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題名 康德道德動機理論重構：論道德心理學的弱情感主義詮釋
Reconstruct Kant's Theory of Moral Motivation: A Soft Affectivist Interpretation of Moral Psychology作者 范均威
Fan, Chun-Wei貢獻者 王華
Wang, Hua
范均威
Fan, Chun-Wei關鍵詞 康德
倫理學
道德心理學
情感主義
弱情感主義
道德動機
Kant
Ethics
moral psychology
affectivism
soft affectivism
moral motivation日期 2024 上傳時間 4-九月-2024 15:15:24 (UTC+8) 摘要 康德的義務論倫理學是倫理學中極具代表性的一派主張，其影響力之大，時至今日仍為哲學家所熱議。其中，康德之道德心理學的議題在所有康德道德哲學研究中雖相對冷門，卻是其道德哲學系統中非常重要的一環，毋寧說，掌握康德的道德心理學是釐清「純粹理性如何可能是實踐的」這一問題之關鍵。然而，康德專用的語詞概念與理論結構既複雜又曖昧，使得其詮釋方式在後世研究者之間莫衷一是。本文試圖細究康德文本中有關於道德心理學之內容，並探討針對此議題的兩大詮釋派別 — 理智主義與情感主義 — 的主張及各自的理論缺點，本文主張理智主義者的詮釋忽略了大量康德關於道德情感/敬畏的情感面作為動力本身的陳述，且無法回應情感主義者關於「意志軟弱」的挑戰；而情感主義的詮釋雖較契合康德之本意，但並不能很好地兼容部分重要概念。因此本文嘗試重構出一個筆者認為與康德文本較為契合，且在哲學上較為合理的「弱情感主義」版本之康德道德心理學結構，以提出一種理解康德的新可能。
Kant’s Deontology is one of the most iconic theories in moral philosophy, with a tremendous impact that continues to be widely debated nowadays. Despite its significance, moral psychology, among the specific topics within Kant’s moral philosophy, is relatively neglected. However, Kant’s moral psychology is undoubtedly crucial for understanding the entirety of his moral philosophy. It is no exaggeration to state that clarifying his moral psychology is essential for comprehending "how Pure Reason can be Practical," which is the primary question of Kant’s second Critique. Nevertheless, the complexity of Kant's terminology and the vast structure of his texts have led to divergent interpretations under debate. This thesis aims to delve into the content concerning moral psychology in Kant’s texts and investigate the two main interpretations: intellectualism and affectivism, with respect to their advantages and problems as well. I argue that intellectualists have ignored massive statements of Kant where moral feeling or the affective aspect of respect play a necessary role in moral motivation, whereas affectivists’ interpretation is more consistent with Kant’s original thought, but still failed to contain some significant concepts. My goal thus is to reconstruct a "soft affectivist version" of Kant’s moral psychological structure, which I argue is more textually consistent and philosophically plausible in order to provide a new way for comprehending Kant’s moral theory.參考文獻 康德文本翻譯 中文： ● 康德（1990）。 道德底形上學之基礎 （李明輝譯）。聯經出版。 ● 康德（1999）。實踐理性批判（韓水法譯）。商務印書館出版。 ● 康德（2004）。實用人類學（鄧曉芒譯）。上海人民出版社。 ● 康德（2015）。道德底形上學 （李明輝譯）。聯經出版。 ● 康德（2017）。單純理性限度內的宗教（李秋零譯）。商務印書館出版。 英文： ● Kant, Immanuel. (1998). Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals (M. Gregor, Ed. & Trans.). Cambridge University Press. ● Kant, Immanuel. (2017). Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, 2nd ed. (S. Orr, Ed. & Trans.). Web. Kants Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten (verbesserte zweyte Auflage bey Hartknoch 1786 ) (groundlaying.appspot.com). ● Kant, Immanuel. (1991). The Metaphysics of Morals (M. Gregor, Ed. & Trans.). Cambridge University Press. ● Kant, Immanuel. (2002). Critique of Practical Reason (W. S. Pluhar, Trans.). Hackett Publishing Company, Inc.. ● Kant, Immanuel. (2016). Collected Works of Immanuel Kant: Series Seven. Delphi Classics. ● Kant, Immanuel. (1997). Lectures on ethics. (P. Heath, & J. B. Schneewind, Ed., P. Heath, Trans.). Cambridge University Press. 中文二手圖書資料 ● 鄺芷人（1992）。康德倫理學原理。文津出版社。 中文二手期刊資料 ● 李明輝（1993）。牟宗三哲學中的「物自身」概念。