| dc.contributor.advisor | 鄭端耀 | zh_TW |
| dc.contributor.advisor | Cheng, Tuan Yao | en_US |
| dc.contributor.author (作者) | 張廖年仲 | zh_TW |
| dc.contributor.author (作者) | Chang Liao, Nien Chung | en_US |
| dc.creator (作者) | 張廖年仲 | zh_TW |
| dc.creator (作者) | Chang Liao, Nien Chung | en_US |
| dc.date (日期) | 2012 | en_US |
| dc.identifier (其他 識別碼) | G0094260502 | en_US |
| dc.description (描述) | 博士 | zh_TW |
| dc.description (描述) | 國立政治大學 | zh_TW |
| dc.description (描述) | 東亞研究所 | zh_TW |
| dc.description (描述) | 94260502 | zh_TW |
| dc.description (描述) | 101 | zh_TW |
| dc.description.abstract (摘要) | 本論文主要探討敵對國家之間如何化解敵意、建立互信，進而達到合作的可能。本研究比較現實主義、新自由主義、建構主義等國際關係理論關於國家之間建立互信的途徑，提出昂貴信號（costly signaling）的模式，主張敵對國家之間可以運用昂貴信號來向對方展現誠意，以克服彼此的互不信任，因而達到相互合作的可能。本論文提出一系列昂貴信號的機制和研究假設，並檢視五個個案，包括：1.以埃和平協議（1974-1979）；2.南北韓關係（1998-2008）；3.中美關係正常化（1968-1972）；4.冷戰終結（1985-1992）；5.兩岸關係（2008-2012）。本研究發現：一、在兩個敵對國家之間，國力越強的一方越會率先使用昂貴信來取信另一方；二、非民主國家和民主國家一樣，可以透過昂貴信號以取信於其他國家。本論文不僅希望能補充現有國際關係理論關於國家間建立互信討論的不足，也希望能為兩岸關係的發展帶來啟發。 | zh_TW |
| dc.description.abstract (摘要) | This dissertation asks: why and how can some rival states overcome their deep suspicions and achieve trust and cooperation? To what extent will power asymmetry and different regime type influence their trust-building process? The argument is: when a common adversary emerges or when resources are constrained, enduring rivals with power disparity and different regime types are able to build mutual trust by exchanging costly signals that demonstrate their cooperative intentions. This thesis attempts to advance the existing literature of reassurance by analyzing the effect of costly signals on trust-building between enemies.Distinguishing between ex ante and ex post costs, this study outlines a set of costly signal mechanisms, including military forms such as self-restraint, arms control, confidence-building measures, and de-alignment; as well as non-military forms including symbolic gestures, domestic reform, diplomatic recognition, and territorial concessions. The costly signaling model (CSM) developed in this project identifies the causal conditions under which states employ costly signals: first, the less vulnerable the state, the more likely it is to initiate costly signals; second, nondemocracies, like democracies, can also conduct costly signals to reassure other states. The CSM is further applied to five empirical cases of dyadic adversarial relations: the Egyptian-Israeli peace process from 1974 to 1979, the relationship of the two Koreas from 1998 to 2008, the Sino-US rapprochement from 1968 to 1972, the end of the Cold War from 1985 to 1992, and the current development of cross-Strait relations. The evidence shows that if one state sends costly signals to the other state, and then the receiving state, rather than taking advantage, instead reciprocates with its own costly signals, a trusting relationship can be established between them. The implications of this research enrich the study of trust-building in international relations theory in the hope of exploring the possibilities for peace and reconciliation across the Taiwan Strait. | en_US |
| dc.description.tableofcontents | Chapter 1 Introduction.......1Chapter 2 Cost, Signal, and Credibility: A Model Development.......35Chapter 3 The Egyptian-Israeli Peace Process, 1973-1979.......71Chapter 4 The False Promise of Korean Unification: 1998-2002.......95Chapter 5 The Sino-American Rapprochement, 1969-1972....121Chapter 6 The End of the Cold War: 1985-1991.......149Chapter 7 From Confrontation to Conciliation? Building Trust across the Taiwan Strait.......177Chapter 8 Conclusion: Assessing the Costly Signaling Model.......199Appendix A Selecting Cases from Enduring Rivals.......221Appendix B North–South Joint Declaration, June 15, 2000.......227Appendix C Joint Communiqué of the United States of America and the People`s Republic of China, February 27, 1972 (Shanghai Communiqué).......229Bibliography.......233 | zh_TW |
| dc.source.uri (資料來源) | http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0094260502 | en_US |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | 昂貴信號 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | 兩岸關係 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | 建立互信 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | 國際關係理論 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | 戰略保證 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | costly signaling | en_US |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | cross-Strait relations | en_US |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | trust-building | en_US |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | international relations theory | en_US |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | strategic reassurance | en_US |
| dc.title (題名) | 敵對國家建立互信之研究：昂貴信號模式 | zh_TW |
| dc.title (題名) | Building trust between enemies: a costly signaling model | en_US |
| dc.type (資料類型) | thesis | en |
