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題名 破裂的權⼒，破裂的和平?檢視墨西哥政黨分裂對政治暴⼒的影響
Fractured Power, Fractured Peace? Examining the Reverberations of Partisan Rifts on Political Violence in Mexico
作者 莫喬丹
Murillo, Jordan Adrian
貢獻者 黃柏鈞
Huang, Po-Chun
莫喬丹
Murillo, Jordan Adrian
關鍵詞 政治暴力
政黨分裂
有組織犯罪
合成差異法
political violence
party fragmentation
organized crime
synthetic differ- ence in differences
日期 2024
上傳時間 4-Sep-2024 15:07:55 (UTC+8)
摘要 挑戰傳統觀點，本研究深入剖析墨西哥各級政府間黨派分裂與有組織犯罪策略性使用政治暴力之間的複雜關係。運用創新方法學方法分析2018-2023年全面性市級數據，本研究isolates離散的「分裂衝擊」以驗證三個假設。違反直覺的是，市級與聯邦政黨之間垂直失調的增加反而降低了針對地方當局的暴力，這表明在權力結構被打亂的情況下，犯罪集團更傾向於選擇收買而非對抗。分裂政黨之間以及聯合政府之間的意識形態極化對暴力並無明顯影響。雖然分裂似乎減少了對政治精英的威脅，但其對平民受害的影響尚不明確。這些細微的發現突顯了不斷演變的黨派格局如何塑造有組織犯罪對反國家脅迫的動機。隨著犯罪化的政治侵蝕墨西哥的民主，深入了解這些動態有助於闡明在犯罪主權嵌入國家機構的地方恢復法治的潛在補救措施。
Challenging conventional wisdom, this study unravels the complex relationships between partisan fragmentation across levels of government and organized crime's strategic use of political violence in Mexico. Leveraging novel methodological approaches on a comprehensive 2018-2023 municipal dataset, the analysis isolates discrete "fragmentation shocks" to test three hypotheses. Counterintuitively, increased vertical misalignment between municipal and federal parties reduces violence targeting local authorities, suggesting criminal groups favor cooption over confrontation amid disrupted power arrangements. Ideological polarization between fragmented parties and between coalitioned governments exhibits no clear violence impacts. While fragmentation appears to reduce threats to political elites, its effects on civilian victimization are less clear. The nuanced findings highlight how evolving partisan landscapes shape organized crime's incentives for anti-state coercion. As criminalized politics erodes Mexico's democracy, disentangling these dynamics illuminates potential remedies for restoring rule of law where criminal sovereignty embeds within state institutions.
參考文獻 Abadie, Alberto, Alexis Diamond, and Jens Hainmueller (June 2010). “Synthetic Control Methods for Comparative Case Studies: Estimating the Effect of California’s To- bacco Control Program.” In: Journal of the American Statistical Association 105.490, pp. 493–505 (cit. p. 17). Acemoglu, Daron, James A. Robinson, and Rafael J. Santos (2013). “THE MONOPOLY OF VIOLENCE: EVIDENCE FROM COLOMBIA.” In: Journal of the European Eco- nomic Association 11. Publisher: Oxford University Press, pp. 5–44 (cit. p. 7). Arkhangelsky, Dmitry, Susan Athey, David A. Hirshberg, Guido W. Imbens, and Stefan Wager (Dec. 1, 2021). “Synthetic Difference-in-Differences.” In: American Economic Review 111.12, pp. 4088–4118 (cit. pp. 17, 39). Berman, Ron and Ayelet Israeli (Nov. 2022). “The Value of Descriptive Analytics: Evidence from Online Retailers.” In: Marketing Science 41.6, pp. 1074–1096 (cit. p. 42). Calderón, María (Mar. 2024). “Political Violence in Mexico’s 2024 Elections.” In: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. Political Violence in Mexico’s 2024 Elec- tions The Mexico Institute (cit. pp. 6–8). Callaway, Brantly and Pedro H.C. Sant’Anna (Dec. 2021). “Difference-in-Differences with multiple time periods.” In: Journal of Econometrics 225.2, pp. 200–230 (cit. p. 41). Chacon, Mario L (2013). “In the Line of Fire: Political Violence and Decentralization in Colombia.” In: SSRN Electronic Journal (cit. pp. 1, 7). Clarke, Damian, Daniel Pailañir, Susan Athey, and Guido Imbens (2023). “Synthetic Dif- ference In Differences Estimation.” In: Publisher: [object Object] Version Number: 