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題名 公司治理和企業併購的超額報酬之關聯性研究
Study of the relationship between corporate governance and the abnormal return of M&A
作者 林慶哲
Lin,Ching Che
貢獻者 吳啟銘
Wu, Chiming
林慶哲
Lin,Ching Che
關鍵詞 併購
公司治理
經理人持股比例
大股東持股比例
獨立董事
董事會規模
市值規模
M@A
Corporate Governance
Independent Directors
Board of Directors
Market Value
日期 2007
上傳時間 14-九月-2009 09:02:53 (UTC+8)
摘要 隨著國內外相關弊案的爆發,「公司治理」近幾年來一直是企業相當重視的議題。除了由於受到國際環境變化劇烈所影響之外,公司治理也與整體企業監控制度有密切之關聯。在國內外有相當多的學者從不同角度進行公司治理的相關的研究,而主管機關如金管會、證交所等也陸續制定相關的措施,希望能夠盡最大的力量來保障投資人的權益。
     
      本研究主要是藉由公司治理的主要變數來探討企業購併案所造成的超額報酬與公司治理之間的影響,並進一步討論當公司治理愈差時,宣告購併所產生的超額報酬是否會較低。研究期間為民國87年1月至97年3月間,曾發生併購活動的上市、櫃公司,共選取100個樣本。而實證結果如下:
     
     一. 經理人持股比例和公司宣告購併所造成的超額報酬呈顯著正相關
     二. 大股東股比例和公司宣告購併所造成的超額報酬呈顯著正相關
     三. 獨立董事占董事會的比例和公司宣告購併所造成的超額報酬呈顯著負相關
     四. 董事會的規模和公司宣告購併所造成的超額報酬呈顯著負相關
     五. 市值規模和公司宣告購併所造成的超額報酬呈現正相關,但不顯著
     
      另外,本研究也針對公司治理較差的公司去進行研究分析,發現若公司治理較差的公司去從事購併案時,可賺取的超額報酬愈少,而當公司治理愈差時,這種關係將愈顯著。最後,本研究也彙整一些相關建議,以供後續學者、企業以及政府機關做參考。
As scandals related to managers and the wealth of investors spring up worldwide, corporate governance has become an important issue recently. In addition to drastic international macroeconomics changes, corporate governance is also strongly influenced by overall monitor systems. Scholars around the world have done lots of research regarding corporate governance for decades. In addition, relevant efforts and measures, aimed at protecting investors’ rights and interests, have also been done by authorities such as FSC and TSE.
     
     The purpose of the study is to study the relationship between abnormal return of M&A and corporate governance by examining the factors we choose. Furthermore, we discuss if a company performs poorly on its corporate governance system, whether the abnormal return caused by merger deals will also decrease? 100 samples were selected from the listed companies from TSE and OTC between 1998~2008. Main findings include the following:
     
     (1). The ratio of the stock held by managers has a positive relationship with abnormal return of M&A.
     (2). The ratio of the stock held by major stockholders has a positive relationship with abnormal return of M&A.
     (3). The ratio of the outside independent directors has a negative relationship with abnormal return of M&A.
     (4). The scale of the board has a negative relationship with abnormal return of M&A.
     (5). The market value has a positive relationship with abnormal return of M&A
     
