1. NCCU Academic Hub
  2. Publications
  3. College of Social Science
  4. Theses
  5. Item

Publications-Theses

Article View/Open

Publication Export

Google ScholarTM

NCCU Library

Citation Infomation

Related Publications in TAIR

題名 臺灣地方首長選舉對於地方政府稅收預估的影響
The Impact of Local Government Elections on Tax Revenue Forecast in Taiwan
作者 曾庭琳
Tzeng, Ting-Lin
貢獻者 陳國樑<br>羅時萬
曾庭琳
Tzeng, Ting-Lin
關鍵詞 地方財政
稅收預測
政府預算
政治預測循環
Local public finance
Tax revenue forecasts
Government budget
Political forecast cycle
日期 2024
上傳時間 4-Sep-2024 14:44:53 (UTC+8)
摘要 政府會根據收入預算數決定支出數額，因此收入的預測對政府財政政策的擬定具有決定性的影響。而稅課收入為政府收入的最主要來源，無論稅收被高估或是低估，失準的稅收估計都會影響政府施政。當稅收預測低估時，將限縮國家的資源規劃，並阻礙政策的推動；相反地，當稅收預測經常性地高估時，政府須以舉債彌補實際收入數不足之處，然而日漸增加的債務將使得政府財政結構更為脆弱。因此如何提升稅收預測準確性，對於國家財政而言係值得重視的課題。 國內在稅收預測的討論聚焦於中央政府的預測技術，不僅地方政府的分析付之闕如，且近年來許多國際文獻指出，地方政府基於政治因素，會刻意操縱預測結果，然而國內關於影響稅收預測因素的研究亦相當有限。因此，本研究蒐集臺灣地方政府民國90年至民國111年之地方政府資料，利用固定效果模型和工具變數法，檢視分析臺灣地方首長選舉對於地方政府稅收預估的影響。 迴歸結果顯示，臺灣地方政府在選舉年會顯著高估稅收預算，透過擴大政府支出，以期能提高勝選的機會。此外，本研究也發現在選舉年時，財政自主程度越高的地方政府，由於在稅收編列上具有更大的操控空間，越容易高估稅收。本研究也分別探討各稅目的預測情形，發現選舉年高估的現象主要來自土地增值稅、房屋稅、使用牌照稅。進一步分析選舉前一年及選舉後一年對於稅收預測誤差的影響，並未發現臺灣地方政府在選舉前一年有顯著的效果；反之，在選舉後一年時，則存在顯著稅收高估，但其高估程度小於選舉年，可能是由於選民已不能透過選票來影響執政者，因此使執政者降低高估預算的動機。
The government determines expenditure levels based on budget revenue; thus, forecasted revenues have a crucial effect on fiscal policy. Tax revenues constitute the primary source of government income, and regardless of whether taxes are overestimated or underestimated, inaccurate tax estimates impact governmental operations. Underestimations constrain national resource planning and policy implementation. In contrast, frequent overestimation of tax forecasts requires the government to cover the shortfall through borrowing, progressively weakening the fiscal framework with mounting debt. Therefore, enhancing tax forecasting accuracy is critical for effective fiscal management. Domestic discussions on tax revenue forecasts primarily focus on the forecasting techniques of the central government. There is a notable lack of analysis from local governments, and recent international literature suggests that local governments may intentionally manipulate forecast results due to political considerations. Additionally, research within the country regarding the factors influencing tax revenue forecasts is relatively sparse. Therefore, this study collects data from local governments in Taiwan for the period 2001–2022, employing fixed effects models and the instrumental variable method to examine the impact of local government elections on tax revenue projections. The results indicate that local governments in Taiwan tend to overestimate tax revenue during election years and expand spending to increase their probability of reelection. In addition, we find that local governments with greater fiscal autonomy, which has a greater margin of maneuver lead to more optimistic forecasts in election years. This study also identifies that overestimation in election years primarily stems from land value increment tax, house taxes, and vehicle license tax. Analyzing forecast errors pre- and post-election in local governments reveals no significant effects in pre-election years. In contrast, there is significant overestimation in post-election years, though it is less than during election years, possibly because voters no longer hold sway over policymakers through voting, reducing the incentive for manipulating their tax estimate.
