| dc.creator (作者) | 徐麗振 | zh_TW |
| dc.date (日期) | 1998-12 | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | 6-一月-2009 15:16:18 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.date.available | 6-一月-2009 15:16:18 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.date.issued (上傳時間) | 6-一月-2009 15:16:18 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.identifier.uri (URI) | https://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/22237 | - |
| dc.description.abstract (摘要) | 本文探討一區域間租稅競爭的跨期模型。在模型中區域政府對資本課稅不僅造成 區域間的外部性，同時也扭曲個人對目前消費與未來消費之間的最適選擇。因為全國資本並 非固定不變，資本稅競爭的結果並不必然造成區域政府低度提供地方公共財。本文的另一主 要結論為雖然區域政府間的合作可將資本稅競爭所產生的外部性內部化，但合作並不能矯正 資本稅所造成的對個人最適儲蓄決策的扭曲。因此，不論區域政府合作與否，他們皆面對一 次佳的問題。故而競爭的均衡在某些情況下，例如以上兩種扭曲相互抵銷時，或許較合作的 均衡有效率。 This paper investigates interjurisdictional tax competition in an intertemporal model. Local capital taxation not only creates externalities between jurisdictions but also distorts individuals` optimal choice between current and future consumption. Since the national capital stock is variable, jurisdictions do not necessarily underprovide local public goods. This paper also shows that although cooperation internalizes the externality among competing jurisdictions, cooperation cannot remedy the distortion in individuals` optimal saving decisions. Therefore, local governments face a second-best problem even if they cooperate. Consequently, the competitive equilibrium in some situations, in which the above two distortions counteract each other, may be more efficient than the cooperative equilibrium. | - |
| dc.format | application/ | en_US |
| dc.language | en | en_US |
| dc.language | en-US | en_US |
| dc.language.iso | en_US | - |
| dc.relation (關聯) | 經濟論文,26(4),441-472 | en_US |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | 租稅競爭 ; 資本稅 ; 目標儲蓄 ; 次佳; Tax competition ; Capital taxation ; Target saving ; Second best | - |
| dc.title (題名) | Interjurisdictional Tax Competition with Non-Fixed National Capital Stock | en_US |
| dc.title.alternative (其他題名) | 全國資本總量不為固定時的區域間租稅競爭 | - |
| dc.type (資料類型) | article | en |