中國文哲研究期刊，第三期，頁547-574。 ● 李明輝（1994）。《康德倫理學發展中的道德情感問題》導論，中國文史研究通訊，第四卷第1期，序跋選錄。 ● 李明輝（2004）。康德的「道德情感」理論與席勒對康德倫理學的批判。揭諦，第七期，頁37-76，南華大學哲學與生命教育學系出版。 ● 史偉民（2023）。康德論道德的判斷原則與踐履原則。東吳哲學學報，第四十六期，第73-104頁。 ● 史偉民（2013）。道德感情與動機：康德、席勒與牟宗三。清華學報，新45卷，第4期，第597-630頁。 外文圖書資料 ● Beck, Lewis White. (1960). A Commentary on Kant’s ‘Critique of Practical Reason. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. ● Nagel, Thomas. (1970). The Possibility of Altruism. Princeton University Press. ● Korsgaard, Christine. (1996). Creating the Kingdom of Ends. Cambridge University Press. ● Allison, Henry. (1990). Kant’s Theory of Freedom. Cambridge University Press. ● Tenenbaum, Sergio. (Ed.). (2007). Moral Psychology, 9-10. Rodopi. ● Kristjánsson, Kristján. (2018). Virtuous Emotion, p. 40. Oxford University Press. 外文二手期刊資料 ● Reath, Andrews. (2006). “Kant’s Theory of Moral Sensibility: Respect for the Moral Law and the Influence of Inclination”. Agency and Autonomy in Kant’s Moral Theory: Selected Essays. Oxford, 2006; online edn, Oxford Academic, 1 May 2006. pp. 284-302. ● Zinkin, Melissa. (2006). “Respect for the Law and the Use of Dynamical terms in Kant’s Theory of Moral Motivation”. Vol.88, No.1. pp. 31-53. ● Broadie, Alexander / Pybus, Elizabeth. (1975). “Kant’s Concept of ‘Respect”. Kant-Studien, 66. pp. 58–64. ● Walker, Ralph C. S. (1989). “Achtung in the Grundlegung, in: Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten: Ein kooperativer Kommentar”, Hg. Otfried Höffe, Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann. pp. 97-116. ● McCarty, Richard. (1994). “Motivation and Moral Choice in Kant’s Theory of Rational Agency”. Kant-Studien 85. pp. 15–31. ● McCarty, Richard. (1993). “Kantian moral motivation and the feeling og respect”. Journal of the History of Philosophy. 31. (3). pp. 421-435. ● Ware, Owen. (2014). “Kant on Moral Sensibility and Moral Motivation”. Journal of the History of Philosophy, vol.52, no.4 pp. 727–746. ● Holberg, Erika. (2016). “The Importance of Pleasure in the Moral for Kant’s Ethics”. The Southern Journal of Philosophy, volume 54, Issue 2. pp. 226-246. ● Noller. Jörg. (2019). “Reason’s feeling: A systematic reconstruction of Kant’s theory of moral respect”. De Gryuter, SATS(20)-1. pp.1-18. ● Yost, S. Benjamin. (2017). “Kant’s Theory of Motivation: A Hybrid Approach”. The Review of Metaphysics, vol.71, no.2. pp.293-319. ● Sargentis, Konstantinos. (2012). “Moral Motivation in Kant”. KSO(1), pp.93-121. ● Schröder, T., Roskies, A. L., Nichols, S.. (2010). “Moral Motivation”. The Moral Psyhology Handbook. pp.72-110 ● Dreyfus, Stuart E., Dreyfus, Hubert L. (February 1980). “A Five-Stage Model of the Mental Activities Involved in Directed Skill Acquisition”. Washington, DC: Storming Media. ● tern, R. (2015). “On Hegel’s Critique of Kant’s Ethics: Beyond the ‘Empty Formalism’ Objection”. Kantian Ethics: Value, Agency, and Obligation, Chapter 8, pp. 138-156. ● Sadler, Brook J. (2003). “The Possibility of Amoralism: A Defense Against Internalism”. Philosophy, Vol.78, No.303, pp. 63-78. ● Mackie, J. L. (1965). “Causes and Conditions”. American Philosophical Quarterly 2: pp. 245-264. ● Smith, M. (1987). “The Humean Theory of Motivation”, Mind, Vol. 96, No.381, pp.36-61. Oxford University Press on behalf of the Mind Assosiation. ● Schüler, G. F. (2010). “Motivational Internalism and Externalism”. A Companion to the Philosophy of Action, O’Connor, Timothy & Sandis Constantine (ed.), pp. 293-300, Wiley-Blackwell. ● Humberstone, Lloyd. (1992). “Direction of Fit”. Mind, New Series, vol. 101, No.401, pp.59-83. 