      Moreover, the study has also done some empirical research on companies whose corporate governance pale in comparison with others and found that those who do poorly on corporate governance tend to make less abnormal return when making acquisition announcements. Last but not least, the study has also made some suggestions for scholars, businesses and government and hope that they may come in handy in the future.
參考文獻 一、中文部份
1. 吳昆皇(民84年),「上市公司董事會組成與特性對企業經營之關聯性研究」,國立台灣大學商學研究所碩士論文
2. 孫秀蘭(民85年),「董事會制度與經營績效之研究」,國立台灣大學財務金融研究所碩士論文
3. 黃鈺光(民82年),「我國上市公司董事會特性與經營績效之研究」,國立台灣大學會計研究所碩士論文
4. 侍台誠(民83年),「董事會特性中家族因素與經營績效之實證研究-兼論法人董事的影響」,國立台灣大學會計研究所碩士論文
5. 王玉珍(民91年),「股權結構、董事會組成、資本結構與企業績效關係之研究」,中央大學企業管理研究所碩士論文
6. 劉靜容(民91年),「經理者股權與公司績效-內生轉換聯立方程模型分析」,淡江大學經濟研究所碩士論文
7. 張明峰(民80年),「股權結構對公司績效影響之研究」,國立政治大學企管所碩士論文
8. 江雅雲(民88年),「我國上市公司董監事改選機制與其經營績效之關聯性研究」,國立政治大學會計系碩士論文
9. 楊麗弘(民88年),「台灣上市公司股權結構與經營績效研究」,私立長庚大學管理研究所碩士論文
10. 林玉霞(民91年),「台灣上市公司代理問題、公司治理與股東價值研究」,私立中原大學會計研究所碩士論文
11. 柯承恩(民89年),「我國公司監理體系之問題與改進建議(上)」,會計研究月刊,第173期,頁75-81
12. 柯承恩(民89年),「我國公司監理體系之問題與改進建議(上)」,會計研究月刊,第174期,頁79-83
13. 陳春山(民75年),「機構投資人與證券市場,證券管理」,第四卷第二期,頁30-40
14. 劉韻僖、葉匡時(民國88年),「強化國內經濟體質:企業監控之研究,經濟情勢暨評論」,第五卷第一期,頁1-22
15. 葉銀華及邱顯比(民85年),「資本結構、股權結構與公司價值關聯性之實證研究:代理成本理論」,台大管理論叢,第七卷第二期,頁57-90
16. 葉銀華、李存修及柯承恩(民89年),「公司治理與評等系統」,台北:商智文化
17. 王元章(民90年),「內部人持股、風險、股利、負債、投資與公司價值」,證券市場發展,第十三卷第三期
18. 蘇裕惠、葉銀華(民88年),「強化公司治理機制之探討」,主計月報第521期,第八十七卷第五期,頁13-25
19. 公開資訊觀測站,http://mops.tse.com.tw
20. 台灣證券交易所,http://www.tse.com.tw
二、英文部份
1. Fama, E. (1980), Agency problems and the theory of the firm, Journal of Political
Economy, 88, 288-307
1. Fama, E&Jensen, M. (1983), Separation of ownership and control, Journal of Law and Economics, 26, 301-325
2. Barnhart, S. W., & Rosenstein, S. (1998). Board composition, managerial ownership, and firm performance:An empirical analysis, Financial Review, 22, 1-16
3. Jensen, M. and W. Meckling (1976), Theory of the firm:Managerial behavior, agency costs, and ownership structure , Journal of Financial Economics, 3, 305-360
4. Core, J., Holthausen, R., & Larcker, D. (1999), Corporate governance, chief executive officer compensation, and firm performance, Journal of Financial Economics, 51, 371-406
5. Morck, R., Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R.(1990), Do managerial objectives drive bad acquisitions?Journal of Finance, 45, 31-48
6. Rosenstein, S. & Wyatt, J. (1990), Outside directors, board independence, and shareholder wealth, Journal of Finance, 26, 175-192
7. Rosenstein, S. & Wyatt, J. (1997), Inside directors, board effectiveness, and shareholder wealth, Journal of Finance, 44, 229-250
8. Ueng, J (1998), Manager incentive and returns to shareholders of acquiring firms, Review of Business, 19, 27-30
9. Zahra, S. A., & Pearce, J. A. II. (1989), Board of directors and corporate financial performance:A review and integrated model, Journal of Management, 15, 291-334
10. World Bank (199), Corporate governance:A framework for implementation-overview, The World Bank, Washington D.C
11. Kesner, I. F., & Johnson, R. B.(1990), An investigation of the relationship between board composition and stockholder suits, Strategic Management Journal, 11, 327-336
12. Magal, R. & H. Singh, (1993), Ownership structure, board relationships and CEO compensation in large US corporation, Accounting and Business Research, 23, 339-350
13. McConnell, J. J., and H. Servaes (1990), Additional evidence in equity ownership and corporate value, Journal of Financial Economics, 27, 595-612
14. Jensen, M & Murphy, K. (1990), Performance pay and top-management incentives, Journal of Political Economy, 88, 225-264
15. Yermack, D. (1996), Higher market valuation of companies with a small board of directors, Journal of Financial Economics, 40, 185-211
16. Datta, S., Iskandar-Datta, M., & Raman, K. (2001), Executive compensation and corporate acquisition decisions, Journal of Finance, 56, 2299-2336
描述 碩士
國立政治大學
財務管理研究所
95357016
96
資料來源 http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0095357016
資料類型 thesis
dc.contributor.advisor 吳啟銘zh_TW
dc.contributor.advisor Wu, Chimingen_US
dc.contributor.author (作者) 林慶哲zh_TW
dc.contributor.author (作者) Lin,Ching Cheen_US
dc.creator (作者) 林慶哲zh_TW
dc.creator (作者) Lin,Ching Cheen_US
dc.date (日期) 2007en_US
dc.date.accessioned 14-九月-2009 09:02:53 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.available 14-九月-2009 09:02:53 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.issued (上傳時間) 14-九月-2009 09:02:53 (UTC+8)-
dc.identifier (其他 識別碼) G0095357016en_US
dc.identifier.uri (URI) https://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/31006-
dc.description (描述) 碩士zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 國立政治大學zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 財務管理研究所zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 95357016zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 96zh_TW
dc.description.abstract (摘要) 隨著國內外相關弊案的爆發,「公司治理」近幾年來一直是企業相當重視的議題。除了由於受到國際環境變化劇烈所影響之外,公司治理也與整體企業監控制度有密切之關聯。在國內外有相當多的學者從不同角度進行公司治理的相關的研究,而主管機關如金管會、證交所等也陸續制定相關的措施,希望能夠盡最大的力量來保障投資人的權益。
     