3 (cit. pp. 17, 24). Correia, Sergio, Paulo Guimarães, and Thomas Zylkin (2019). “ppmlhdfe: Fast Poisson Es- timation with High-Dimensional Fixed Effects.” In: Publisher: [object Object] Version Number: 3 (cit. pp. 19, 43). “En qué estados habrá elecciones en 2021 y qué cargos se eligen” (Dec. 15, 2020). In: Grupo Milenio. Section: Política (cit. p. 12). Fiorentini, Gianluca and Sam Peltzman (1997). The Economics of Organised Crime. Cam- bridge Books. Cambridge University Press (cit. p. 5). Gutiérrez-Romero, Roxana, Nayely Iturbe, and UNU-WIDER (Jan. 2023). Why are Mexi- can politicians being assassinated? The role of oil theft and narcocracy and the elec- toral consequences of organized crime. WIDER Working Paper 2023. ISBN: 9789292673154 Series: WIDER Working Paper Volume: 2023. UNU-WIDER (cit. p. 6). Hernández Huerta, Víctor Antonio (2020). “Candidates Murdered in Mexico: Criminal or Electoral Violence?” In: Politics and Government 27.2. Publisher: Centro de Investi- gación y Docencia Económicas AC, División de Estudios Políticos (cit. pp. 6, 7). Laakso, Markku and Rein Taagepera (Apr. 1979). ““Effective”Number of Parties: A Measure with Application to West Europe.” In: Comparative Political Studies 12.1, pp. 3–27 (cit. p. 15). Lessing, Benjamin (Dec. 2015). “Logics of Violence in Criminal War.” In: Journal of Con- flict Resolution 59.8, pp. 1486–1516 (cit. p. 5). Magar, Eric (2018). Recent Mexican Election Vote Returns Repository (cit. pp. 12, 14, 15). Mou, Hongyu, Licheng Liu, and Yiqing Xu (2023). “Panel Data Visualization in R (pan- elView) and Stata (panelview).” In: Journal of Statistical Software 107.7 (cit. p. 12). National Institute of Statistics and Geography (Mexico) (2011). Mexico Population and Housing Census 2010. National Institute of Statistics and Geography (Mexico) (cit. p. 15). Osorio, Javier (2015). “The Contagion of Drug Violence: Spatiotemporal Dynamics of the Mexican War on Drugs.” In: The Journal of Conflict Resolution 59.8. Publisher: Sage Publications, Inc., pp. 1403–1432 (cit. p. 7). Raleigh, Clionadh, Andrew Linke, Håvard Hegre, and Joakim Karlsen (2010). “Introducing ACLED-Armed Conflict Location and Event Data.” In: Journal of Peace Research 47.5, pp. 651–660 (cit. pp. 9, 10). Ramsey, J. B. (1969). “Tests for Specification Errors in Classical Linear Least-Squares Re- gression Analysis.” In: Journal of the Royal Statistical Society. Series B (Methodolog- ical) 31.2. Publisher: [Royal Statistical Society, Wiley], pp. 350–371 (cit. p. 43). Rios, Viridiana (Dec. 2015). “How Government Coordination Controlled Organized Crime: The Case of Mexico’s Cocaine Markets.” In: Journal of Conflict Resolution 59.8, pp. 1433–1454 (cit. pp. 5, 7). Snyder, Richard and Angelica Duran-Martinez (Sept. 2009). “Does illegality breed vio- lence? Drug trafficking and state-sponsored protection rackets.” In: Crime, Law and Social Change 52.3, pp. 253–273 (cit. p. 5). Timmons, Jeffrey F. and Daniel Broid (2013). “The Political Economy of Municipal Trans- fers: Evidence from Mexico.” In: Publius: The Journal of Federalism 43.4, pp. 551– 579 (cit. p. 14). Trejo, Guillermo and Sandra Ley (2020). Votes, drugs, and violence: The Political Logic of Criminal Wars in Mexico. First edition. Cambridge studies in comparative politics. New York: Cambridge University Press. 1 p. (cit. pp. 1, 2, 6, 7, 29). — (Jan. 2021). “High-Profile Criminal Violence: Why Drug Cartels Murder Government Officials and Party Candidates in Mexico.” In: British Journal of Political Science 51.1, pp. 203–229 (cit. p. 6).