網路資料： ● Giannini, H. C. (2013). “Korsgaard and the Wille/Willkür Distinction: Radical Constructivism and the Imputability of Immoral Actions”, 72. Kant Studies Online Ltd. URL = <https://kantstudiesonline.net/>. ● Rosati, Connie S., "Moral Motivation", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2016 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2016/entries/moral-motivation/>. 描述 碩士
國立政治大學
哲學系
109154010資料來源 http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0109154010 資料類型 thesis dc.contributor.advisor 王華 zh_TW dc.contributor.advisor Wang, Hua en_US dc.contributor.author (作者) 范均威 zh_TW dc.contributor.author (作者) Fan, Chun-Wei en_US dc.creator (作者) 范均威 zh_TW dc.creator (作者) Fan, Chun-Wei en_US dc.date (日期) 2024 en_US dc.date.accessioned 4-九月-2024 15:15:24 (UTC+8) - dc.date.available 4-九月-2024 15:15:24 (UTC+8) - dc.date.issued (上傳時間) 4-九月-2024 15:15:24 (UTC+8) - dc.identifier (其他 識別碼) G0109154010 en_US dc.identifier.uri (URI) https://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/153440 - dc.description (描述) 碩士 zh_TW dc.description (描述) 國立政治大學 zh_TW dc.description (描述) 哲學系 zh_TW dc.description (描述) 109154010 zh_TW dc.description.abstract (摘要) 康德的義務論倫理學是倫理學中極具代表性的一派主張，其影響力之大，時至今日仍為哲學家所熱議。其中，康德之道德心理學的議題在所有康德道德哲學研究中雖相對冷門，卻是其道德哲學系統中非常重要的一環，毋寧說，掌握康德的道德心理學是釐清「純粹理性如何可能是實踐的」這一問題之關鍵。然而，康德專用的語詞概念與理論結構既複雜又曖昧，使得其詮釋方式在後世研究者之間莫衷一是。本文試圖細究康德文本中有關於道德心理學之內容，並探討針對此議題的兩大詮釋派別 — 理智主義與情感主義 — 的主張及各自的理論缺點，本文主張理智主義者的詮釋忽略了大量康德關於道德情感/敬畏的情感面作為動力本身的陳述，且無法回應情感主義者關於「意志軟弱」的挑戰；而情感主義的詮釋雖較契合康德之本意，但並不能很好地兼容部分重要概念。因此本文嘗試重構出一個筆者認為與康德文本較為契合，且在哲學上較為合理的「弱情感主義」版本之康德道德心理學結構，以提出一種理解康德的新可能。 zh_TW dc.description.abstract (摘要) Kant’s Deontology is one of the most iconic theories in moral philosophy, with a tremendous impact that continues to be widely debated nowadays. Despite its significance, moral psychology, among the specific topics within Kant’s moral philosophy, is relatively neglected. However, Kant’s moral psychology is undoubtedly crucial for understanding the entirety of his moral philosophy. It is no exaggeration to state that clarifying his moral psychology is essential for comprehending "how Pure Reason can be Practical," which is the primary question of Kant’s second Critique. Nevertheless, the complexity of Kant's terminology and the vast structure of his texts have led to divergent interpretations under debate. This thesis aims to delve into the content concerning moral psychology in Kant’s texts and investigate the two main interpretations: intellectualism and affectivism, with respect to their advantages and problems as well. I argue that intellectualists have ignored massive statements of Kant where moral feeling or the affective aspect of respect play a necessary role in moral motivation, whereas affectivists’ interpretation is more consistent with Kant’s original thought, but still failed to contain some significant concepts. My goal thus is to reconstruct a "soft affectivist version" of Kant’s moral psychological structure, which I argue is more textually consistent and philosophically plausible in order to provide a new way for comprehending Kant’s moral theory. en_US dc.description.tableofcontents 目錄 目錄 1 緒論 2 一、研究背景 2 二、研究動機與目的 2 三、章節安排說明 4 第一章、動機問題闡述 6 1-1、 法則直接決定意志 10 1-2、 道德法則對心靈的否定作用 12 1-3、 《實踐理性批判》中的敬畏 16 1-4、 敬畏就是「動機」？ 