參考文獻 王鼎銘 (2006)，「政治與經濟間的交錯：政治景氣循環理論的發展評析」，《公共行政學報》，20，161–172。 古坤榮、林全與鄭光甫 (1998)，「臺灣地區綜合所得稅收入預測方法之研究」，《國家科學委員會研究彙刊：人文及社會科學》，8(2)，276–287。 石恩銘與陳國樑 (2023)，「稅收超徵的財政紀律觀點與解決問題之道」，《月旦財稅實務釋評》，38，8–18。 石恩銘、伍大開、陳國樑與黃勢璋，「財政管理機制之效果分析」，《人文及社會科學集刊》，即將發表。 陳致綱與郭炳伸 (2011)，「固定效果動態追蹤資料模型之估計與推論-二階差分動差法」，《經濟論文》，39(4)，401–438。 陳思穎 (2015)，《臺灣地方政府歲入估測之研究》，碩士論文，國立臺灣大學政治學系。 陳國樑 (2023)，「稅收超徵的解方」，《聯合報》名人Talks，2023年1月12日。 陳聽安與陳國樑 (2017)，「稅收超徵？是短估！」，《聯合報》民意論壇，2017年12月18日。 傅彥凱 (2006)，「地方政府預算制定之政治經濟分析：政治預算循環的觀點」，《選舉研究》，13(1)，119–162。 楊佩烜 (2019)，「臺灣稅收預測表現之探討」，《人文及社會科學集刊》， 32(2)，271–319。 蘇彩足 (2002)，「臺灣地區縣市政府歲入估測之研究」，國家科學委員會專題研究計畫。 Aidt, T., F. J. Veiga, and L. G. Veiga (2011), “Election Results and Opportunistic Policies: A New Test of the Rational Political Business Cycle Model,” Public Choice, 148(1–2), 21–44. Alesina, A. and A. Drazen (1991), “Why Are Stabilizations Delayed?” American Economic Review, 81(5), 1170–1188. Allers, M., J. de Haan, and C. Sterks (2001), “Partisan Influence on the Local Tax Burden in the Netherlands,” Public Choice, 106(3–4), 351–363. Arbatli, E. and J. Escolano (2015), “Fiscal Transparency, Fiscal Performance and Credit Ratings,” Fiscal Studies, 36(2), 237–270. Arellano, M. and S. Bond (1991), “Some Tests of Specification for Panel Data: Monte Carlo Evidence and an Application to Employment Equations,” The Review of Economic Studies, 58(2), 277–297. Arellano, M. (1993), “On the testing of correlated effects with panel data,” Journal of Econometrics, 59(1–2), 87–97. Arellano, M. and O. Bover (1995), “Another Look at the Instrumental Variable Estimation of Error-Components Models,” Journal of Econometrics, 68(1), 29–51. Auerbach, A. J. (1999), “On the Performance and Use of Government Revenue Forecasts,” National Tax Journal, 52(4), 767–782. Baltagi, B. H. and C. Kao (2001), “Nonstationary Panels, Cointegration in Panels and Dynamic Panels: A survey,” in Baltagi, B. H. (ed.), Nonstationary Panels, Panel Cointegration, and Dynamic Panels, 7–51, Leeds: Emerald Publishing Limited. Benito, B. and F. J. Bastida (2009), “Budget Transparency, Fiscal Performance, and Political Turnout: An International Approach,” Public Administration Review, 69(3), 403–417. Benito, B., M. D. Guillamón, and F. Bastida (2015), “Budget Forecast Deviations in Municipal Governments: Determinants and Implications,” Australian Accounting Review, 25(1), 45–70. Biørn, E. (2017), Econometrics of Panel Data: Methods and Applications, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Bischoff, I. and W. Gohout (2006), “Tax Projections in German States — Manipulated by Opportunistic Incumbent Parties?” Finanzwissenschaftliche Arbeitspapiere, 74, 1–24. Bischoff, I. and W. Gohout (2010), “The Political Economy of Tax Projections,” International Tax and Public Finance, 17(2), 133–150. Blais, A. and R. Nadeau (1992), “The Electoral Budget Cycle,” Public Choice, 74(4), 389–403. Blundell, R. and S. Bond (1998), “Initial Conditions and Moment Restrictions in Dynamic Panel Data Models,” Journal of Econometrics, 87(1), 115–143. Bohn, F. (2018), “Political Cycles: Beyond Rational Expectations,” PLoS ONE, 13(10), e0203390. Bohn, F. and F. J. Veiga (2021), “Political Forecast Cycles,” European Journal of Political Economy, 66(101934), 1–27. Boukaria, M. and F. J. Veiga (2018), “Disentangling Political and Institutional Determinants of Budges Forecast