| dc.creator (作者) | 何靜嫺 | zh_TW |
| dc.date (日期) | 2000 | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | 9-Jan-2009 11:38:33 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.date.available | 9-Jan-2009 11:38:33 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.date.issued (上傳時間) | 9-Jan-2009 11:38:33 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.identifier.uri (URI) | https://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/23179 | - |
| dc.description.abstract (摘要) | We analyze the formation and stability of coalitions for a situation where finitely many individuals form different coalitions and their payoffs depend on the consequence of a noncooperative game with different coalitions, and examine the moving path of individuals among various coalitions. Our main finding is to show that there exists at least one evolutionarily stable coalition equilibrium in Γnx. | en_US |
| dc.format | application/ | en_US |
| dc.language | en | en_US |
| dc.language | en-US | en_US |
| dc.language.iso | en_US | - |
| dc.relation (關聯) | The Annual Conference of the Japan Association for Evolutionary Economics | en_US |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | coalition structure;evolutionarily stable;folk theorem;game theory;self-organization | en_US |
| dc.title (題名) | Evolutionarily Stable Coalition Structure | en_US |
| dc.type (資料類型) | conference | en |
| dc.identifier.doi (DOI) | 10.1023/A:1014062211818 | - |
| dc.doi.uri (DOI) | http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/A:1014062211818 | - |
