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題名 同業競爭對手迎合或擊敗盈餘預期是否重要呢? 其他題名 Does Rivals’ Meeting/Beating Earnings Expectations Matter? 作者 金成隆;梁嘉紋 貢獻者 國立政治大學會計學系
行政院國家科學委員會關鍵詞 經濟;同業競爭;擊敗盈餘預期 日期 2010 上傳時間 26-六月-2012 14:57:35 (UTC+8) 摘要 迎合或擊敗分析師預期(簡稱迎合預期)的公司不僅未來具有較佳的績效，市場也會給予額外 的津貼(即便控制未預期盈餘/預測誤差)，因此是評估管理當局績效的重要指標。本計劃分三年 探討三個與迎合預期有關的問題: (1)以往有關盈餘在產業內的移轉效果的實証文獻，幾乎都顯示 信息移轉具有正向的傳染效果。當迎合預期表示未來績效較佳，且市場會給予津貼(透過股價或 報酬)時，同業迎合預期的比率愈高時，由於出現負向的產業競爭效果，此時市場是否對於本公 司的處罰愈高(透過股價或報酬)? 此外，市場對於無法盈餘預期者所給予的處罰，是否隨著更多 同業達到他們的盈餘預期，而益發嚴重?或者是市場對於無法盈餘預期者所給予的處罰，端賴於 同業是否有較高的比率盈餘預期而定? (2)同業迎合預期的比率愈高，由於競爭效果增加，是否 管理當局愈有迎合分析師預期的誘因或壓力? 此時是偏好使用「盈餘管理」或是「預期管理」 來達成迎合預期的壓力? (3)除權益市場外，私債市場的貸款者(如銀行)，對於未迎合預期的公 司，是否給予比較嚴格的條件(如:高利率、要擔保、較多限制債務條款)? 同時，是否當同業迎 合預期的比率愈高時，此一嚴格條件更加明顯? (前二年計畫所指的預期是分析師預期，第三年 則同時探討零盈餘、盈餘變動、與分析師預期三者)。此外此一私債發行是屬於初級市場，發行 後此一貸款(loan)可以在次級市場交易，此時迎合與否對於此一貸款在次級市場交易的買賣價差 有無影響?， 綜言之，三年期的各年期計畫主題及方向，說明如下: 第一年研究計畫主題及方向: 迎合分析師預期的信息移轉，是否具有負面的競爭效果?包括: (1)在控制未預期盈餘或是預測誤差下，同業迎合預期的比率愈高時，是否出現負向的產業競爭 效果，而使市場出現對本公司的處罰愈高? (2) 市場對於無法盈餘預期者所給予的處罰，是否隨 著更高比率的同業達到盈餘預期而益發嚴重? (3) 達成迎合預期的方法包括預期管理或是盈餘 管理，當同業迎合預期的比率愈高時，市場給予哪一種方法較高的津貼? (4) 前二項問題是否隨 著產業競爭狀況而異? 第二年研究計畫主題及方向: 管理當局迎合分析師預期的誘因與同業迎合預期比率之關連性， 包括: (1) 在控制未預期盈餘或是預測誤差下，同業迎合預期的比率愈高時，管理當局迎合預期的誘因 或是壓力是否更大? (2) 同業達成預期比率與管理當局達成預期誘因的正向關係，是否隨著產業 競爭程度而更加明顯? (3) 對於達成預期的公司而言，同業迎合預期的比率愈高時，是否愈會選 擇比較高點的預期數字來達成預期? (4) 對於達成預期的公司而言，業迎合預期的比率愈高時， 是否管理當局愈不可能引導新分析師向下(相對於向上盈餘管理而言)? (5) 根據以往文獻再將同 業再劃分為”主要競爭者”與”一般競爭者”，則前四項議題在”主要競爭者”的顯著情況下，是否大 於相對於”一般競爭者”的情況? 第三年研究計畫主題及方向: 管理當局與同業迎合預期對於銀行貸款條件的影響，以及該貸款 合約在次級市場的買賣差價的影響，包括: (1) 銀行借錢給公司時，對於無法迎合盈餘預期的公司，利率是否較高? (2) 銀行借錢給公司時， 對於常常無法迎合盈餘預期的公司，利率是否較高(相對於比較少無法迎合的公司)?(3) 銀行借 錢給公司時，對於無法迎合盈餘預期的公司，是否比較會要求其提供擔保品?(4) 銀行借錢給公 司時，對於無法迎合盈餘預期的公司，是否會提出比較多的債務限制條款?(5) 銀行對於未迎合 預期的借錢公司所提高的利率，隨著該公司同業迎合預期的比率增高而增加? (6) 銀行對要求未 迎合預期公司提供擔保品的現象，在該公司同業迎合預期的比率增高的情況下更為明顯? (7) 銀 行加諸於未迎合預期公司的限制性債務條款，在該公司同業迎合預期的比率增高的情況下更為 明顯? (8) 未迎合預期的借錢公司，相對於迎合者而言，其所借得的貸款在次級交易市場交易 時，買賣價差是否 較大? (9) (8)點未迎合預期者所產生的較大價差，是否在次級市場中其 他借錢公司迎合預期比率愈高時， 情況是否將更明顯? 額外檢測之議題: 如果這三年中任何一年仍有足夠時間，則可以隨時加作下列議題: (1) 股價是未來各期現金流量(分子)使用資金成本(分母)加以折現。當文獻發現市場對於未迎合 預期的公司會給予處罰(透過股價)時，同時也發現未來兩三的績效相對將更較差(分子)。然 而，未迎合預期所產生的股價降低，主要是來自分母(資金成本)變大，或是分子與分母同時 影響所致?本計劃家可以加作:未迎合預期的公司，權益資金成本將加大此一假說。邏輯推理 與前同。
Prior studies show that meeting/beating earnings expectation (thereafter MBE) is a leading indicator of better future performance, and that market rewards for meeting earnings expectation. Thus, MBE also is a desirable measure of managers’ performance. In this three-year projects, I will address three sets of MBE issues: (1) How market participants react to a higher proportion of rival firms meeting analysts’ expectations. While documenting that good (bad) earnings news has a positive (negative) average impact on the security prices of other non-announcing firms in the same industry, extant research also recognizes that negative information transfers from a firm’s earnings announcement may occur due to shifts in industry’s competition balance. This argument, coupled with a premium to MBE, addresses the issue as to whether market penalties firms when more rival firms meet expectations. Next, I explore whether the penalty for missing expectation