Errors: A Comparative Approach,” Journal of Comparative Economics, 46(4), 1030–1045. Boylan, R. T. (2008), “Political Distortions in State Forecasts,” Public Choice, 136(3–4), 1091–1121. Bronić, M., K. Ott, M. Petrušić, S. Prijaković, and B. Stanić (2023), “Budget transparency in Croatian Counties, Cities and Municipalities: November 2022 – April 2023,” Institute of Public Finance Notes, 16(132), 1–16. Brück, T. and A. Stephan (2006), “Do Eurozone Countries Cheat with Their Budget Deficit Forecasts,” International Review for Social Sciences, 59(1), 3–15. Cameron, A. C. and P. K. Trivedi (2005), Microeconometrics: Methods and Applications, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Chatagny, F. and N. C. Soguel (2012), “The Effect of Tax Revenue Budgeting Errors on Fiscal Balance: Evidence from the Swiss Cantons,” International Tax and Public Finance, 19, 319–337. Couture, J. and L. M. Imbeau (2009), “Do Governments Manipulate Their Revenue Forecasts? Budget Speech and Budget Outcomes in the Canadian Provinces,” in Louis, M. I. (ed.), Do they walk like they talk? Speech and action in policy processes, 155–166. Crombach, L. and F. Bohn (2022), “Uninformed Voters with (Im)precise Expectations: Explaining Political Budget Cycle Puzzles,” Economics and Politics, 36(1), 275–311. Drazen, A. (2000), “The political business cycle after 25 years,” in Bernanke, B. S. and K. Rogoff (eds.), NBER Macroeconomics Annual 2000, 75–137. Drazen, A. (2008), “Political Business Cycles,” in Durlauf, S. N. and L. E. Blume (eds.), The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, 1–10. Dubois, E. (2016), “Political Business Cycles 40 Years after Nordhaus,” Public Choice, 166(1–2), 235–259. Esteller-Moré, A. (2005), “Is There a Connection Between the Tax Administration and the Political Power?” International Tax and Public Finance, 12(5), 639–663. Goeminne, S., B. Geys, and C. Smolders (2008), “Political Fragmentation and Projected Tax Revenues: Evidence from Flemish Municipalities,” International Tax and Public Finance, 15(3), 297–315. Hansen, L. P. (1982), “Large Sample Properties of Generalized Method of Moments Estimators,” Econometrica, 50(4), 1029–1054. Heinemann, F. (2006), “Factor Mobility, Government Debt and the Decline in Public Investment,” International Economics and Economic Policy, 3(1), 11–26. Hettich, W. and S. Winer (1988), “Economic and Political Foundations of Tax Structure,” American Economic Review, 78(4), 701–712. Hibbs, D. A. Jr. (1977), “Political Parties and Macroeconomic Policy,” The American Political Science Review, 71(4), 1467–1487. Jong-A-Pin, R., J. E. Sturm, and J. De Haan (2012), Using Real-time Data to Test for Political Budget Cycles, Netherlands: University of Groningen. Jochimsen, B. and R. Lehmann (2017), “On the Political Economy of National Tax Revenue Forecasts: Evidence from OECD Countries,” Public Choice, 170, 211–230. Klay, W. E. (1983), “Revenue Forecasting: An Administrative Perspective”, in Rabin, J. and T. D. Lynch (eds.), Handbook on Public Budgeting and Financial Management, 287–315. Lago-Peñas, I. and S. Lago-Peñas (2008), “Explaining Budgetary Indiscipline: Evidence from Spanish Municipalities,” Public Finance and Management, 8(1), 36–69. Lami, E. and D. Imami (2019), “Electoral Cycles of Tax Performance in Advanced Democracies,” CESifo Economic Studies, 65(3), 