, February 27). 為什麼爭當貧困縣？http://www.71.cn/2014/0227/760403.shtml 環球網. (2015, October 09). 審計署公告：廣西部分貧困縣「窮人」買車2645輛. https://china.huanqiu.com/article/9CaKrn 王愛雲.（2019）. 改革開放40年中國農村扶貧開發歷程與經驗.泰山學院學報， 41（1）， 1–19. https://doi.org/10.3969/j.issn.1672-2590.2019.01.002 Angrist, J. D., Angrist, J. D., & Jörn-Steffen Pischke. (2008). Mostly harmless econometrics: An empiricist’s companion. (1st ed., pp. 1–373). Princeton University Press. https://doi.org/10.1515/9781400829828 Abadie, A., & Vives-i-Bastida, J. (2022). Synthetic controls in action. https://doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.2203.06279 Arkhangelsky, D., Athey, S., Hirshberg, D. A., Imbens, G. W., & Wager, S. (2021). Synthetic difference-in-differences. American Economic Review, 111(12), 4088–4118. Austin, P. C., & Stuart, E. A. (2015). Moving towards best practice when using inverse probability of treatment weighting (IPTW) using the propensity score to estimate causal treatment effects in observational studies. Statistics in Medicine, 34(28), 3661–3679. https://doi.org/10.1002/sim.6607 Arce, J. S. S. (2016). The political logic of poverty relief: Electoral strategies and social policy in Mexico. Foro Internacional, 56(4), 1160-. Brollo, F. (2010). The political resource curse (Issue w15705). SSRN. Clarke, D., Pailañir, D., Athey, S., & Imbens, G. (2023). Synthetic difference in differences estimation. arXiv.Org. https://doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.2301.11859 de Kadt, D., & Lieberman, E. S. (n.d.). Do citizens reward good service? Voter responses to basic service provision in Southern Africa. SSRN Electronic Journal. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2668334 Imbens, G., & Rubin, D. B. (2015). Causal inference for statistics, social, and biomedical sciences : an introduction / Guido W. Imbens (Stanford University), Donald B. Rubin (Harvard University). Cambridge University Press. Jacobs, A. (2013, March 27). Elite in China face austerity under Xi’s rule. The New York Times. Nwabuzor, A. (2005). Corruption and development: New initiatives in economic openness and strengthened rule of law. Journal of Business Ethics, 59(1–2), 121–138. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10551-005-3402-3 Qian, N., & Wen, J. Y. (2015). The impact of Xi Jinping's anti-corruption campaign on luxury imports in China (Preliminary draft). Qin, C., & Chong, T. T. L. (2018). Can poverty be alleviated in China? The Review of Income and Wealth, 64(1), 192–212. https://doi.org/10.1111/roiw.12273 Quah, D. (2003). One third of the world’s growth and inequality. In T. S. Eicher & S. J. Turnovsky (Eds.), Growth and inequality: Issues and policy implications. The CESifo Seminar Series. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press. Rosenbaum, P. R., & Rubin, D. B. (1985). Constructing a control group using multivariate matched sampling methods that incorporate the propensity score. The American Statistician, 39(1), 33-. https://doi.org/10.2307/2683903 Wang, K. (2022). Does poverty relief breed corruption? An evaluation of China’s poverty alleviation program. Chinese Journal of Political Science, 27(2), 341–374. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11366-021-09785-w zh_TW
