學術產出-學位論文

題名 「公告申報預計損益表」規定與審計判斷關係之研究
The effects of requiring the release of pre-announced earnings on audit judgments
作者 唐怡錚
Tan, Yi-chen
貢獻者 杜榮瑞<br>俞洪昭
Duh, Rong-ruey<br>Yu, Hung-chao
唐怡錚
Tan, Yi-chen
關鍵詞 自結損益
查核損益
審計判斷
Pre-announced earnings
Audited earnings
Audit judgment
Regulation
日期 2003
上傳時間 18-九月-2009 09:01:32 (UTC+8)
摘要 證期會於民國九十一年十一月十四日公布「公開發行公司公開財務預測資訊處理準則」,該準則中規定已公開財務預測之公開發行公司,於年度終了後一個月內須公告申報預計損益表之達成情形並說明差異原因。而且若與嗣後經會計師查核之稅前損益間之差異超過一定門檻時,亦須一併公告差異金額及原因。
本研究預期,公司為了聲譽、股價、融資受阻及溝通成本等原因,可能不希望自結損益與查核損益差異過大。另外,公司管理當局為了避免上述差異超過門檻,在公告自結損益前可能洽請審計人員進行財務報表初查或過目自結損益表;而審計人員也可能為了避免查核時調整事項過多,造成與客戶間的衝突,亦可能希望客戶在公告自結損益前能先洽請審計人員進行初查或過目自結損益表。因此,實施自結損益規定可能造成審計人員先前涉入公司之自結損益。
本研究以四大會計師事務所之合夥會計師九名及資深審計經理六十六名為對象,採取實驗的方式,探討實施自結損益規定對審計人員審計判斷的影響。並進一步探討審計人員先前涉入公司自結損益的普遍程度,及此一情形對審計人員審計判斷的影響
實驗結果顯示實施自結損益的規定的確會使得審計人員普遍先前涉入公司自結損益;審計人員調整應計損失的幅度比實施前小,尤其在其有先前涉入公司自結損益的情形下,更為明顯;且發現因設有重大差異標準而造成的門檻效果。換言之,依本研究結果推論,實施公告自結損益規定會影響審計人員的專業判斷,壓縮審計人員調整損益的空間。
This thesis experimentally examines the effects of a regulation on audit judgments. In November 2002, the Securities and Futures Commission announced a new measure requiring listed companies that have made their financial forecast to the public to release within a month after the year end their income statements (hereafter called “pre-announced earnings”) and explain the discrepancy from the forecasted earnings. This new measure requires that the above listed companies release their earnings information earlier than the deadline for filing audited financial statements (hereafter called “audited earnings”) by three months, aiming to ask the listed companies to provide more timely information to investors. It also sets some threshold beyond which the companies and auditors are required to explain the discrepancy. The threshold dictates, among others, that the differences between the pre-announced earnings and audited earnings cannot exceed 20 percent of pre-announced earnings.
The current study predicts that due to the consideration of reputation, communication costs, and stock price reaction, companies will have incentives to keep the difference, if any, between the pre-announced earnings and audited earnings within the limit. The auditors will also have similar incentives to do so to avoid the loss of clients, and communication costs. In doing so, the companies will ask auditors to involve in the process prior to pre-announcing earnings (hereafter called “pre-announcement process”), which will help narrow down the difference between pre-announced earnings and audited earnings.
This study recruits 66 senior managers and nine partners from Big 4 firms to participate in an experiment in which they make audit judgment as to the adjustment required for a client’s allowance for bad debts. They are also required to generalize the client’s case to the listed companies as a whole and make similar judgments. Their perception on the extent to which auditors’ involvement in the pre-announcement process is also solicited. The data based on the experiment are used to examine the following hypotheses:
H1: The adjustments required by auditors will be smaller after this new regulation than before the new regulation.
H2: The degree to which auditors are involved in the pre-announcement process will be high.
H3: The adjustment required by auditors will be smaller when auditors are involved in the pre-announcement process than when they are not.