275–295. Lee, T. H. and S. Kwak (2020), “Revenue Volatility and Forecast Errors: Evidence from Korean Local Governments,” Local Government Studies, 46(6), 979–994. Mayper, A. G., M. Granof, and G. Giroux (1991), “An Analysis of Municipal Budget Variances,” Accounting, Auditing and Accountability Journal, 4(1), 29–50. Nordhaus, W. D. (1975), “The Political Business Cycle,”. The Review of Economic Studies, 42(2), 169–190. Persson, T., G. Roland, and G. Tabellini (2000), “Comparative Politics and Public Finance,” Journal of Political Economy, 108(6), 1121–1161. Prijaković, S. (2023), “The Impact of Budget Transparency on Tax Revenue Forecasts: Evidence from Croatian Local Government Units,” preprint from Research Square, https://doi.org/10.21203/rs.3.rs-3440688 /v1. Rodgers, R. and P. Joyce (1996), “The Effect of Underforecasting on the Accuracy of Revenue Forecasts by State Governments,” Public Administration Review, 56(1), 48–56. Rogoff, K. (1990), “Equilibrium Political Budget Cycles,” American Economic Review, 80(1), 21–36. Rogoff, K. and A. Sibert (1988), “Elections and Macroeconomic Policy Cycles,” The Review of Economic Studies, 55(1), 1–16. Roodman, D. (2009), “How to Do Xtabond2: An Introduction to Difference and System GMM in Stata,” The Stata Journal, 9(1), 86–136. Roubini, N. and J. D. Sachs (1989a), “Political and Economic Determinants of Budget Deficits in the Industrial Democracies,” European Economic Review, 33(5), 903–933. Roubini, N. and J. D. Sachs (1989b), “Government Spending and Budget Deficits in the Industrial Countries,” Economic Policy, 4(8), 99–132. Rubin, I. S. (1987), “Estimated and Actual Urban Revenues: Exploring the Gap,” Public Budgeting & Finance, 7(4), 83–95. Sanderson, E. and F. Windmeijer (2016), “A weak instrument F-test in linear IV models with multiple endogenous variables,” Journal of econometrics, 190(2), 212–221. Schroeder, L. (1982), “Local Government Multi-Year Budgetary Forecasting: Some Administrative and Political Issues,” Public Administration Review, 42(2), 121–127. Seitz, H. (2000), “Fiscal Policy, Deficits and Politics of Subnational Governments: The Case of the German Laender,” Public Choice, 102(3–4), 183–218. Serritzlew, S. (2005), “The Perverse Effect of Spending Caps,” Journal of Theoretical Politics, 17(1), 75–105. Shi, M. and J. Svensson (2003), “Political Budget Cycles: A Review of Recent Developments,” Nordic Journal of Political Economy, 29(1), 67–76. Shi, M. and J. Svensson (2006), “Political Budget Cycles: Do They Differ Across Countries and Why?” Journal of Public Economics, 90(8–9), 1367–1389. Staiger, D. and J. H. Stock (1997), “Instrumental Variables Regression with Weak Instruments,” Econometrica, 65(3), 557–586. Tellier, G. (2006), “Public Expenditures in Canadian Provinces: An Empirical Study of Politico-Economic Interactions,” Public Choice, 126(3–4), 367–85. Vasche, J. D. and B. Williams (1987), “Optimal Governmental Budgeting Contingency Reserve Funds,” Public Budgeting & Finance, 7(1), 66–82. von Hagen, J. and B. Eichengreen (1996), “Federalism, Fiscal Restraints, and European Monetary Union,” American Economic Review, 86(2), 134–138. Wooldridge, J. M. (2002), Econometric analysis of cross section and panel data. Cambridge: MIT Press. Wooldridge, J. M. (2010), Econometric Analysis of Cross Section and Panel Data. Cambridge: MIT Press.
