| dc.contributor.advisor | 陳錦烽 | zh_TW |
| dc.contributor.author (Authors) | 黃勝平 | zh_TW |
| dc.contributor.author (Authors) | Huang,Sheng Ping | en_US |
| dc.creator (作者) | 黃勝平 | zh_TW |
| dc.creator (作者) | Huang,Sheng Ping | en_US |
| dc.date (日期) | 2004 | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | 18-Sep-2009 09:11:44 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.date.available | 18-Sep-2009 09:11:44 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.date.issued (上傳時間) | 18-Sep-2009 09:11:44 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.identifier (Other Identifiers) | G0923530201 | en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri (URI) | https://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/34270 | - |
| dc.description (描述) | 碩士 | zh_TW |
| dc.description (描述) | 國立政治大學 | zh_TW |
| dc.description (描述) | 會計研究所 | zh_TW |
| dc.description (描述) | 92353020 | zh_TW |
| dc.description (描述) | 93 | zh_TW |
| dc.description.abstract (摘要) | Jensen(1998)認為，當公司有過多的自由現金流量時，經理人基於自利動機，較有可能從事非最大化主理人的行為，加劇代理問題的產生。Jensen也認為，發行長期負債可以降低公司多餘的自由現金流量，進而減緩代理問題的產生。因此，本研究即由此一觀點出發，探討是否可藉由長期負債的發行，減緩代理問題的產生？以及當經理人持股比例低，代理問題較嚴重時，負債可否做為監督機制，以減緩代理問題？ 本研究以審計公費做為衡量代理問題之替代變數。當代理問題愈嚴重，即意味著公司有較高的固有風險，因此將增加查核努力，進而收取較高的審計公費。換句話說，當代理問題愈嚴重，審計公費將愈高。實證結果發現，低成長高自由現金流量的公司，發行長期負債可以降低自由現金流量，進而減緩代理問題。而在經理人低持股比例時，長期負債可做為替代的監督機制，以減緩代理問題的產生。故本研究認為，負債確實可做為減緩代理問題之機制。 | zh_TW |
| dc.description.abstract (摘要) | Jensen(1986)argued that when company own more free cash flow, based on the self-serving motivation, managers will tend to pursue his benefit rather than principal’s. In such situation, agency problem will become more serious. Jensen also point out that issuing long-term debt can reduce the free cash flow in the company, therefore, ease the agency problem. This study is based on the free cash flow theory, examining whether issuing long-term debt can reducing the free cash flow, therefore reducing the agency problem? Besides, we will examine when managers hold fewer stocks, whether issuing long-term debt can be a substitute monitor mechanism or not? Using audit fee as a variable to measure the agency problem. In auditing, serious agency problem means higher inherent risk and, in turn, audit fees. In other words, more serious agency problem means higher audit fee. The result finds that in low growth firm with higher free cash flow, issuing long-term debt can reduce free cash flow and, in turn, mitigate agency problem. Besides, when managers hold fewer stocks, long-term debt can be a substitute monitor mechanism. As a conclusion, debt can be a mechanism to mitigate agency problem. | en_US |
| dc.description.tableofcontents | 第一章 緒論 1第一節 研究背景與目的 1第二節 研究問題 3第三節 論文架構 4第二章 文獻探討 6第一節 代理理論 6第二節 自由現金流量理論 11第三節 公司治理 16第三章 研究方法 26第一節 研究假說 26第二節 變數衡量 30第三節 實證模型 36第四節 樣本與資料年份 38第五節 資料來源 39第六節 資料分析方法 40第四章 實證結果與分析 42第一節 敘述性統計量分析 42第二節 迴歸分析結果 52第三節 殘差分析 61第四節 敏感性分析 63第五章 結論與建議 64第一節 研究結論 64第二節 研究限制 66第三節 未來研究方向之建議 67參考文獻 68圖目錄圖1-1 本研究流程 5圖2-1 世界銀行公司治理架構 ……………………………………………..22圖3-1 審計公費、代理問題與自由現金流量之關係 27圖3-2 藉由長期負債減少自由現金流量 28表目錄表1-1 代理問題解決方式 1表2-1 公司治理定義 17表3-1 審計風險比較 27表3-2 變數定義、衡量方式與預期方向 37表3-3 資料來源 39表4-1 樣本篩選 42表4-2 台灣證交所及本研究產業分類方式 43表4-3 樣本分布 43表4-4 審計公費之敘述性統計量 44表4-5 高低成長公司基本統計量比較 46表4-6 控制變數敘述統計量 47表4-7 相關係數分析 49表4-8.1 成長變數之相關係數 50表4-8.2 共同因子分析結果 50表4-8.3 成長變數之估計共同性 51表4-9.1 假說一複迴歸分析—模式一 54表4-9.2 假說一複迴歸分析—模式二 55表4-10.1 假說二複迴歸分析—模式一 57表4-10.2 假說二複迴歸分析—模式二 58表4-11 低成長公司下，FCF×DE之效果 59表4-12 FCF×DE在不同經理人持股比例下之效果 60表4-13 Wilk-Shapiro 誤差項變異數分析 61表4-14 誤差項變異數分析 62表4-15 樣本公司與非樣本公司之比較 63 | zh_TW |
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| dc.language.iso | en_US | - |
| dc.source.uri (資料來源) | http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0923530201 | en_US |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | 代理問題 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | 審計公費 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | 負債 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | 公司治理 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | agency problem | en_US |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | audit fee | en_US |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | debt | en_US |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | corporate governance | en_US |
| dc.title (題名) | 負債、代理問題與審計公費關聯性之探討 | zh_TW |
| dc.type (資料類型) | thesis | en |
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