| dc.contributor.advisor | 王智賢 | zh_TW |
| dc.contributor.author (作者) | 孫瑋廷 | zh_TW |
| dc.creator (作者) | 孫瑋廷 | zh_TW |
| dc.date (日期) | 2004 | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | 14-九月-2009 13:44:30 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.date.available | 14-九月-2009 13:44:30 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.date.issued (上傳時間) | 14-九月-2009 13:44:30 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.identifier (其他 識別碼) | G0922550231 | en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri (URI) | https://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/32362 | - |
| dc.description (描述) | 碩士 | zh_TW |
| dc.description (描述) | 國立政治大學 | zh_TW |
| dc.description (描述) | 財政研究所 | zh_TW |
| dc.description (描述) | 92255023 | zh_TW |
| dc.description (描述) | 93 | zh_TW |
| dc.description.abstract (摘要) | 在相關之傳統職位晉升的研究中，多數只有討論一位員工獲得晉升的情況。Chen(2003)建立一模型，分析當員工彼此間具有負面攻擊競爭對手的情形下，得到正面實力最強的員工遭遇到其他競爭對手最多的負面總攻擊現象，易造成正面能力最強的員工不易獲得晉升的結果。本文則考慮當獲得晉升的員工不只一位時之狀況，發現當員工能力異質時，晉升超過一位員工之制度將使正面能力最強之員工較不會獲得最多之負面攻擊而易於獲得晉升；但當員工能力同質時，只晉升一位員工是對公司最有利的制度。 | zh_TW |
| dc.description.tableofcontents | 1、前言……………………………………..……………………………1 2、文獻回顧………………………………..……………………………4 3、模型……………………………………..……………………………6 3.1 基本假設………………………....…………………………….6 3.2 N搶1……………………………...…………………………...7 3.3 N搶N-1………...…………………...…………………………9 3.4 三搶二………………………………………………………...13 3.5 延伸討論:N搶N-2...………………………………………….16 3.6 能力同質……………………………………………………...18 4、結論…………………………………………………………………23 附錄一…………………………………………………………………..25 附錄二…………………………………………………………………..40 參考文獻………………………………………………………………..54 | zh_TW |
| dc.language.iso | en_US | - |
| dc.source.uri (資料來源) | http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0922550231 | en_US |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | 晉升 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | 負面攻擊 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | 異質 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | 同質 | zh_TW |
| dc.title (題名) | 負面攻擊下內部升遷制度之改善 | zh_TW |
| dc.type (資料類型) | thesis | en |
| dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) | Baker, G., M. Gibbs and B. Holmstorm (1994),“The Internal Economics of a Firm：Evidence from Personal Data,”Quarterly Journal of Economics 109, 881-919. | zh_TW |
| dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) | Bognanno, M. L. (1999), “Corporate Tournament, ”Journal of LaboEconomics, 19, 290-315. | zh_TW |
| dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) | Chen, K.-P. (2005), “External Recruitment as an Incentive Device, ”Journal of Labor Economics, forthcoming. | zh_TW |
| dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) | Chen, K. -P. (2003), “Sabotage in Promotion Tournaments,”Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, 19, 119-140. | zh_TW |
| dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) | DeVaro, J. (2002), “Promotion Tournament in Real Firms, ”mimeo, Cornell University. | zh_TW |
| dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) | Eriksson, T. (1999),“Executive Compensation and Tournament Theory: Empirical Test on Danish Data, ”Journal of Labor Economics, 17, 262-80. | zh_TW |
| dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) | Green, J. and N. Stokey (1983),“A Comparison of Tournaments and Contracts, ”Journal of Political Economy, 91, 349-64. | zh_TW |
| dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) | Harring, J. J. and G. D. Hess (1996), “A Spatial Theory of Positive and Negative Campaigning, ” Games and Economic Behavior, 17, 209-29. | zh_TW |
| dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) | Hvide, H. K. (2002), “Tournament and risk taking, ” Journal of Labor Economics, 20, 877-98. | zh_TW |
| dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) | Lazear, E. P. and S. Rosen (1981), “Rank-Order Tournaments as Optimum Labor Contracts, ”Journal of Political Economy, 89, 841-64. | zh_TW |
| dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) | Malcomson, J. (1984), “Work incentives, hierarchy, and internal labor markets. ” Journal of Political Economy, 89, 841-64. | zh_TW |
| dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) | Prendergast, C. (1993), “The role of promotion in including specific human capital, ” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 108, 528-34. | zh_TW |
| dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) | Skaperdas, S. and B. Grofman (1995), “Modeling Negative Campaigning, ”American Political Science Review, 89, 49-61. | zh_TW |
| dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) | Zabojnik, J. and D. Bernhardt ( 2001 ), “Corporate tournaments, human capital acquisition, and the firm size-wage relaion, ” Review of Economic studies, 68, 693-716. | zh_TW |
