1. NCCU Academic Hub
  2. 學術產出
  3. 商學院
  4. 期刊論文
  5. Item

學術產出-期刊論文

文章檢視/開啟

書目匯出

Google ScholarTM

政大圖書館

引文資訊

TAIR相關學術產出

題名 Can second-chance provisions increase the effectiveness of penalty contracts? Evidence from a quasi field experiment
作者 吳安妮
Wu, Anne;Chen, Clara Xiaoling;Wang, Laura W.;Wu, Steve Yuching
貢獻者 會計系
關鍵詞 fairness; penalty; performance; second chance
日期 2024-09
上傳時間 28-十月-2024 11:42:50 (UTC+8)
摘要 Penalty contracts are commonly utilized in developing countries. Such contracts may be perceived as unfair, potentially reducing employee motivation and performance. We predict that adding a second-chance provision, an opportunity to reverse a penalty for poor performance if subsequent performance improves, could improve the effectiveness of penalty contracts. In a quasi field experiment at a company with two manufacturing facilities in Taiwan, we treated one facility with a traditional-penalty contract without a second-chance provision and the other with a penalty contract with a second-chance provision. We observe a significant difference in the two treatment effects, with employee performance decreasing significantly after the traditional-penalty treatment but showing no decrease when a second-chance provision was included. Further analysis reveals that this difference is mediated by employees' fairness perceptions. These results provide valuable insights to governments, nongovernmental organizations, and multinationals as they work together to improve the fairness of global compensation practices.
關聯 Contemporary Accounting Research, Vol.41, No.3, pp.1672-1694
資料類型 article
DOI https://doi.org/10.1111/1911-3846.12961
dc.contributor 會計系-
dc.creator (作者) 吳安妮-
dc.creator (作者) Wu, Anne;Chen, Clara Xiaoling;Wang, Laura W.;Wu, Steve Yuching-
dc.date (日期) 2024-09-
dc.date.accessioned 28-十月-2024 11:42:50 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.available 28-十月-2024 11:42:50 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.issued (上傳時間) 28-十月-2024 11:42:50 (UTC+8)-
dc.identifier.uri (URI) https://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/154115-
dc.description.abstract (摘要) Penalty contracts are commonly utilized in developing countries. Such contracts may be perceived as unfair, potentially reducing employee motivation and performance. We predict that adding a second-chance provision, an opportunity to reverse a penalty for poor performance if subsequent performance improves, could improve the effectiveness of penalty contracts. In a quasi field experiment at a company with two manufacturing facilities in Taiwan, we treated one facility with a traditional-penalty contract without a second-chance provision and the other with a penalty contract with a second-chance provision. We observe a significant difference in the two treatment effects, with employee performance decreasing significantly after the traditional-penalty treatment but showing no decrease when a second-chance provision was included. Further analysis reveals that this difference is mediated by employees' fairness perceptions. These results provide valuable insights to governments, nongovernmental organizations, and multinationals as they work together to improve the fairness of global compensation practices.-
dc.format.extent 103 bytes-
dc.format.mimetype text/html-
dc.relation (關聯) Contemporary Accounting Research, Vol.41, No.3, pp.1672-1694-
dc.subject (關鍵詞) fairness; penalty; performance; second chance-
dc.title (題名) Can second-chance provisions increase the effectiveness of penalty contracts? Evidence from a quasi field experiment-
dc.type (資料類型) article-
dc.identifier.doi (DOI) 10.1111/1911-3846.12961-
dc.doi.uri (DOI) https://doi.org/10.1111/1911-3846.12961-