18 第二章、理智主義詮釋及評析 23 2-1、 Andrews Reath的理智推動主張 23 2-2、 Henry Allison的採納主張與敬畏詮釋 26 2-3、 理智主義整理 31 第三章、情感主義詮釋及評析 33 3-1、 McCarty的批評：意志軟弱 33 3-2、 情感對抗主張與道德情感的角色 37 3-3、 McCarty的問題 41 3-4、 弱情感主義 44 第四章、動機問題結論 48 4-1、綜觀理智主義與情感主義之爭 48 4-2、總結動機問題 52 第五章、弱情感主義詮釋下的康德道德心理學 56 5-1、道德主體基本架構 – 人的雙重身分 59 5-2、意志與意念之分 68 5-3、德行、道德與敬畏 71 5-4、道德抉擇：情感對抗與採納 80 5-5、道德行動與道德價值 82 參考資料 84 zh_TW dc.format.extent 1637272 bytes - dc.format.mimetype application/pdf - dc.source.uri (資料來源) http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0109154010 en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) 康德 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) 倫理學 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) 道德心理學 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) 情感主義 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) 弱情感主義 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) 道德動機 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) Kant en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) Ethics en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) moral psychology en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) affectivism en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) soft affectivism en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) moral motivation en_US dc.title (題名) 康德道德動機理論重構：論道德心理學的弱情感主義詮釋 zh_TW dc.title (題名) Reconstruct Kant's Theory of Moral Motivation: A Soft Affectivist Interpretation of Moral Psychology en_US dc.type (資料類型) thesis en_US dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) 康德文本翻譯 中文： ● 康德（1990）。 道德底形上學之基礎 （李明輝譯）。聯經出版。 ● 康德（1999）。實踐理性批判（韓水法譯）。商務印書館出版。 ● 康德（2004）。實用人類學（鄧曉芒譯）。上海人民出版社。 ● 康德（2015）。道德底形上學 （李明輝譯）。聯經出版。 ● 康德（2017）。單純理性限度內的宗教（李秋零譯）。商務印書館出版。 英文： ● Kant, Immanuel. (1998). Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals (M. Gregor, Ed. & Trans.). Cambridge University Press. ● Kant, Immanuel. (2017). Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, 2nd ed. (S. Orr, Ed. & Trans.). Web. Kants Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten (verbesserte zweyte Auflage bey Hartknoch 1786 ) (groundlaying.appspot.com). ● Kant, Immanuel. (1991). The Metaphysics of Morals (M. Gregor, Ed. & Trans.). Cambridge University Press. ● Kant, Immanuel. (2002). Critique of Practical Reason (W. S. Pluhar, Trans.). Hackett Publishing Company, Inc.. ● Kant, Immanuel. (2016). Collected Works of Immanuel Kant: Series Seven. Delphi Classics. ● Kant, Immanuel. (1997). Lectures on ethics. (P. Heath, & J. B. Schneewind, Ed., P. Heath, Trans.). Cambridge University Press. 中文二手圖書資料 ● 鄺芷人（1992）。康德倫理學原理。文津出版社。 中文二手期刊資料 ● 李明輝（1993）。牟宗三哲學中的「物自身」概念。中國文哲研究期刊，第三期，頁547-574。 ● 李明輝（1994）。《康德倫理學發展中的道德情感問題》導論，中國文史研究通訊，第四卷第1期，序跋選錄。 ● 李明輝（2004）。康德的「道德情感」理論與席勒對康德倫理學的批判。揭諦，第七期，頁37-76，南華大學哲學與生命教育學系出版。 ● 史偉民（2023）。康德論道德的判斷原則與踐履原則。東吳哲學學報，第四十六期，第73-104頁。 ● 史偉民（2013）。道德感情與動機：康德、席勒與牟宗三。清華學報，新45卷，第4期，第597-630頁。 外文圖書資料 ● Beck, Lewis White. (1960). A Commentary on Kant’s ‘Critique of Practical Reason. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. ● Nagel, Thomas. (1970). The Possibility of Altruism. Princeton University Press. ● Korsgaard, Christine. (1996). Creating the Kingdom of Ends. Cambridge University Press. ● Allison, Henry. (1990). Kant’s Theory of Freedom. Cambridge University Press. ● Tenenbaum, Sergio. (Ed.). (2007). Moral Psychology, 9-10. Rodopi. ● Kristjánsson, Kristján. (2018). Virtuous Emotion, p. 40. Oxford University Press. 