描述 碩士
國立政治大學
應用經濟與社會發展英語碩士學位學程(IMES)
111266012
資料來源 http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0111266012
資料類型 thesis
dc.contributor.advisor 黃柏鈞zh_TW
dc.contributor.advisor Huang, Po-Chunen_US
dc.contributor.author (Authors) 莫喬丹zh_TW
dc.contributor.author (Authors) Murillo, Jordan Adrianen_US
dc.creator (作者) 莫喬丹zh_TW
dc.creator (作者) Murillo, Jordan Adrianen_US
dc.date (日期) 2024en_US
dc.date.accessioned 4-Sep-2024 15:07:55 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.available 4-Sep-2024 15:07:55 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.issued (上傳時間) 4-Sep-2024 15:07:55 (UTC+8)-
dc.identifier (Other Identifiers) G0111266012en_US
dc.identifier.uri (URI) https://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/153414-
dc.description (描述) 碩士zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 國立政治大學zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 應用經濟與社會發展英語碩士學位學程(IMES)zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 111266012zh_TW
dc.description.abstract (摘要) 挑戰傳統觀點，本研究深入剖析墨西哥各級政府間黨派分裂與有組織犯罪策略性使用政治暴力之間的複雜關係。運用創新方法學方法分析2018-2023年全面性市級數據，本研究isolates離散的「分裂衝擊」以驗證三個假設。違反直覺的是，市級與聯邦政黨之間垂直失調的增加反而降低了針對地方當局的暴力，這表明在權力結構被打亂的情況下，犯罪集團更傾向於選擇收買而非對抗。分裂政黨之間以及聯合政府之間的意識形態極化對暴力並無明顯影響。雖然分裂似乎減少了對政治精英的威脅，但其對平民受害的影響尚不明確。這些細微的發現突顯了不斷演變的黨派格局如何塑造有組織犯罪對反國家脅迫的動機。隨著犯罪化的政治侵蝕墨西哥的民主，深入了解這些動態有助於闡明在犯罪主權嵌入國家機構的地方恢復法治的潛在補救措施。zh_TW
dc.description.abstract (摘要) Challenging conventional wisdom, this study unravels the complex relationships between partisan fragmentation across levels of government and organized crime's strategic use of political violence in Mexico. Leveraging novel methodological approaches on a comprehensive 2018-2023 municipal dataset, the analysis isolates discrete "fragmentation shocks" to test three hypotheses. Counterintuitively, increased vertical misalignment between municipal and federal parties reduces violence targeting local authorities, suggesting criminal groups favor cooption over confrontation amid disrupted power arrangements. Ideological polarization between fragmented parties and between coalitioned governments exhibits no clear violence impacts. While fragmentation appears to reduce threats to political elites, its effects on civilian victimization are less clear. The nuanced findings highlight how evolving partisan landscapes shape organized crime's incentives for anti-state coercion. As criminalized politics erodes Mexico's democracy, disentangling these dynamics illuminates potential remedies for restoring rule of law where criminal sovereignty embeds within state institutions.en_US
dc.description.tableofcontents 1 Introduction 1 2 Institutional Background 5 2.1 From Pax Priista to Heightened Violence 5 2.2 The Dynamics of Political Violence 6 2.3 Criminal Influence in Local Politics 7 2.4 Political Violence under Vertical Fragmentation 7 3 Data 11 3.1 Dependent Variables 11 3.2 Independent Variables 12 3.3 Control Variables 17 4 Methodology 19 4.1 Synthetic Difference-in-Differences 19 4.2 Poisson Pseudo-Maximum Likelihood with Fixed Effects 21 5 Results 25 5.1 Party Fragmentation 25 5.2 Federal Funding and Coalition Governments 28 6 Discussion 31 7 Conclusion 35 Bibliography 37 A Robustness 41 A.1 Synthetic Difference-in-Differences 41 A.2 Poisson Pseudo-Maximum Likelihood 45 B Maps & Figures 47 B.1 Political Violence Incidence 47zh_TW