      本研究主要是藉由公司治理的主要變數來探討企業購併案所造成的超額報酬與公司治理之間的影響,並進一步討論當公司治理愈差時,宣告購併所產生的超額報酬是否會較低。研究期間為民國87年1月至97年3月間,曾發生併購活動的上市、櫃公司,共選取100個樣本。而實證結果如下:
     
     一. 經理人持股比例和公司宣告購併所造成的超額報酬呈顯著正相關
     二. 大股東股比例和公司宣告購併所造成的超額報酬呈顯著正相關
     三. 獨立董事占董事會的比例和公司宣告購併所造成的超額報酬呈顯著負相關
     四. 董事會的規模和公司宣告購併所造成的超額報酬呈顯著負相關
     五. 市值規模和公司宣告購併所造成的超額報酬呈現正相關,但不顯著
     
      另外,本研究也針對公司治理較差的公司去進行研究分析,發現若公司治理較差的公司去從事購併案時,可賺取的超額報酬愈少,而當公司治理愈差時,這種關係將愈顯著。最後,本研究也彙整一些相關建議,以供後續學者、企業以及政府機關做參考。
zh_TW
dc.description.abstract (摘要) As scandals related to managers and the wealth of investors spring up worldwide, corporate governance has become an important issue recently. In addition to drastic international macroeconomics changes, corporate governance is also strongly influenced by overall monitor systems. Scholars around the world have done lots of research regarding corporate governance for decades. In addition, relevant efforts and measures, aimed at protecting investors’ rights and interests, have also been done by authorities such as FSC and TSE.
     
     The purpose of the study is to study the relationship between abnormal return of M&A and corporate governance by examining the factors we choose. Furthermore, we discuss if a company performs poorly on its corporate governance system, whether the abnormal return caused by merger deals will also decrease? 100 samples were selected from the listed companies from TSE and OTC between 1998~2008. Main findings include the following:
     
     (1). The ratio of the stock held by managers has a positive relationship with abnormal return of M&A.
     (2). The ratio of the stock held by major stockholders has a positive relationship with abnormal return of M&A.
     (3). The ratio of the outside independent directors has a negative relationship with abnormal return of M&A.
     (4). The scale of the board has a negative relationship with abnormal return of M&A.
     (5). The market value has a positive relationship with abnormal return of M&A
     
      Moreover, the study has also done some empirical research on companies whose corporate governance pale in comparison with others and found that those who do poorly on corporate governance tend to make less abnormal return when making acquisition announcements. Last but not least, the study has also made some suggestions for scholars, businesses and government and hope that they may come in handy in the future.
en_US
dc.description.tableofcontents 第一章 序論…………………………………………………………………. 1
     
     第一節 研究背景…………………………………………………………….. 1
     第二節 研究動機和目的…………………………………………………….. 2
     第三節 研究流程…………………………………………………………….. 3
     第四節 研究範圍和論文架構……………………………………………….. 4
     
     第二章 相關文獻探討………………………………………………………. 5
     
     第一節 代理問題與解決機制………………………………………………. 5
     第二節 公司治理的意義、架構和執行現況………………………………. 9
     第三節 公司治理和企業經營績效之關聯性………………………………18
     