描述 碩士
國立政治大學
財政學系
111255011
資料來源 http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0111255011
資料類型 thesis
dc.contributor.advisor 陳國樑<br>羅時萬zh_TW
dc.contributor.author (Authors) 曾庭琳zh_TW
dc.contributor.author (Authors) Tzeng, Ting-Linen_US
dc.creator (作者) 曾庭琳zh_TW
dc.creator (作者) Tzeng, Ting-Linen_US
dc.date (日期) 2024en_US
dc.date.accessioned 4-Sep-2024 14:44:53 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.available 4-Sep-2024 14:44:53 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.issued (上傳時間) 4-Sep-2024 14:44:53 (UTC+8)-
dc.identifier (Other Identifiers) G0111255011en_US
dc.identifier.uri (URI) https://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/153322-
dc.description (描述) 碩士zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 國立政治大學zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 財政學系zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 111255011zh_TW
dc.description.abstract (摘要) 政府會根據收入預算數決定支出數額，因此收入的預測對政府財政政策的擬定具有決定性的影響。而稅課收入為政府收入的最主要來源，無論稅收被高估或是低估，失準的稅收估計都會影響政府施政。當稅收預測低估時，將限縮國家的資源規劃，並阻礙政策的推動；相反地，當稅收預測經常性地高估時，政府須以舉債彌補實際收入數不足之處，然而日漸增加的債務將使得政府財政結構更為脆弱。因此如何提升稅收預測準確性，對於國家財政而言係值得重視的課題。 國內在稅收預測的討論聚焦於中央政府的預測技術，不僅地方政府的分析付之闕如，且近年來許多國際文獻指出，地方政府基於政治因素，會刻意操縱預測結果，然而國內關於影響稅收預測因素的研究亦相當有限。因此，本研究蒐集臺灣地方政府民國90年至民國111年之地方政府資料，利用固定效果模型和工具變數法，檢視分析臺灣地方首長選舉對於地方政府稅收預估的影響。 迴歸結果顯示，臺灣地方政府在選舉年會顯著高估稅收預算，透過擴大政府支出，以期能提高勝選的機會。此外，本研究也發現在選舉年時，財政自主程度越高的地方政府，由於在稅收編列上具有更大的操控空間，越容易高估稅收。本研究也分別探討各稅目的預測情形，發現選舉年高估的現象主要來自土地增值稅、房屋稅、使用牌照稅。進一步分析選舉前一年及選舉後一年對於稅收預測誤差的影響，並未發現臺灣地方政府在選舉前一年有顯著的效果；反之，在選舉後一年時，則存在顯著稅收高估，但其高估程度小於選舉年，可能是由於選民已不能透過選票來影響執政者，因此使執政者降低高估預算的動機。zh_TW
dc.description.abstract (摘要) The government determines expenditure levels based on budget revenue; thus, forecasted revenues have a crucial effect on fiscal policy. Tax revenues constitute the primary source of government income, and regardless of whether taxes are overestimated or underestimated, inaccurate tax estimates impact governmental operations. Underestimations constrain national resource planning and policy implementation. In contrast, frequent overestimation of tax forecasts requires the government to cover the shortfall through borrowing, progressively weakening the fiscal framework with mounting debt. Therefore, enhancing tax forecasting accuracy is critical for effective fiscal management. Domestic discussions on tax revenue forecasts primarily focus on the forecasting techniques of the central government. There is a notable lack of analysis from local governments, and recent international literature suggests that local governments may intentionally manipulate forecast results due to political considerations. Additionally, research within the country regarding the factors influencing tax revenue forecasts is relatively sparse. Therefore, this study collects data from local governments in Taiwan for the period 2001–2022, employing fixed effects models and the instrumental variable method to examine the impact of local government elections on tax revenue projections. The results indicate that local governments in Taiwan tend to overestimate tax revenue during election years and expand spending to increase their probability of reelection. In addition, we find that local governments with greater fiscal autonomy, which has a greater margin of maneuver lead to more optimistic forecasts in election years. This study also identifies that overestimation in election years primarily stems from land value increment tax, house taxes, and vehicle license tax. Analyzing forecast errors pre- and post-election in local governments reveals no significant effects in pre-election years. In contrast, there is significant overestimation in post-election years, though it is less than during election years, possibly because voters no longer hold sway over policymakers through voting, reducing the incentive for manipulating their tax estimate.en_US