The results show that the adjustment required by auditors is smaller after the new regulation than before the new regulation. But the difference is not statistically significant (p = 0.133). When generalizing the client’s case to the listed companies as a whole, the difference becomes marginally significant (p = 0.074). Thus, H1 is not supported. The auditors perceive that the extent to which auditors will be involved in the process prior to pre-announcement is significantly higher than 7 on a 1-9 scale (p = 0.002), supporting H2. The results also indicate that auditor’s prior involvement in the pre-announcement process has a significant effect on the required adjustment no matter it is a specific or general case (p < 0.001). Thus H3 is supported. Combining these findings suggests that the new regulation has an effect on constraining auditors in requiring adjustments to their client’s accounting estimates to the extent that the threshold permits. This new regulation therefore poses a trade off between relevance (timeliness) and reliability (representational faithfulness) of accounting information. Meanwhile, the role of auditors in attesting financial statements may also be adversely affected.
參考文獻 一、中文文獻
林嬋娟、黃惠君,2003,從公司自結損益實施狀況一探公司良窳,會計研究月刊,第212期(7月):118-126。
楊孟萍、林瑞青、盧怡倫,2004,自結盈餘與公告盈餘間差異之影響因素研究,台大管理論叢,第十四卷第二期(6月):109-134。
林君怡,2002,門檻心理下之盈餘管理,國立台灣大學會計學系研究所未出版碩士論文。
吳思璇,2003,自行結算盈餘對股價影響之研究,國立台灣大學會計學系研究所未出版碩士論文。
官心怡,1994,經理人員盈餘預測與盈餘操縱之關聯性,國立台灣大學會計學系研究所未出版碩士論文。
胡永純,1997,盈餘預測與盈餘管理之關聯性研究,國立中興大學會計學系研究所未出版碩士論文。
許珮真,2004,自行結算盈餘與公告盈餘差異影響因素之研究,國立台灣大學會計學系研究所未出版碩士論文。
張永芳,1999,強制性財務預測與盈餘管理關係之研究20%門檻限制之影響,國立彰化師範大學商業教育學系研究所未出版碩士論文。
張瓊文,2000,強制性財務預測與盈餘管理關聯性之研究----更新標準改變前後之探討,國立台灣大學會計學系研究所未出版碩士論文。
張金鈴,2001,自行結算盈餘與公告盈餘差異影響之研究,東吳大學會計學系研究所未出版碩士論文。
張瑞峰,2003,自行結算盈餘差異影響因素之研究,國立台灣大學會計學系研究所未出版碩士論文。
陳旭郁,1998,會計師出具保留意見與其害怕失去客戶之恐懼及其提供非審計服務之關聯性研究,國立政治大學會計學系研究所未出版碩士論文。
劉聯旭,1999,實施強制性財測對管理當局自願性盈餘預測揭露行為之影響,國立台灣大學會計學系研究所未出版碩士論文。
蔣永民,2001,強制性財務預測與盈餘管理----門檻效果之研究,東吳大學會計學系研究所未出版碩士論文。
廖仲協,1995,強制性財務預測、盈餘操縱及股票投資報酬之實證研究,國立政治大學會計學系研究所未出版碩士論文。
魏文勤,2000,強制性財務預測誤差門檻與盈餘管理----營收與其他盈餘組成分子之探討,國立彰化師範大學商業教育學系研究所未出版碩士論文。
盧怡倫,2002,自行結算盈餘準確性之影響因素研究,東吳大學會計學系研究所未出版碩士論文。
謝銘偉,2000,概估盈餘與公告盈餘不一致對股價影響之研究,國立台灣大學會計學系研究所未出版碩士論文。
二、英文文獻
Abarbanell, J., and R. Lehavy. 2003. Can stock recommendations predict earnings management and analysts` earnings forecast errors?Journal of Accounting Research 41(March):1-31.
Brody, R. G., and S. E. Kaplan. 1996. Escalation of commitment among internal auditors. Auditing:A Journal of Practice & Theory 15(Spring):1-15.
Brown, C. E., M. E. Peecher, and I. Solomon. 1999. Auditors’ hypothesis testing in diagnostic inference tasks. Journal of Accounting Research 37(Spring):1-25.
Burgstahler, D., and I. Dichev. 1997. Earnings management to avoid earnings decrease and losses. Journal of Accounting & Economics 24:99-126.
Caster, P., D. W. Massey, and A. M. Wright. 2000. Research on the nature, characteristics, and causes of accounting errors:the need for a multi-method approach. Journal of Accounting Literature19:60-92.
Church, B. K. 1991. An examination of the effect that commitment to a hypothesis has on auditors’ evaluations of confirming and disconfirming evidence. Contemporary Accounting Research 7(Spring):513-534.
Clement, M., R. Frankel, and J. Miller. 2003. Confirming management earnings forecasts, earnings uncertainty, and stock returns. Journal of Accounting Research 41 ( September ):653-679.