is pronounced when more rivals meet expectations. (2) To meet analysts’ expectations, managers have two options to avoid negative earnings surprise: earnings management and/or expectation management. It is an interesting issue as to which instrument managers prefer to use to meet expectations when more rivals meet their expectations. In addition to the above issues related to equity market, my third-year project further will explore the effect of MBE on private debt market, including (1) whether bank imposes tighter price and nonprice (e.g., collateral requirement and restrictive covenants) loan terms for borrowers missing earrings expectations than for those meeting expectations when designing loan contracts; and whether this positive association increases with the number of times missing expectations. (2) whether the positive relation between tighter loan terms and the presence of missing expectations is stronger when there are more industry rival firms meet expectations. (3) In addition to primary debt market, I further explore whether MBE affects the bid-ask spreads of loans traded in secondary loans market. 1. Research topics are as follows for the first year: (1) This project will explore whether firms experience more unfavorable abnormal returns when there are a higher proportion of rivals meeting their expectations (i.e., non-negative earnings surprises). (2) This project will explore whether the penalty for failing to meet expectations is stronger when there are more rival firms avoiding negative surprises. (3) While there are two options to avoid negative earnings surprise (i.e., earnings management and expectation management), This project will explore which instrument market reacts more favorably to when more rival firms meet analysts’ expectations. (4)This project will explore whether the associations in (1) and (2) are stronger when industry is more competitive. 2. Research topics are as follows for the second year: (1) This project will explore whether managers’ have greater incentive or pressure to meet expectation when there are a higher proportion of rival firms meeting their expectations. (2)This project will explore whether the associations in (1) are stronger when industry is more competitive. (3) This project will explore whether, in addition to meeting expectations itself, managers have greater tendency to meet higher analysts’ forecasts when more rivals meet expectations. (4) While there are two options to avoid negative earnings surprise, this project will explore which instrument managers prefer to use when more rival firms meet analysts’ expectations.(5) Following Hoover’s reports I will decompose rival firms into competitive and non-competitive subsamples, and examine whether there are differential effects on the above four hypotheses between competitive and non-competitive firms. 