     第三章 研究架構與方法…………………………………………………....28
     
     第一節 研究架構…………………………………………………………....28
     第二節 研究假設……………………………………………………………30
     第三節 研究樣本……………………………………………………………36
     第四節 研究變數定義及衡量………………………………………………37
     第五節 研究資料及分析方法………………………………………………38
     
     第四章 實證結果與分析……………………………………………………42
     
     第一節 樣本特性分析…………………………………………………….…42
     第二節 研究變數基本統計分析…………………………………………….43
     第三節 假設驗證與分析…………………………………………………….46
     
     第五章 結論與建議…………………………………………………………52
     
     第一節 研究結論…………………………………………………………....52
     第二節 建議…………………………………………………………………53
     
     參考文獻………………………………………………………………………56
     
     圖目錄
     圖 1-3 本研究的研究流程………………………………………………………….. 3
     圖 2-1-1 代理問題的發生………………………………………………………….. 6
      圖 2-2-2 世界銀行公司治理架構…………………………………………………..15
     圖 3-1 研究架構………………………………………………………………….....29
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     表目錄
     表 2-1 代理理論概觀……………………………………….…………….………… 5
     表3-2-1 經理人持股比例和公司經營績效的關係……………………….……….. 31
     表3-2-2 大股東持股比例和公司經營績效的關係……………………….……….. 32
     表3-2-3 獨立董監事比例和公司經營績效的關係……………………….……….. 33
     表3-2-4 董事會規模和公司經營績效的關係…………………………….……….. 35
     表3-2-5 市值規模和公司經營績效的關係……………………………….……….. 36
     表 3-5-1量化與質化研究的差異………………………………………….……….. 39
     表 3-5-2 研究方法之劃分………………………………………………………….. 39
     表 4-1 樣本選取標的分佈…………………………………………………………. 42
     表 4-2-1 自變數敘述統計分析……………………………………………………. 43
     表 4-2-2 自變數相關性分析………………………………………………………. 44
     表 4-2-3 應變數敘述性統計分析…………………………………………………. 45
     表 4-2-4 應變數敘述性統計分析--公司治理較差者…………………………….. 45
     表 4-3-1 OLS多元迴歸結果………………………………………………………. 46
     表 4-3-2 經理人持股比例和CAR之間的關係…………………………………... 47
     表 4-3-3 大股東持股比例和CAR之間的關係…………………………………... 48
     表 4-3-4 獨立董事占董事會的比例和CAR之間的關係………………………... 49
     表 4-3-5 董監事席次和CAR之間的關係……………….……………………….. 50
     表 4-3-6 市值規模和CAR之間的關係…………………………………………… 51
zh_TW
dc.language.iso en_US-
dc.source.uri (資料來源) http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0095357016en_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 併購zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 公司治理zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 經理人持股比例zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 大股東持股比例zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 獨立董事zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 董事會規模zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 市值規模zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) M@Aen_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) Corporate Governanceen_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) Independent Directorsen_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) Board of Directorsen_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) Market Valueen_US
dc.title (題名) 公司治理和企業併購的超額報酬之關聯性研究zh_TW
dc.title (題名) Study of the relationship between corporate governance and the abnormal return of M&Aen_US
dc.type (資料類型) thesisen
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) 一、中文部份zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) 1. 吳昆皇(民84年),「上市公司董事會組成與特性對企業經營之關聯性研究」,國立台灣大學商學研究所碩士論文zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) 2. 孫秀蘭(民85年),「董事會制度與經營績效之研究」,國立台灣大學財務金融研究所碩士論文zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) 3. 黃鈺光(民82年),「我國上市公司董事會特性與經營績效之研究」,國立台灣大學會計研究所碩士論文zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) 4. 侍台誠(民83年),「董事會特性中家族因素與經營績效之實證研究-兼論法人董事的影響」,國立台灣大學會計研究所碩士論文zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) 5. 王玉珍(民91年),「股權結構、董事會組成、資本結構與企業績效關係之研究」,中央大學企業管理研究所碩士論文zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) 6. 劉靜容(民91年),「經理者股權與公司績效-內生轉換聯立方程模型分析」,淡江大學經濟研究所碩士論文zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) 7. 張明峰(民80年),「股權結構對公司績效影響之研究」,國立政治大學企管所碩士論文zh_TW
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