外文二手期刊資料 ● Reath, Andrews. (2006). “Kant’s Theory of Moral Sensibility: Respect for the Moral Law and the Influence of Inclination”. Agency and Autonomy in Kant’s Moral Theory: Selected Essays. Oxford, 2006; online edn, Oxford Academic, 1 May 2006. pp. 284-302. ● Zinkin, Melissa. (2006). “Respect for the Law and the Use of Dynamical terms in Kant’s Theory of Moral Motivation”. Vol.88, No.1. pp. 31-53. ● Broadie, Alexander / Pybus, Elizabeth. (1975). “Kant’s Concept of ‘Respect”. Kant-Studien, 66. pp. 58–64. ● Walker, Ralph C. S. (1989). “Achtung in the Grundlegung, in: Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten: Ein kooperativer Kommentar”, Hg. Otfried Höffe, Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann. pp. 97-116. ● McCarty, Richard. (1994). “Motivation and Moral Choice in Kant’s Theory of Rational Agency”. Kant-Studien 85. pp. 15–31. ● McCarty, Richard. (1993). “Kantian moral motivation and the feeling og respect”. Journal of the History of Philosophy. 31. (3). pp. 421-435. ● Ware, Owen. (2014). “Kant on Moral Sensibility and Moral Motivation”. Journal of the History of Philosophy, vol.52, no.4 pp. 727–746. ● Holberg, Erika. (2016). “The Importance of Pleasure in the Moral for Kant’s Ethics”. The Southern Journal of Philosophy, volume 54, Issue 2. pp. 226-246. ● Noller. Jörg. (2019). “Reason’s feeling: A systematic reconstruction of Kant’s theory of moral respect”. De Gryuter, SATS(20)-1. pp.1-18. ● Yost, S. Benjamin. (2017). “Kant’s Theory of Motivation: A Hybrid Approach”. The Review of Metaphysics, vol.71, no.2. pp.293-319. ● Sargentis, Konstantinos. (2012). “Moral Motivation in Kant”. KSO(1), pp.93-121. ● Schröder, T., Roskies, A. L., Nichols, S.. (2010). “Moral Motivation”. The Moral Psyhology Handbook. pp.72-110 ● Dreyfus, Stuart E., Dreyfus, Hubert L. (February 1980). “A Five-Stage Model of the Mental Activities Involved in Directed Skill Acquisition”. Washington, DC: Storming Media. ● tern, R. (2015). “On Hegel’s Critique of Kant’s Ethics: Beyond the ‘Empty Formalism’ Objection”. Kantian Ethics: Value, Agency, and Obligation, Chapter 8, pp. 138-156. ● Sadler, Brook J. (2003). “The Possibility of Amoralism: A Defense Against Internalism”. Philosophy, Vol.78, No.303, pp. 63-78. ● Mackie, J. L. (1965). “Causes and Conditions”. American Philosophical Quarterly 2: pp. 245-264. ● Smith, M. (1987). “The Humean Theory of Motivation”, Mind, Vol. 96, No.381, pp.36-61. Oxford University Press on behalf of the Mind Assosiation. ● Schüler, G. F. (2010). “Motivational Internalism and Externalism”. A Companion to the Philosophy of Action, O’Connor, Timothy & Sandis Constantine (ed.), pp. 293-300, Wiley-Blackwell. ● Humberstone, Lloyd. (1992). “Direction of Fit”. Mind, New Series, vol. 101, No.401, pp.59-83. 網路資料： ● Giannini, H. C. (2013). “Korsgaard and the Wille/Willkür Distinction: Radical Constructivism and the Imputability of Immoral Actions”, 72. Kant Studies Online Ltd. URL = <https://kantstudiesonline.net/>. ● Rosati, Connie S., "Moral Motivation", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2016 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2016/entries/moral-motivation/>. zh_TW