3. Research topics are as follows for the third year: (1) Loan spreads, measured by loan interest rate, in excess of a benchmark rate, are higher for firms missing earnings expectations than for those meeting expectations. (2) Loan spreads, measured by loan interest rate, in excess of a benchmark rate, are higher for firms more frequently missing earnings expectations than for those less frequently missing expectations. (3) The likelihood of loans being secured by collateral is higher for firms missing earnings expectations than for those meeting expectations. (4) The use of restrictive covenants in loan contracts is more intensive and prevalent for firms missing earnings expectations than for those meeting expectations. (5) The positive association loan spreads and firm’s missing expectations is stronger when more rivals meet their earnings expectations. (6)The positive association likelihood of pledging collateral and firm’s missing expectations is stronger when more rivals meet their earnings expectations. (7) The positive association between intensity of restrictive covenants in loan contracts and firm’s missing expectations stronger when more rivals meet earnings expectation. (8) The loans of firms missing expectations are traded at higher bid-ask spreads than are those of firms meeting expectations in the secondary loan trade. (9) The positive association of bid-ask spreads of loans traded in secondary loan market with firm’s missing expectations is pronounced when more rivals meet their expectations.關聯 應用研究
學術補助
研究期間:9908~ 10007
研究經費:957仟元資料類型 report dc.contributor 國立政治大學會計學系 en_US dc.contributor 行政院國家科學委員會 en_US dc.creator (作者) 金成隆;梁嘉紋 zh_TW dc.date (日期) 2010 en_US dc.date.accessioned 26-六月-2012 14:57:35 (UTC+8) - dc.date.available 26-六月-2012 14:57:35 (UTC+8) - dc.date.issued (上傳時間) 26-六月-2012 14:57:35 (UTC+8) - dc.identifier.uri (URI) http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/53242 - dc.description.abstract (摘要) 迎合或擊敗分析師預期(簡稱迎合預期)的公司不僅未來具有較佳的績效，市場也會給予額外 的津貼(即便控制未預期盈餘/預測誤差)，因此是評估管理當局績效的重要指標。本計劃分三年 探討三個與迎合預期有關的問題: (1)以往有關盈餘在產業內的移轉效果的實証文獻，幾乎都顯示 信息移轉具有正向的傳染效果。當迎合預期表示未來績效較佳，且市場會給予津貼(透過股價或 報酬)時，同業迎合預期的比率愈高時，由於出現負向的產業競爭效果，此時市場是否對於本公 司的處罰愈高(透過股價或報酬)? 此外，市場對於無法盈餘預期者所給予的處罰，是否隨著更多 同業達到他們的盈餘預期，而益發嚴重?或者是市場對於無法盈餘預期者所給予的處罰，端賴於 同業是否有較高的比率盈餘預期而定? (2)同業迎合預期的比率愈高，由於競爭效果增加，是否 管理當局愈有迎合分析師預期的誘因或壓力? 此時是偏好使用「盈餘管理」或是「預期管理」 來達成迎合預期的壓力? (3)除權益市場外，私債市場的貸款者(如銀行)，對於未迎合預期的公 司，是否給予比較嚴格的條件(如:高利率、要擔保、較多限制債務條款)? 同時，是否當同業迎 合預期的比率愈高時，此一嚴格條件更加明顯? (前二年計畫所指的預期是分析師預期，第三年 則同時探討零盈餘、盈餘變動、與分析師預期三者)。此外此一私債發行是屬於初級市場，發行 後此一貸款(loan)可以在次級市場交易，此時迎合與否對於此一貸款在次級市場交易的買賣價差 有無影響?， 綜言之，三年期的各年期計畫主題及方向，說明如下: 第一年研究計畫主題及方向: 迎合分析師預期的信息移轉，是否具有負面的競爭效果?包括: (1)在控制未預期盈餘或是預測誤差下，同業迎合預期的比率愈高時，是否出現負向的產業競爭 效果，而使市場出現對本公司的處罰愈高? (2) 市場對於無法盈餘預期者所給予的處罰，是否隨 著更高比率的同業達到盈餘預期而益發嚴重? (3) 達成迎合預期的方法包括預期管理或是盈餘 管理，當同業迎合預期的比率愈高時，市場給予哪一種方法較高的津貼? (4) 前二項問題是否隨 著產業競爭狀況而異? 第二年研究計畫主題及方向: 管理當局迎合分析師預期的誘因與同業迎合預期比率之關連性， 包括: (1) 在控制未預期盈餘或是預測誤差下，同業迎合預期的比率愈高時，管理當局迎合預期的誘因 或是壓力是否更大? (2) 同業達成預期比率與管理當局達成預期誘因的正向關係，是否隨著產業 競爭程度而更加明顯? (3) 對於達成預期的公司而言，同業迎合預期的比率愈高時，是否愈會選 擇比較高點的預期數字來達成預期? (4) 對於達成預期的公司而言，業迎合預期的比率愈高時， 是否管理當局愈不可能引導新分析師向下(相對於向上盈餘管理而言)? (5) 根據以往文獻再將同 業再劃分為”主要競爭者”與”一般競爭者”，則前四項議題在”主要競爭者”的顯著情況下，是否大 於相對於”一般競爭者”的情況? 第三年研究計畫主題及方向: 管理當局與同業迎合預期對於銀行貸款條件的影響，以及該貸款 合約在次級市場的買賣差價的影響，包括: (1) 銀行借錢給公司時，對於無法迎合盈餘預期的公司，利率是否較高? (2) 銀行借錢給公司時， 對於常常無法迎合盈餘預期的公司，利率是否較高(相對於比較少無法迎合的公司)?(3) 銀行借 錢給公司時，對於無法迎合盈餘預期的公司，是否比較會要求其提供擔保品?(4) 銀行借錢給公 司時，對於無法迎合盈餘預期的公司，是否會提出比較多的債務限制條款?