dc.description.tableofcontents 第一章 緒論 1 第一節 研究背景 1 第二節 研究動機 3 第三節 論文架構 5 第二章 文獻回顧與我國地方政府稅收預測概況 6 第一節 政治循環理論的相關研究 6 第二節 影響稅收預測的相關因素 10 第三節 我國地方政府稅收預測概況 19 第三章 研究方法 27 第一節 統計分析模型 27 第二節 模型設定與變數定義 30 第三節 資料蒐集及處理 35 第四章 研究結果 38 第一節 敘述統計 38 第二節 實證結果 39 第三節 交乘項的效果 42 第四節 選舉前後一年的效果 46 第五節 分稅結果 48 第六節 穩健性測試 58 第五章 結論與建議 66 參考文獻 69 中文文獻 69 英文文獻 70zh_TW
dc.format.extent 2136964 bytes-
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf-
dc.source.uri (資料來源) http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0111255011en_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 地方財政zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 稅收預測zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 政府預算zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 政治預測循環zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) Local public financeen_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) Tax revenue forecastsen_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) Government budgeten_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) Political forecast cycleen_US
dc.title (題名) 臺灣地方首長選舉對於地方政府稅收預估的影響zh_TW
dc.title (題名) The Impact of Local Government Elections on Tax Revenue Forecast in Taiwanen_US
dc.type (資料類型) thesisen_US
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) 王鼎銘 (2006)，「政治與經濟間的交錯：政治景氣循環理論的發展評析」，《公共行政學報》，20，161–172。 古坤榮、林全與鄭光甫 (1998)，「臺灣地區綜合所得稅收入預測方法之研究」，《國家科學委員會研究彙刊：人文及社會科學》，8(2)，276–287。 石恩銘與陳國樑 (2023)，「稅收超徵的財政紀律觀點與解決問題之道」，《月旦財稅實務釋評》，38，8–18。 石恩銘、伍大開、陳國樑與黃勢璋，「財政管理機制之效果分析」，《人文及社會科學集刊》，即將發表。 陳致綱與郭炳伸 (2011)，「固定效果動態追蹤資料模型之估計與推論-二階差分動差法」，《經濟論文》，39(4)，401–438。 陳思穎 (2015)，《臺灣地方政府歲入估測之研究》，碩士論文，國立臺灣大學政治學系。 陳國樑 (2023)，「稅收超徵的解方」，《聯合報》名人Talks，2023年1月12日。 陳聽安與陳國樑 (2017)，「稅收超徵？是短估！」，《聯合報》民意論壇，2017年12月18日。 傅彥凱 (2006)，「地方政府預算制定之政治經濟分析：政治預算循環的觀點」，《選舉研究》，13(1)，119–162。 楊佩烜 (2019)，「臺灣稅收預測表現之探討」，《人文及社會科學集刊》， 32(2)，271–319。 蘇彩足 (2002)，「臺灣地區縣市政府歲入估測之研究」，國家科學委員會專題研究計畫。 Aidt, T., F. J. Veiga, and L. G. Veiga (2011), “Election Results and Opportunistic Policies: A New Test of the Rational Political Business Cycle Model,” Public Choice, 148(1–2), 21–44. Alesina, A. and A. Drazen (1991), “Why Are Stabilizations Delayed?” American Economic Review, 81(5), 1170–1188. Allers, M., J. de Haan, and C. Sterks (2001), “Partisan Influence on the Local Tax Burden in the Netherlands,” Public Choice, 106(3–4), 351–363. Arbatli, E. and J. Escolano (2015), “Fiscal Transparency, Fiscal Performance and Credit Ratings,” Fiscal Studies, 36(2), 237–270. Arellano, M. and S. Bond (1991), “Some Tests of Specification for Panel Data: Monte Carlo Evidence and an Application to Employment Equations,” The Review of Economic Studies, 58(2), 277–297. Arellano, M. (1993), “On the testing of correlated effects with panel data,” Journal of Econometrics, 59(1–2), 87–97. Arellano, M. and O. Bover (1995), “Another Look at the Instrumental Variable Estimation of Error-Components Models,” Journal of Econometrics, 68(1), 29–51. Auerbach, A. J. (1999), “On the Performance and Use of Government Revenue Forecasts,” National Tax Journal, 52(4), 767–782. Baltagi, B. H. and C. Kao (2001), “Nonstationary Panels, Cointegration in Panels and Dynamic Panels: A survey,” in Baltagi, B. H. (ed.), Nonstationary Panels, Panel Cointegration, and Dynamic Panels, 7–51, Leeds: Emerald Publishing Limited. Benito, B. and F. J. Bastida (2009), “Budget Transparency, Fiscal Performance, and Political Turnout: An International Approach,” Public Administration Review, 69(3), 403–417. Benito, B., M. D. Guillamón, and F. Bastida (2015), “Budget Forecast Deviations in Municipal Governments: Determinants and Implications,” Australian Accounting Review, 25(1), 45–70. Biørn, E. (2017), Econometrics of Panel Data: Methods and Applications, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Bischoff, I. and