Cuccia, A. D., K. Hackenbrack, and M. W. Nelson. 1995. The ability of professional standards to mitigate aggressive reporting. The Accounting Review 70(April):227-248.
DeFond, M. L., and J. Jiambalvo. 1993. Factors related to auditor-client disagreements over income-increasing accounting methods. Contemporary Accounting Research 9(Spring):415-431.
Dutta, Sunil., and F. Gigler. 2002. The effect of earnings forecasts on earnings management. Journal of Accounting Research 40(June):631-655.
Foran, M. F., and D. T. DeCoster. 1974. An experimental study of effects of participation, authoritarianism, and feedback on cognitive dissonance in a standard setting situation. The Accounting Review (October):751-763.
Hackenbrack, K., and M. W. Nelson. 1996. Auditors’ incentives and their application of financial accounting standards. The Accounting Review 71(January):43-59.
Healy, P. M., and J. M. Wahlen. 1999. A review of the earnings management literature and its implications for standard setting. Accounting Horizons 13(December):365-383.
Hirst, D. E., L. Koonce, and J. Miller. 1999. The joint effect of management’s prior forecast accuracy and the form of its financial forecasts on investor judgment. Journal of Accounting Research 37(Supplement):101-124.
Hodge, F. D. 2003. Investors’ perceptions of earnings quality, auditor independence, and the usefulness of audited financial information. Accounting Horizons (Supplement):37-48.
Jermias, J. 2001. Cognitive dissonance and resistance to change:the influence of commitment confirmation and feedback on judgment usefulness of accounting systems. Accounting, Organizations and Society 26:141-160.
Johnson, M. F., R. Kasznik, and K. K. Nelson. 2001. The impact of securities litigation reform on the disclosure of forward-looking information by high technology firms. Journal of Accounting Research 39(September):297-327.
Kasznik, R.1999. On the association between voluntary disclosure and earnings management. Journal of Accounting Research 37(March):57-81.
Kasznik, R., and M. F. Mcnichols. 2002. Does meeting earnings expectations matter? Evidence from analyst forecast revisions and share prices. Journal of Accounting Research 40(June):727-759.
Kerr, D. S., and D. D. Ward. 1994. The effect of audit task on evidence integration and belief revision. Behavioral Research in Accounting 6:21-42.
King, R., G. Pownall, and G. Waymire. 1990. Expectations adjustment via timely management forecasts:review, synthesis, and suggestions for future research. Journal of Accounting Literature 9:113-144.
Kinney , W. R., and R. D. Martin. 1994. Does auditing reduce bias in financial reporting? A review of audit-related adjustment studies. Auditing:A Journal of Practice & Theory 13(Spring):149-156.
Klersey, G. 1994. Identification of auditors’ propositions related to assessments of management estimates. Behavioral Research in Accounting 6:43-71.
Koonce, L., U. Anderson, and G. Marchant. 1995. Justification of decisions in auditing. Journal of Accounting Research 33(Autumn):369-384.
Libby, R., and M. G. Lipe. 1992. Incentives, effort, and the cognitive processes involved in accounting-related judgments. Journal of Accounting Research 30(Autumn):249-273.
Libby, R., and W. R. Kinney. 2000. Does mandated audit communication reduce opportunistic corrections to manage earnings to forecasts? The Accounting Review 75(October):383-404.
Matsumoto, D. A. 2002. Management’s incentives to avoid negative earnings surprises. The Accounting Review 77(July):483-514.
Nelson, M. W. 2003. Behavioral evidence on the effects of principles-and rules-based standards. Accounting Horizons 17(March):91-104.
Nelson, M. W., J. A. Elliott, and R. L. Tarpley. 2002. Evidence from auditors about managers’ and auditors’ earnings management decisions. The Accounting Review 77(Supplement):175-202.
Nelson, M. W., J. A. Elliott, and R. L. Tarpley. 2003. How are earings managed? Examples from auditors. Accounting Horizons (Supplement):17-35.
Nieschwietz, R. J., J. J. Schultz , and M. F. Zimbelman. 2000. Empirical research on external auditors’ detection of financial statement fraud. Journal of Accounting Literature19:190-246.
Patterson, E. R., and R. Smith. 2003. Materiality uncertainty and earnings misstatement. The Accounting Review 78 (July):819-846.