dc.format.extent 6141382 bytes-
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf-
dc.source.uri (資料來源) http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0111266012en_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 政治暴力zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 政黨分裂zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 有組織犯罪zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 合成差異法zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) political violenceen_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) party fragmentationen_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) organized crimeen_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) synthetic differ- ence in differencesen_US
dc.title (題名) 破裂的權⼒，破裂的和平?檢視墨西哥政黨分裂對政治暴⼒的影響zh_TW
dc.title (題名) Fractured Power, Fractured Peace? Examining the Reverberations of Partisan Rifts on Political Violence in Mexicoen_US
dc.type (資料類型) thesisen_US
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Abadie, Alberto, Alexis Diamond, and Jens Hainmueller (June 2010). “Synthetic Control Methods for Comparative Case Studies: Estimating the Effect of California’s To- bacco Control Program.” In: Journal of the American Statistical Association 105.490, pp. 493–505 (cit. p. 17). Acemoglu, Daron, James A. Robinson, and Rafael J. Santos (2013). “THE MONOPOLY OF VIOLENCE: EVIDENCE FROM COLOMBIA.” In: Journal of the European Eco- nomic Association 11. Publisher: Oxford University Press, pp. 5–44 (cit. p. 7). Arkhangelsky, Dmitry, Susan Athey, David A. Hirshberg, Guido W. Imbens, and Stefan Wager (Dec. 1, 2021). “Synthetic Difference-in-Differences.” In: American Economic Review 111.12, pp. 4088–4118 (cit. pp. 17, 39). Berman, Ron and Ayelet Israeli (Nov. 2022). “The Value of Descriptive Analytics: Evidence from Online Retailers.” In: Marketing Science 41.6, pp. 1074–1096 (cit. p. 42). Calderón, María (Mar. 2024). “Political Violence in Mexico’s 2024 Elections.” In: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. Political Violence in Mexico’s 2024 Elec- tions The Mexico Institute (cit. pp. 6–8). Callaway, Brantly and Pedro H.C. Sant’Anna (Dec. 2021). “Difference-in-Differences with multiple time periods.” In: Journal of Econometrics 225.2, pp. 200–230 (cit. p. 41). Chacon, Mario L (2013). “In the Line of Fire: Political Violence and Decentralization in Colombia.” In: SSRN Electronic Journal (cit. pp. 1, 7). Clarke, Damian, Daniel Pailañir, Susan Athey, and Guido Imbens (2023). “Synthetic Dif- ference In Differences Estimation.” In: Publisher: [object Object] Version Number: 3 (cit. pp. 17, 24). Correia, Sergio, Paulo Guimarães, and Thomas Zylkin (2019). “ppmlhdfe: Fast Poisson Es- timation with High-Dimensional Fixed Effects.” In: Publisher: [object Object] Version Number: 3 (cit. pp. 19, 43). “En qué estados habrá elecciones en 2021 y qué cargos se eligen” (Dec. 15, 2020). In: Grupo Milenio. Section: Política (cit. p. 12). Fiorentini, Gianluca and Sam