W. Gohout (2006), “Tax Projections in German States — Manipulated by Opportunistic Incumbent Parties?” Finanzwissenschaftliche Arbeitspapiere, 74, 1–24. Bischoff, I. and W. Gohout (2010), “The Political Economy of Tax Projections,” International Tax and Public Finance, 17(2), 133–150. Blais, A. and R. Nadeau (1992), “The Electoral Budget Cycle,” Public Choice, 74(4), 389–403. Blundell, R. and S. Bond (1998), “Initial Conditions and Moment Restrictions in Dynamic Panel Data Models,” Journal of Econometrics, 87(1), 115–143. Bohn, F. (2018), “Political Cycles: Beyond Rational Expectations,” PLoS ONE, 13(10), e0203390. Bohn, F. and F. J. Veiga (2021), “Political Forecast Cycles,” European Journal of Political Economy, 66(101934), 1–27. Boukaria, M. and F. J. Veiga (2018), “Disentangling Political and Institutional Determinants of Budges Forecast Errors: A Comparative Approach,” Journal of Comparative Economics, 46(4), 1030–1045. Boylan, R. T. (2008), “Political Distortions in State Forecasts,” Public Choice, 136(3–4), 1091–1121. Bronić, M., K. Ott, M. Petrušić, S. Prijaković, and B. Stanić (2023), “Budget transparency in Croatian Counties, Cities and Municipalities: November 2022 – April 2023,” Institute of Public Finance Notes, 16(132), 1–16. Brück, T. and A. Stephan (2006), “Do Eurozone Countries Cheat with Their Budget Deficit Forecasts,” International Review for Social Sciences, 59(1), 3–15. Cameron, A. C. and P. K. Trivedi (2005), Microeconometrics: Methods and Applications, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Chatagny, F. and N. C. Soguel (2012), “The Effect of Tax Revenue Budgeting Errors on Fiscal Balance: Evidence from the Swiss Cantons,” International Tax and Public Finance, 19, 319–337. Couture, J. and L. M. Imbeau (2009), “Do Governments Manipulate Their Revenue Forecasts? Budget Speech and Budget Outcomes in the Canadian Provinces,” in Louis, M. I. (ed.), Do they walk like they talk? Speech and action in policy processes, 155–166. Crombach, L. and F. Bohn (2022), “Uninformed Voters with (Im)precise Expectations: Explaining Political Budget Cycle Puzzles,” Economics and Politics, 36(1), 275–311. Drazen, A. (2000), “The political business cycle after 25 years,” in Bernanke, B. S. and K. Rogoff (eds.), NBER Macroeconomics Annual 2000, 75–137. Drazen, A. (2008), “Political Business Cycles,” in Durlauf, S. N. and L. E. Blume (eds.), The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, 1–10. Dubois, E. (2016), “Political Business Cycles 40 Years after Nordhaus,” Public Choice, 166(1–2), 235–259. Esteller-Moré, A. (2005), “Is There a Connection Between the Tax Administration and the Political Power?” International Tax and Public Finance, 12(5), 639–663. Goeminne, S., B. Geys, and C. Smolders (2008), “Political Fragmentation and Projected Tax Revenues: Evidence from Flemish Municipalities,” International Tax and Public Finance, 15(3), 297–315. Hansen, L. P. (1982), “Large Sample Properties of Generalized Method of Moments Estimators,” Econometrica, 50(4), 1029–1054. Heinemann, F. (2006), “Factor Mobility, Government Debt and the Decline in Public Investment,” International Economics and Economic Policy, 3(1), 11–26. Hettich, W. and S. Winer (1988), “Economic and Political Foundations of Tax Structure,” American Economic Review, 78(4), 701–712. Hibbs, D. A. Jr. (1977), “Political Parties and Macroeconomic Policy,” The American Political Science Review, 71(4), 1467–1487. Jong-A-Pin, R., J. E. Sturm, and J. De Haan (2012), Using Real-time Data to Test for Political Budget Cycles, Netherlands: University of Groningen. Jochimsen, B. and R. Lehmann (2017), “On the Political Economy of National Tax Revenue Forecasts: Evidence from OECD Countries,” Public Choice, 170, 211–230. Klay, W. E. (1983), “Revenue