Peecher, M. E. 1996. The influence of auditors’ justification processes on their decisions:A cognitive model and experimental evidence. Journal of Accounting Research 34(Spring):125-140.
Phillips, F. 1999. Auditor attention to and judgments of aggressive financial reporting. Journal of Accounting Research 37(Spring):167-189.
Schipper, K. 1989. Commentary on earnings management. Accounting Horizons (December):91-102.
Tan, H. T. 1995. Effects of expectations, prior involvement, and review awareness on memory for audit evidence and judgment. Journal of Accounting Research 33( Spring ):113-135.
Tan, H. T., R. Libby, and J. E. Hunton. 2002. Analysts’ reactions to earnings preannouncement strategies. Journal of Accounting Research 40( March ):223-246.
Trotman, K., and J. Sng. 1989. The effect of hypothesis framing, prior expectations and cue diagnosticity on auditors’ information choice. Accounting, Organizations and Society 14:565-576.
描述 碩士
國立政治大學
會計研究所
91353033
92
資料來源 http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0091353033
資料類型 thesis
dc.contributor.advisor 杜榮瑞<br>俞洪昭zh_TW
dc.contributor.advisor Duh, Rong-ruey<br>Yu, Hung-chaoen_US
dc.contributor.author (作者) 唐怡錚zh_TW
dc.contributor.author (作者) Tan, Yi-chenen_US
dc.creator (作者) 唐怡錚zh_TW
dc.creator (作者) Tan, Yi-chenen_US
dc.date (日期) 2003en_US
dc.date.accessioned 18-九月-2009 09:01:32 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.available 18-九月-2009 09:01:32 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.issued (上傳時間) 18-九月-2009 09:01:32 (UTC+8)-
dc.identifier (其他 識別碼) G0091353033en_US
dc.identifier.uri (URI) https://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/34214-
dc.description (描述) 碩士zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 國立政治大學zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 會計研究所zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 91353033zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 92zh_TW
dc.description.abstract (摘要) 證期會於民國九十一年十一月十四日公布「公開發行公司公開財務預測資訊處理準則」,該準則中規定已公開財務預測之公開發行公司,於年度終了後一個月內須公告申報預計損益表之達成情形並說明差異原因。而且若與嗣後經會計師查核之稅前損益間之差異超過一定門檻時,亦須一併公告差異金額及原因。
本研究預期,公司為了聲譽、股價、融資受阻及溝通成本等原因,可能不希望自結損益與查核損益差異過大。另外,公司管理當局為了避免上述差異超過門檻,在公告自結損益前可能洽請審計人員進行財務報表初查或過目自結損益表;而審計人員也可能為了避免查核時調整事項過多,造成與客戶間的衝突,亦可能希望客戶在公告自結損益前能先洽請審計人員進行初查或過目自結損益表。因此,實施自結損益規定可能造成審計人員先前涉入公司之自結損益。
本研究以四大會計師事務所之合夥會計師九名及資深審計經理六十六名為對象,採取實驗的方式,探討實施自結損益規定對審計人員審計判斷的影響。並進一步探討審計人員先前涉入公司自結損益的普遍程度,及此一情形對審計人員審計判斷的影響
實驗結果顯示實施自結損益的規定的確會使得審計人員普遍先前涉入公司自結損益;審計人員調整應計損失的幅度比實施前小,尤其在其有先前涉入公司自結損益的情形下,更為明顯;且發現因設有重大差異標準而造成的門檻效果。換言之,依本研究結果推論,實施公告自結損益規定會影響審計人員的專業判斷,壓縮審計人員調整損益的空間。
zh_TW
dc.description.abstract (摘要) This thesis experimentally examines the effects of a regulation on audit judgments. In November 2002, the Securities and Futures Commission announced a new measure requiring listed companies that have made their financial forecast to the public to release within a month after the year end their income statements (hereafter called “pre-announced earnings”) and explain the discrepancy from the forecasted earnings. This new measure requires that the above listed companies release their earnings information earlier than the deadline for filing audited financial statements (hereafter called “audited earnings”) by three months, aiming to ask the listed companies to provide more timely information to investors. It also sets some threshold beyond which the companies and auditors are required to explain the discrepancy. The threshold dictates, among others, that the differences between the pre-announced earnings and audited earnings cannot exceed 20 percent of pre-announced earnings.
