| dc.coverage.temporal | 計畫年度：91 起迄日期：20020801～20040131 | en_US |
| dc.creator (作者) | 何靜嫺 | zh_TW |
| dc.date (日期) | 2002 | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | 18-四月-2007 18:27:16 (UTC+8) | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | 9-九月-2008 09:00:47 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.date.available | 18-四月-2007 18:27:16 (UTC+8) | en_US |
| dc.date.available | 9-九月-2008 09:00:47 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.date.issued (上傳時間) | 18-四月-2007 18:27:16 (UTC+8) | en_US |
| dc.identifier (其他 識別碼) | 912415H004010.pdf | en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri (URI) | http://tair.lib.ntu.edu.tw:8000/123456789/5064 | en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri (URI) | https://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/5064 | - |
| dc.description (描述) | 核定金額：277600元 | en_US |
| dc.description.abstract (摘要) | This paper investigates the eect of environmental consciousness on rms` adoption decisions toward a pollution abatement equipment. The impact of environmental awareness takes a form of cost reduction, which turns the interaction among rms into a coordination game with multiple equilibria: either both rms adopt or no one adopts. This is contrary to the various facts of partially coordination on pollution control. Moreover, two prominent criteria for equilibrium selection suggest that the equilib-rium with no adoption should be chosen. We provide a solution by proving the existence of collusion outcomes in subgames following asymmetric adop- tion decisions. Such a subgame outcome, in turn, supports the asymmetric adoptions (partially coordination) as part of a subgame perfect equilibrium. | - |
| dc.format | applicaiton/pdf | en_US |
| dc.format.extent | bytes | en_US |
| dc.format.extent | 183392 bytes | en_US |
| dc.format.extent | 183392 bytes | - |
| dc.format.extent | 16753 bytes | - |
| dc.format.mimetype | application/pdf | en_US |
| dc.format.mimetype | application/pdf | en_US |
| dc.format.mimetype | application/pdf | - |
| dc.format.mimetype | text/plain | - |
| dc.language | zh-TW | en_US |
| dc.language.iso | zh-TW | en_US |
| dc.publisher (出版社) | 臺北市：國立政治大學經濟學系 | en_US |
| dc.rights (權利) | 行政院國家科學委員會 | en_US |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | 排放稅;環保意識;均衡選擇;協調;靜態分析;動態分析 | - |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | Emission tax;Environmental consciousness;Equilibrium selection;Coordination;Static analysis;Dynamic analysis | - |
| dc.title (題名) | 污染稅能否鼓勵廠商採用防治污染設備?靜態與動態分析 | zh_TW |
| dc.title.alternative (其他題名) | The Eect of Environmental Consciousness on Emission Tax and Abatement Equipment | - |
| dc.type (資料類型) | report | en |
