| dc.contributor.advisor | 林柏生<br>溫偉任 | zh_TW |
| dc.contributor.advisor | <br> | en_US |
| dc.contributor.author (作者) | 沈祥玲 | zh_TW |
| dc.contributor.author (作者) | Shen, Hsiang-Ling | en_US |
| dc.creator (作者) | 沈祥玲 | zh_TW |
| dc.creator (作者) | Shen, Hsiang-Ling | en_US |
| dc.date (日期) | 2004 | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | 18-九月-2009 14:17:27 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.date.available | 18-九月-2009 14:17:27 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.date.issued (上傳時間) | 18-九月-2009 14:17:27 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.identifier (其他 識別碼) | G0923510141 | en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri (URI) | https://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/35152 | - |
| dc.description (描述) | 碩士 | zh_TW |
| dc.description (描述) | 國立政治大學 | zh_TW |
| dc.description (描述) | 國際經營與貿易研究所 | zh_TW |
| dc.description (描述) | 92351014 | zh_TW |
| dc.description (描述) | 93 | zh_TW |
| dc.description.abstract (摘要) | 本篇論文的研究重心，在於希望能找到一種機制，使老闆不會因為員工年老後生產力衰退而將其開除；老公不會因為老婆生完小孩身材變形而將其拋棄。我們利用一個二工人、一老闆的二期模型，假設工人的生產力會因為年紀的增長而衰退，而且有努力投入的工人衰退的情形更為嚴重，並設存在一個補償c，當老闆要將員工解雇時，必須要支付給員工。我們的研究發現，只要投入的成本i小於某範圍時，無論學習效果的大小、工人為風險中立或趨避、是否假設有限責任下，均存在最佳狀況 ，廠商的行為與社會福利最大下的結果相一致；但若i大於此一範圍時，便不存在最佳狀況，且可能會產生廠商為了自身利益而做出違背社會福利最大狀況下的行為，此時便需要透過政府的介入，使廠商的行為回復到社會福利最大下的狀況。若想要達到我們所希望的員工投入，老闆不將其解雇的情形 ，唯有在契約中明訂員工必須要投入大於一定的範圍且員工的議價能力很強下，才能保護員工不會被廠商任意的解雇。在此契約下，老闆只賺得正常利潤，而員工則成為剩餘價值的要求者(residual claimant)。 | zh_TW |
| dc.description.tableofcontents | 第一章 諸論...........................................01 第一節 定義機會性毀約................................01 第二節 研究動機與目的................................01 第三節 研究架構與內容................................03第二章 參考文獻........................................04 第一節 婚姻巿場相關文獻..............................04 第二節 勞動巿場相關文獻..............................05第三章 研究方法.......................................08 第一節 基本假設......................................08 第二節 模型I—工人為風險中立.........................11 第三節 模型I—工人為風險趨避.........................30 第四節 模型II—工人為風險中立.........................47 第五節 模型II—工人為風險趨避.........................59 第六節 簡化模型.......................................71 第七節 分析...........................................72第四章 結論與建議......................................77 第一節 研究結論......................................77 第二節 後續研究建議..................................79參考文獻................................................80 | zh_TW |
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| dc.language.iso | en_US | - |
| dc.source.uri (資料來源) | http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0923510141 | en_US |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | 機會性毀約 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | 只能用於該廠商的投資 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | Opportunistic Breach | en_US |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | Firm-specific investment | en_US |
| dc.title (題名) | 機會性毀約之最適補償 | zh_TW |
| dc.title (題名) | Optimal Remedy for Opportunistic Breach | en_US |
| dc.type (資料類型) | thesis | en |
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