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題名 意識的注意力結構
The Attentional Structure of Consciousness作者 鄭會穎 貢獻者 哲學系 關鍵詞 意識; 注意力; 資訊; 表徵內容
Consciousness; Attention; Information; Representational Content日期 2023-12 上傳時間 15-八月-2024 09:04:29 (UTC+8) 摘要 許多哲學家會同意關於意識的議題是當代心靈哲學中最棘手的問題。表徵主義者所提倡的著名的「自然化心靈」方案主張先把表徵或是意向性內容化約到自然世界(因為似乎相對容易)，再把意識化約到意向性內容。無論此方案成功與否，自上個世紀的最後二三十年以來，去了解意識的本性以及結構是心靈哲學家的其中一個主要目標。 然而大致在同一個時期，自然科學家們對於意識相關的問題通常持著很不一樣的態度。基本上，意識被當作一個禁忌的研究題目，因為對意識給出一個經驗上能被接受的操作型定義是十分困難甚至是接近不可能的。因此心理學家以及認知神經科學家在相關的領域主要研究注意力：在這背後的想法是意識與注意力彼此緊密相互關聯，所以注意力可以暫時被當作意識的替代研究對象。我們注意到什麼似乎就是和意識到什麼是一樣的。 而在上個世紀的最後，經驗科學家開始對意識重新燃起了興趣。著名的科學家潘洛斯(Roger Penrose)以及克里克(Francis Crick)都對意識的本性提出了大膽的假設。其後許多神經科學家們也開始對意識現象進行實驗測試。基於此情況，釐清意識與注意力之間的關係就變得急迫。如果它們雖不等同但彼此緊密關聯，那麼它們之間的關係究竟為何？ 為了在這個領域中進行更深入的了解，在此計畫中我們會進行六個子題，而其中大部分會被發展為單一的期刊文章或是專書篇章：1) 「刻畫現象意識」，解析許多意識的概念，特別是現象意識；2) 「注意力的形上學與功能」，探索注意力現象的本性及其神經基礎，並討論注意力的各種功能及其相互關係；3) 「意識對注意力是充分的嗎？」論證此問題否定的答案；4) 「注意力對意識是充分的嗎？」亦論證此問題否定的答案；5) 「注意力、意識、與意向性」，探詢意識的注意力結構並發展相關的意向性理論；最後6) 「理由空間中的現象意向性」詳述相關的表徵內容之知識論意涵。
Many if not most philosophers would agree that issues concerning consciousness are the most recalcitrant ones in contemporary philosophy of mind. The prominent “naturalising the mind” project, let by Fred Dretske, Michael Tye, and other representationalists, aims to first reduce representational content or intentionality to nature, which seems to be relatively easier, and then reduce consciousness to intentionality. No matter whether this can be done, understanding the nature and structure of consciousness has been one prime aim for philosophers of mind since the final two or three decades of the previous century. During that same period of time, however, natural scientists tended to hold a different attitude towards issues concerning consciousness. Basically, consciousness was regarded as a taboo since it was difficult if not impossible to give an empirically respectable operationalisation of consciousness. Therefore psychologists and cognitive neuroscientists studied attention instead: the underlying idea is that attention can act as a surrogate of consciousness since they are so intimately connected. What one is attending is coextensive with what one is conscious of, or so it might seem. Towards the end of the previous century, empirical researchers regained their interests in consciousness. Renowned scientists such as Roger Penrose and Francis Crick put forward their bold hypotheses concerning the nature of consciousness. Later well-regarded neuroscientists such as Christof Koch and Antonio Damasio began to test consciousness empirically. Given this wave, it became urgent to get clear about the relations between consciousness and attention. If they are intimately connected though non-identical, what is the relation exactly? In order to make progress in this area, this project will pursue the following six sub-topics, most of which will be developed into one published paper or book chapter: 1) “characterising phenomenal consciousness,” where various notions of consciousness will be explicated with an emphasis on the phenomenal version; 2) “the metaphysics and functions of attention,” where the natures of attentional phenomena and their neurological basis will be explored, and various functions of attention will be explained and there relations specified; 3) “is consciousness sufficient for attention?” where a negative answer will be argued; 4) “is attention sufficient for consciousness?” where again a negative answer will be argued; 5) “attention, consciousness, and intentionality,” where the attentional structure of consciousness will be mapped and how this can deliver representational content will be developed; And finally 6) “phenomenal intentionality in the space of reasons,” where the epistemic import of the relevant representational content will be elaborated.關聯 科技部, MOST109-2410-H004-006-MY3, 109.05-112.04 資料類型 report dc.contributor 哲學系 dc.creator (作者) 鄭會穎 dc.date (日期) 2023-12 dc.date.accessioned 15-八月-2024 09:04:29 (UTC+8) - dc.date.available 15-八月-2024 09:04:29 (UTC+8) - dc.date.issued (上傳時間) 15-八月-2024 09:04:29 (UTC+8) - dc.identifier.uri (URI) https://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/153031 - dc.description.abstract (摘要) 許多哲學家會同意關於意識的議題是當代心靈哲學中最棘手的問題。