The current study predicts that due to the consideration of reputation, communication costs, and stock price reaction, companies will have incentives to keep the difference, if any, between the pre-announced earnings and audited earnings within the limit. The auditors will also have similar incentives to do so to avoid the loss of clients, and communication costs. In doing so, the companies will ask auditors to involve in the process prior to pre-announcing earnings (hereafter called “pre-announcement process”), which will help narrow down the difference between pre-announced earnings and audited earnings.
This study recruits 66 senior managers and nine partners from Big 4 firms to participate in an experiment in which they make audit judgment as to the adjustment required for a client’s allowance for bad debts. They are also required to generalize the client’s case to the listed companies as a whole and make similar judgments. Their perception on the extent to which auditors’ involvement in the pre-announcement process is also solicited. The data based on the experiment are used to examine the following hypotheses:
H1: The adjustments required by auditors will be smaller after this new regulation than before the new regulation.
H2: The degree to which auditors are involved in the pre-announcement process will be high.
H3: The adjustment required by auditors will be smaller when auditors are involved in the pre-announcement process than when they are not.
The results show that the adjustment required by auditors is smaller after the new regulation than before the new regulation. But the difference is not statistically significant (p = 0.133). When generalizing the client’s case to the listed companies as a whole, the difference becomes marginally significant (p = 0.074). Thus, H1 is not supported. The auditors perceive that the extent to which auditors will be involved in the process prior to pre-announcement is significantly higher than 7 on a 1-9 scale (p = 0.002), supporting H2. The results also indicate that auditor’s prior involvement in the pre-announcement process has a significant effect on the required adjustment no matter it is a specific or general case (p < 0.001). Thus H3 is supported. Combining these findings suggests that the new regulation has an effect on constraining auditors in requiring adjustments to their client’s accounting estimates to the extent that the threshold permits. This new regulation therefore poses a trade off between relevance (timeliness) and reliability (representational faithfulness) of accounting information. Meanwhile, the role of auditors in attesting financial statements may also be adversely affected.
en_US
dc.description.tableofcontents 第一章 緒論 1
第一節 研究動機 1
第二節 研究目的與問題 6
第三節 研究結構 7
第二章 文獻探討與研究假說 8
第三章 研究方法 21
第一節 個案設計 22
第二節 變數定義與衡量 29
第三節 受試者與實驗程序 31
第四節 資料分析方法 33
第四章 研究結果與討論 34
第一節 實驗結果彙總 34
第二節 實施公告自結損益規定對審計判斷之影響 38
第三節 審計人員先前涉入公司自結損益對審計判斷
之影響 41
第四節 實施公告自結損益規定與審計人員先前涉入
公司自結損益對審計判斷之綜合影響 45
第五章 結論、研究限制與建議 48
第一節 研究結論 48
第二節 研究貢獻 50
第三節 研究限制 51
第四節 研究建議 52
參考文獻 54
附錄:實驗材料 60
zh_TW
dc.format.extent 39456 bytes-
dc.format.extent 45654 bytes-
dc.format.extent 81679 bytes-
dc.format.extent 123160 bytes-
dc.format.extent 54333 bytes-
dc.format.extent 73005 bytes-
dc.format.extent 73355 bytes-
dc.format.extent 83465 bytes-
dc.format.extent 55367 bytes-
dc.format.extent 57517 bytes-
dc.format.extent 74378 bytes-
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf-
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf-
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf-
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf-
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf-
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf-
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf-
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf-
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf-
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf-
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf-
dc.language.iso en_US-
dc.source.uri (資料來源) http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0091353033en_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 自結損益zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 查核損益zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 審計判斷zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) Pre-announced earningsen_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) Audited earningsen_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) Audit judgmenten_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) Regulationen_US
dc.title (題名) 「公告申報預計損益表」規定與審計判斷關係之研究zh_TW
dc.title (題名) The effects of requiring the release of pre-announced earnings on audit judgmentsen_US
dc.type (資料類型) thesisen