Forecasting: An Administrative Perspective”, in Rabin, J. and T. D. Lynch (eds.), Handbook on Public Budgeting and Financial Management, 287–315. Lago-Peñas, I. and S. Lago-Peñas (2008), “Explaining Budgetary Indiscipline: Evidence from Spanish Municipalities,” Public Finance and Management, 8(1), 36–69. Lami, E. and D. Imami (2019), “Electoral Cycles of Tax Performance in Advanced Democracies,” CESifo Economic Studies, 65(3), 275–295. Lee, T. H. and S. Kwak (2020), “Revenue Volatility and Forecast Errors: Evidence from Korean Local Governments,” Local Government Studies, 46(6), 979–994. Mayper, A. G., M. Granof, and G. Giroux (1991), “An Analysis of Municipal Budget Variances,” Accounting, Auditing and Accountability Journal, 4(1), 29–50. Nordhaus, W. D. (1975), “The Political Business Cycle,”. The Review of Economic Studies, 42(2), 169–190. Persson, T., G. Roland, and G. Tabellini (2000), “Comparative Politics and Public Finance,” Journal of Political Economy, 108(6), 1121–1161. Prijaković, S. (2023), “The Impact of Budget Transparency on Tax Revenue Forecasts: Evidence from Croatian Local Government Units,” preprint from Research Square, https://doi.org/10.21203/rs.3.rs-3440688 /v1. Rodgers, R. and P. Joyce (1996), “The Effect of Underforecasting on the Accuracy of Revenue Forecasts by State Governments,” Public Administration Review, 56(1), 48–56. Rogoff, K. (1990), “Equilibrium Political Budget Cycles,” American Economic Review, 80(1), 21–36. Rogoff, K. and A. Sibert (1988), “Elections and Macroeconomic Policy Cycles,” The Review of Economic Studies, 55(1), 1–16. Roodman, D. (2009), “How to Do Xtabond2: An Introduction to Difference and System GMM in Stata,” The Stata Journal, 9(1), 86–136. Roubini, N. and J. D. Sachs (1989a), “Political and Economic Determinants of Budget Deficits in the Industrial Democracies,” European Economic Review, 33(5), 903–933. Roubini, N. and J. D. Sachs (1989b), “Government Spending and Budget Deficits in the Industrial Countries,” Economic Policy, 4(8), 99–132. Rubin, I. S. (1987), “Estimated and Actual Urban Revenues: Exploring the Gap,” Public Budgeting & Finance, 7(4), 83–95. Sanderson, E. and F. Windmeijer (2016), “A weak instrument F-test in linear IV models with multiple endogenous variables,” Journal of econometrics, 190(2), 212–221. Schroeder, L. (1982), “Local Government Multi-Year Budgetary Forecasting: Some Administrative and Political Issues,” Public Administration Review, 42(2), 121–127. Seitz, H. (2000), “Fiscal Policy, Deficits and Politics of Subnational Governments: The Case of the German Laender,” Public Choice, 102(3–4), 183–218. Serritzlew, S. (2005), “The Perverse Effect of Spending Caps,” Journal of Theoretical Politics, 17(1), 75–105. Shi, M. and J. Svensson (2003), “Political Budget Cycles: A Review of Recent Developments,” Nordic Journal of Political Economy, 29(1), 67–76. Shi, M. and J. Svensson (2006), “Political Budget Cycles: Do They Differ Across Countries and Why?” Journal of Public Economics, 90(8–9), 1367–1389. Staiger, D. and J. H. Stock (1997), “Instrumental Variables Regression with Weak Instruments,” Econometrica, 65(3), 557–586. Tellier, G. (2006), “Public Expenditures in Canadian Provinces: An Empirical Study of Politico-Economic Interactions,” Public Choice, 126(3–4), 367–85. Vasche, J. D. and B. Williams (1987), “Optimal Governmental Budgeting Contingency Reserve Funds,” Public Budgeting & Finance, 7(1), 66–82. von Hagen, J. and B. Eichengreen (1996), “Federalism, Fiscal Restraints, and European Monetary Union,” American Economic Review, 86(2), 134–138. Wooldridge, J. M. (2002), Econometric analysis of cross section and panel data. Cambridge: MIT Press. Wooldridge, J. M. (2010), Econometric Analysis of Cross Section and Panel Data. Cambridge: MIT Press.zh_TW