(5) 銀行對於未迎合 預期的借錢公司所提高的利率，隨著該公司同業迎合預期的比率增高而增加? (6) 銀行對要求未 迎合預期公司提供擔保品的現象，在該公司同業迎合預期的比率增高的情況下更為明顯? (7) 銀 行加諸於未迎合預期公司的限制性債務條款，在該公司同業迎合預期的比率增高的情況下更為 明顯? (8) 未迎合預期的借錢公司，相對於迎合者而言，其所借得的貸款在次級交易市場交易 時，買賣價差是否 較大? (9) (8)點未迎合預期者所產生的較大價差，是否在次級市場中其 他借錢公司迎合預期比率愈高時， 情況是否將更明顯? 額外檢測之議題: 如果這三年中任何一年仍有足夠時間，則可以隨時加作下列議題: (1) 股價是未來各期現金流量(分子)使用資金成本(分母)加以折現。當文獻發現市場對於未迎合 預期的公司會給予處罰(透過股價)時，同時也發現未來兩三的績效相對將更較差(分子)。然 而，未迎合預期所產生的股價降低，主要是來自分母(資金成本)變大，或是分子與分母同時 影響所致?本計劃家可以加作:未迎合預期的公司，權益資金成本將加大此一假說。邏輯推理 與前同。 en_US dc.description.abstract (摘要) Prior studies show that meeting/beating earnings expectation (thereafter MBE) is a leading indicator of better future performance, and that market rewards for meeting earnings expectation. Thus, MBE also is a desirable measure of managers’ performance. In this three-year projects, I will address three sets of MBE issues: (1) How market participants react to a higher proportion of rival firms meeting analysts’ expectations. While documenting that good (bad) earnings news has a positive (negative) average impact on the security prices of other non-announcing firms in the same industry, extant research also recognizes that negative information transfers from a firm’s earnings announcement may occur due to shifts in industry’s competition balance. This argument, coupled with a premium to MBE, addresses the issue as to whether market penalties firms when more rival firms meet expectations. Next, I explore whether the penalty for missing expectation is pronounced when more rivals meet expectations. (2) To meet analysts’ expectations, managers have two options to avoid negative earnings surprise: earnings management and/or expectation management. It is an interesting issue as to which instrument managers prefer to use to meet expectations when more rivals meet their expectations. In addition to the above issues related to equity market, my third-year project further will explore the effect of MBE on private debt market, including (1) whether bank imposes tighter price and nonprice (e.g., collateral requirement and restrictive covenants) loan terms for borrowers missing earrings expectations than for those meeting expectations when designing loan contracts; and whether this positive association increases with the number of times missing expectations. (2) whether the positive relation between tighter loan terms and the presence of missing expectations is stronger when there are more industry rival firms meet expectations. (3) In addition to primary debt market, I further explore whether MBE affects the bid-ask spreads of loans traded in secondary loans market. 1. Research topics are as follows for the first year: (1) This project will explore whether firms experience more unfavorable abnormal returns when there are a higher proportion of rivals meeting their expectations (i.e., non-negative earnings surprises). (2) This project will explore whether the penalty for failing to meet expectations is stronger when there are more rival firms avoiding negative surprises. (3) While there are two options to avoid negative earnings surprise (i.e., earnings management and expectation management), This project will explore which instrument market reacts more favorably to when more rival firms meet analysts’ expectations. (4)This project will explore whether the associations in (1) and (2) are stronger when industry is more competitive. 