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) 一、中文文獻zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) 林嬋娟、黃惠君,2003,從公司自結損益實施狀況一探公司良窳,會計研究月刊,第212期(7月):118-126。zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) 楊孟萍、林瑞青、盧怡倫,2004,自結盈餘與公告盈餘間差異之影響因素研究,台大管理論叢,第十四卷第二期(6月):109-134。zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) 林君怡,2002,門檻心理下之盈餘管理,國立台灣大學會計學系研究所未出版碩士論文。zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) 吳思璇,2003,自行結算盈餘對股價影響之研究,國立台灣大學會計學系研究所未出版碩士論文。zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) 官心怡,1994,經理人員盈餘預測與盈餘操縱之關聯性,國立台灣大學會計學系研究所未出版碩士論文。zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) 胡永純,1997,盈餘預測與盈餘管理之關聯性研究,國立中興大學會計學系研究所未出版碩士論文。zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) 許珮真,2004,自行結算盈餘與公告盈餘差異影響因素之研究,國立台灣大學會計學系研究所未出版碩士論文。zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) 張永芳,1999,強制性財務預測與盈餘管理關係之研究20%門檻限制之影響,國立彰化師範大學商業教育學系研究所未出版碩士論文。zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) 張瓊文,2000,強制性財務預測與盈餘管理關聯性之研究----更新標準改變前後之探討,國立台灣大學會計學系研究所未出版碩士論文。zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) 張金鈴,2001,自行結算盈餘與公告盈餘差異影響之研究,東吳大學會計學系研究所未出版碩士論文。zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) 張瑞峰,2003,自行結算盈餘差異影響因素之研究,國立台灣大學會計學系研究所未出版碩士論文。zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) 陳旭郁,1998,會計師出具保留意見與其害怕失去客戶之恐懼及其提供非審計服務之關聯性研究,國立政治大學會計學系研究所未出版碩士論文。zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) 劉聯旭,1999,實施強制性財測對管理當局自願性盈餘預測揭露行為之影響,國立台灣大學會計學系研究所未出版碩士論文。zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) 蔣永民,2001,強制性財務預測與盈餘管理----門檻效果之研究,東吳大學會計學系研究所未出版碩士論文。zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) 廖仲協,1995,強制性財務預測、盈餘操縱及股票投資報酬之實證研究,國立政治大學會計學系研究所未出版碩士論文。zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) 魏文勤,2000,強制性財務預測誤差門檻與盈餘管理----營收與其他盈餘組成分子之探討,國立彰化師範大學商業教育學系研究所未出版碩士論文。zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) 盧怡倫,2002,自行結算盈餘準確性之影響因素研究,東吳大學會計學系研究所未出版碩士論文。zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) 謝銘偉,2000,概估盈餘與公告盈餘不一致對股價影響之研究,國立台灣大學會計學系研究所未出版碩士論文。zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) 二、英文文獻zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Abarbanell, J., and R. Lehavy. 2003. Can stock recommendations predict earnings management and analysts` earnings forecast errors?Journal of Accounting Research 41(March):1-31.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Brody, R. G., and S. E. Kaplan. 1996. Escalation of commitment among internal auditors. Auditing:A Journal of Practice & Theory 15(Spring):1-15.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Brown, C. E., M. E. Peecher, and I. Solomon. 1999. Auditors’ hypothesis testing in diagnostic inference tasks. Journal of Accounting Research 37(Spring):1-25.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Burgstahler, D., and I. Dichev. 1997. Earnings management to avoid earnings decrease and losses. Journal of Accounting & Economics 24:99-126.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Caster, P., D. W. Massey, and A. M. Wright. 2000. Research on the nature, characteristics, and causes of accounting errors:the need for a multi-method approach. Journal of Accounting Literature19:60-92.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Church, B. K. 1991. An examination of the effect that commitment to a hypothesis has on auditors’ evaluations of confirming and disconfirming evidence. Contemporary Accounting Research 7(Spring):513-534.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Clement, M., R. Frankel, and J. Miller. 2003. Confirming management earnings forecasts, earnings uncertainty, and stock returns. Journal of Accounting Research 41 ( September ):653-679.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Cuccia, A. D., K. Hackenbrack, and M. W. Nelson. 1995. The ability of professional standards to mitigate aggressive reporting. The Accounting Review 70(April):227-248.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) DeFond, M. L., and J. Jiambalvo. 1993. Factors related to auditor-client disagreements over income-increasing accounting methods. Contemporary Accounting Research 9(Spring):415-431.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Dutta, Sunil., and F. Gigler. 2002. The effect of earnings forecasts on earnings management. Journal of Accounting Research 40(June):631-655.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Foran, M. F., and D. T. DeCoster. 1974. An experimental study of effects of participation, authoritarianism, and feedback on cognitive dissonance in a standard setting situation. The Accounting Review (October):751-763.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Hackenbrack, K., and M. W. Nelson. 1996. Auditors’ incentives and their application of financial accounting standards. The Accounting Review 71(January):43-59.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Healy, P. M., and J. M. Wahlen. 1999. A review of the earnings management literature and its implications for standard setting. Accounting Horizons 13(December):365-383.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Hirst, D. E., L. Koonce, and J. Miller. 1999. The joint effect of management’s prior forecast accuracy and the form of its financial forecasts on investor judgment. Journal of Accounting Research 37(Supplement):101-124.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Hodge, F. D. 2003. Investors’ perceptions of earnings quality, auditor independence, and the usefulness of audited financial information. Accounting Horizons (Supplement):37-48.