Peltzman (1997). The Economics of Organised Crime. Cam- bridge Books. Cambridge University Press (cit. p. 5). Gutiérrez-Romero, Roxana, Nayely Iturbe, and UNU-WIDER (Jan. 2023). Why are Mexi- can politicians being assassinated? The role of oil theft and narcocracy and the elec- toral consequences of organized crime. WIDER Working Paper 2023. ISBN: 9789292673154 Series: WIDER Working Paper Volume: 2023. UNU-WIDER (cit. p. 6). Hernández Huerta, Víctor Antonio (2020). “Candidates Murdered in Mexico: Criminal or Electoral Violence?” In: Politics and Government 27.2. Publisher: Centro de Investi- gación y Docencia Económicas AC, División de Estudios Políticos (cit. pp. 6, 7). Laakso, Markku and Rein Taagepera (Apr. 1979). ““Effective”Number of Parties: A Measure with Application to West Europe.” In: Comparative Political Studies 12.1, pp. 3–27 (cit. p. 15). Lessing, Benjamin (Dec. 2015). “Logics of Violence in Criminal War.” In: Journal of Con- flict Resolution 59.8, pp. 1486–1516 (cit. p. 5). Magar, Eric (2018). Recent Mexican Election Vote Returns Repository (cit. pp. 12, 14, 15). Mou, Hongyu, Licheng Liu, and Yiqing Xu (2023). “Panel Data Visualization in R (pan- elView) and Stata (panelview).” In: Journal of Statistical Software 107.7 (cit. p. 12). National Institute of Statistics and Geography (Mexico) (2011). Mexico Population and Housing Census 2010. National Institute of Statistics and Geography (Mexico) (cit. p. 15). Osorio, Javier (2015). “The Contagion of Drug Violence: Spatiotemporal Dynamics of the Mexican War on Drugs.” In: The Journal of Conflict Resolution 59.8. Publisher: Sage Publications, Inc., pp. 1403–1432 (cit. p. 7). Raleigh, Clionadh, Andrew Linke, Håvard Hegre, and Joakim Karlsen (2010). “Introducing ACLED-Armed Conflict Location and Event Data.” In: Journal of Peace Research 47.5, pp. 651–660 (cit. pp. 9, 10). Ramsey, J. B. (1969). “Tests for Specification Errors in Classical Linear Least-Squares Re- gression Analysis.” In: Journal of the Royal Statistical Society. Series B (Methodolog- ical) 31.2. Publisher: [Royal Statistical Society, Wiley], pp. 350–371 (cit. p. 43). Rios, Viridiana (Dec. 2015). “How Government Coordination Controlled Organized Crime: The Case of Mexico’s Cocaine Markets.” In: Journal of Conflict Resolution 59.8, pp. 1433–1454 (cit. pp. 5, 7). Snyder, Richard and Angelica Duran-Martinez (Sept. 2009). “Does illegality breed vio- lence? Drug trafficking and state-sponsored protection rackets.” In: Crime, Law and Social Change 52.3, pp. 253–273 (cit. p. 5). Timmons, Jeffrey F. and Daniel Broid (2013). “The Political Economy of Municipal Trans- fers: Evidence from Mexico.” In: Publius: The Journal of Federalism 43.4, pp. 551– 579 (cit. p. 14). Trejo, Guillermo and Sandra Ley (2020). Votes, drugs, and violence: The Political Logic of Criminal Wars in Mexico. First edition. Cambridge studies in comparative politics. New York: Cambridge University Press. 1 p. (cit. pp. 1, 2, 6, 7, 29). — (Jan. 2021). “High-Profile Criminal Violence: Why Drug Cartels Murder Government Officials and Party Candidates in Mexico.” In: British Journal of Political Science 51.1, pp. 203–229 (cit. p. 6).zh_TW