表徵主義者所提倡的著名的「自然化心靈」方案主張先把表徵或是意向性內容化約到自然世界(因為似乎相對容易)，再把意識化約到意向性內容。無論此方案成功與否，自上個世紀的最後二三十年以來，去了解意識的本性以及結構是心靈哲學家的其中一個主要目標。 然而大致在同一個時期，自然科學家們對於意識相關的問題通常持著很不一樣的態度。基本上，意識被當作一個禁忌的研究題目，因為對意識給出一個經驗上能被接受的操作型定義是十分困難甚至是接近不可能的。因此心理學家以及認知神經科學家在相關的領域主要研究注意力：在這背後的想法是意識與注意力彼此緊密相互關聯，所以注意力可以暫時被當作意識的替代研究對象。我們注意到什麼似乎就是和意識到什麼是一樣的。 而在上個世紀的最後，經驗科學家開始對意識重新燃起了興趣。著名的科學家潘洛斯(Roger Penrose)以及克里克(Francis Crick)都對意識的本性提出了大膽的假設。其後許多神經科學家們也開始對意識現象進行實驗測試。基於此情況，釐清意識與注意力之間的關係就變得急迫。如果它們雖不等同但彼此緊密關聯，那麼它們之間的關係究竟為何？ 為了在這個領域中進行更深入的了解，在此計畫中我們會進行六個子題，而其中大部分會被發展為單一的期刊文章或是專書篇章：1) 「刻畫現象意識」，解析許多意識的概念，特別是現象意識；2) 「注意力的形上學與功能」，探索注意力現象的本性及其神經基礎，並討論注意力的各種功能及其相互關係；3) 「意識對注意力是充分的嗎？」論證此問題否定的答案；4) 「注意力對意識是充分的嗎？」亦論證此問題否定的答案；5) 「注意力、意識、與意向性」，探詢意識的注意力結構並發展相關的意向性理論；最後6) 「理由空間中的現象意向性」詳述相關的表徵內容之知識論意涵。 dc.description.abstract (摘要) Many if not most philosophers would agree that issues concerning consciousness are the most recalcitrant ones in contemporary philosophy of mind. The prominent “naturalising the mind” project, let by Fred Dretske, Michael Tye, and other representationalists, aims to first reduce representational content or intentionality to nature, which seems to be relatively easier, and then reduce consciousness to intentionality. No matter whether this can be done, understanding the nature and structure of consciousness has been one prime aim for philosophers of mind since the final two or three decades of the previous century. During that same period of time, however, natural scientists tended to hold a different attitude towards issues concerning consciousness. Basically, consciousness was regarded as a taboo since it was difficult if not impossible to give an empirically respectable operationalisation of consciousness. Therefore psychologists and cognitive neuroscientists studied attention instead: the underlying idea is that attention can act as a surrogate of consciousness since they are so intimately connected. What one is attending is coextensive with what one is conscious of, or so it might seem. Towards the end of the previous century, empirical researchers regained their interests in consciousness. Renowned scientists such as Roger Penrose and Francis Crick put forward their bold hypotheses concerning the nature of consciousness. Later well-regarded neuroscientists such as Christof Koch and Antonio Damasio began to test consciousness empirically. Given this wave, it became urgent to get clear about the relations between consciousness and attention. If they are intimately connected though non-identical, what is the relation exactly? In order to make progress in this area, this project will pursue the following six sub-topics, most of which will be developed into one published paper or book chapter: 1) “characterising phenomenal consciousness,” where various notions of consciousness will be explicated with an emphasis on the phenomenal version; 2) “the metaphysics and functions of attention,” where the natures of attentional phenomena and their neurological basis will be explored, and various functions of attention will be explained and there relations specified; 3) “is consciousness sufficient for attention?” where a negative answer will be argued; 4) “is attention sufficient for consciousness?” where again a negative answer will be argued; 5) “attention, consciousness, and intentionality,” where the attentional structure of consciousness will be mapped and how this can deliver representational content will be developed; And finally 6) “phenomenal intentionality in the space of reasons,” where the epistemic import of the relevant representational content will be elaborated. dc.format.extent 116 bytes - dc.format.mimetype text/html - dc.relation (關聯) 科技部, MOST109-2410-H004-006-MY3, 109.05-112.04 dc.subject (關鍵詞) 意識; 注意力; 資訊; 表徵內容 dc.subject (關鍵詞) Consciousness; Attention; Information; Representational Content dc.title (題名) 意識的注意力結構 dc.title (題名) The Attentional Structure of Consciousness dc.type (資料類型) report