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Jermias, J. 2001. Cognitive dissonance and resistance to change:the influence of commitment confirmation and feedback on judgment usefulness of accounting systems. Accounting, Organizations and Society 26:141-160.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Johnson, M. F., R. Kasznik, and K. K. Nelson. 2001. The impact of securities litigation reform on the disclosure of forward-looking information by high technology firms. Journal of Accounting Research 39(September):297-327.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Kasznik, R.1999. On the association between voluntary disclosure and earnings management. Journal of Accounting Research 37(March):57-81.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Kasznik, R., and M. F. Mcnichols. 2002. Does meeting earnings expectations matter? Evidence from analyst forecast revisions and share prices. Journal of Accounting Research 40(June):727-759.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Kerr, D. S., and D. D. Ward. 1994. The effect of audit task on evidence integration and belief revision. Behavioral Research in Accounting 6:21-42.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) King, R., G. Pownall, and G. Waymire. 1990. Expectations adjustment via timely management forecasts:review, synthesis, and suggestions for future research. Journal of Accounting Literature 9:113-144.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Kinney , W. R., and R. D. Martin. 1994. Does auditing reduce bias in financial reporting? A review of audit-related adjustment studies. Auditing:A Journal of Practice & Theory 13(Spring):149-156.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Klersey, G. 1994. Identification of auditors’ propositions related to assessments of management estimates. Behavioral Research in Accounting 6:43-71.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Koonce, L., U. Anderson, and G. Marchant. 1995. Justification of decisions in auditing. Journal of Accounting Research 33(Autumn):369-384.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Libby, R., and M. G. Lipe. 1992. Incentives, effort, and the cognitive processes involved in accounting-related judgments. Journal of Accounting Research 30(Autumn):249-273.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Libby, R., and W. R. Kinney. 2000. Does mandated audit communication reduce opportunistic corrections to manage earnings to forecasts? The Accounting Review 75(October):383-404.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Matsumoto, D. A. 2002. Management’s incentives to avoid negative earnings surprises. The Accounting Review 77(July):483-514.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Nelson, M. W. 2003. Behavioral evidence on the effects of principles-and rules-based standards. Accounting Horizons 17(March):91-104.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Nelson, M. W., J. A. Elliott, and R. L. Tarpley. 2002. Evidence from auditors about managers’ and auditors’ earnings management decisions. The Accounting Review 77(Supplement):175-202.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Nelson, M. W., J. A. Elliott, and R. L. Tarpley. 2003. How are earings managed? Examples from auditors. Accounting Horizons (Supplement):17-35.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Nieschwietz, R. J., J. J. Schultz , and M. F. Zimbelman. 2000. Empirical research on external auditors’ detection of financial statement fraud. Journal of Accounting Literature19:190-246.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Patterson, E. R., and R. Smith. 2003. Materiality uncertainty and earnings misstatement. The Accounting Review 78 (July):819-846.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Peecher, M. E. 1996. The influence of auditors’ justification processes on their decisions:A cognitive model and experimental evidence. Journal of Accounting Research 34(Spring):125-140.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Phillips, F. 1999. Auditor attention to and judgments of aggressive financial reporting. Journal of Accounting Research 37(Spring):167-189.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Schipper, K. 1989. Commentary on earnings management. Accounting Horizons (December):91-102.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Tan, H. T. 1995. Effects of expectations, prior involvement, and review awareness on memory for audit evidence and judgment. Journal of Accounting Research 33( Spring ):113-135.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Tan, H. T., R. Libby, and J. E. Hunton. 2002. Analysts’ reactions to earnings preannouncement strategies. Journal of Accounting Research 40( March ):223-246.zh_TW
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Trotman, K., and J. Sng. 1989. The effect of hypothesis framing, prior expectations and cue diagnosticity on auditors’ information choice. Accounting, Organizations and Society 14:565-576.zh_TW