2. Research topics are as follows for the second year: (1) This project will explore whether managers’ have greater incentive or pressure to meet expectation when there are a higher proportion of rival firms meeting their expectations. (2)This project will explore whether the associations in (1) are stronger when industry is more competitive. (3) This project will explore whether, in addition to meeting expectations itself, managers have greater tendency to meet higher analysts’ forecasts when more rivals meet expectations. (4) While there are two options to avoid negative earnings surprise, this project will explore which instrument managers prefer to use when more rival firms meet analysts’ expectations.(5) Following Hoover’s reports I will decompose rival firms into competitive and non-competitive subsamples, and examine whether there are differential effects on the above four hypotheses between competitive and non-competitive firms. 3. Research topics are as follows for the third year: (1) Loan spreads, measured by loan interest rate, in excess of a benchmark rate, are higher for firms missing earnings expectations than for those meeting expectations. (2) Loan spreads, measured by loan interest rate, in excess of a benchmark rate, are higher for firms more frequently missing earnings expectations than for those less frequently missing expectations. (3) The likelihood of loans being secured by collateral is higher for firms missing earnings expectations than for those meeting expectations. (4) The use of restrictive covenants in loan contracts is more intensive and prevalent for firms missing earnings expectations than for those meeting expectations. (5) The positive association loan spreads and firm’s missing expectations is stronger when more rivals meet their earnings expectations. (6)The positive association likelihood of pledging collateral and firm’s missing expectations is stronger when more rivals meet their earnings expectations. (7) The positive association between intensity of restrictive covenants in loan contracts and firm’s missing expectations stronger when more rivals meet earnings expectation. (8) The loans of firms missing expectations are traded at higher bid-ask spreads than are those of firms meeting expectations in the secondary loan trade. (9) The positive association of bid-ask spreads of loans traded in secondary loan market with firm’s missing expectations is pronounced when more rivals meet their expectations. en_US dc.language.iso en_US - dc.relation (關聯) 應用研究 en_US dc.relation (關聯) 學術補助 en_US dc.relation (關聯) 研究期間:9908~ 10007 en_US dc.relation (關聯) 研究經費:957仟元 en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) 經濟;同業競爭;擊敗盈餘預期 en_US dc.title (題名) 同業競爭對手迎合或擊敗盈餘預期是否重要呢? zh_TW dc.title.alternative (其他題名) Does Rivals’ Meeting/Beating Earnings Expectations Matter? en_US dc.type (資料類型) report en
