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題名 集合住宅管理維護績效之研究：集體行動、管理模式、使用衝突之影響探討
Performance Evaluation of Property Management Services for Condominiums: A Research of Collective Action, Management Modes, and Usage Conflicts
作者 朱芳妮
Chu, Fang Ni
貢獻者 張金鶚
Chang, Chin oh
朱芳妮
Chu, Fang Ni
關鍵詞 集合住宅管理維護模式
代理理論
公司治理
集體行動
公共財
使用衝突
績效指標
Condominium management modes
principal-agent theory
corporate governance
collective action
public goods
usage conflicts
indicators of management performance
日期 2011
上傳時間 1-May-2013 11:51:12 (UTC+8)
摘要 集合住宅社區共同使用部份屬於住戶分別共有的「共有資產」，具有類似公共財的特性，可能會因為相關使用衝突課題，或集體行動困境，而減損多數願意配合社區事務的住戶之使用效益。此外，代理問題可能衍生自管理委員會所建立的管理模式，其影響程度可能因決策控制權及管理權不同程度的委外而有異。
      因此，本論文主要有三個探討課題：第一，從集體行動困境角度分析並釐清管理委員會自治管理問題；第二，依據代理理論、公司治理機制，從決策控制權移轉的程度來重新定義集合住宅社區的事務管理模式，分析事務管理模式對於管理維護效率的影響；第三，了解使用混合與面積混合所產生的使用衝突與管理維護績效間的相互關係。本文使用台北集合住宅管理維護現況調查的問卷資料進行實證研究，期望透過上述課題的探討，釐清管理維護潛在問題，並對不同類型社區提出適宜管理維護方式的建議，產生兼具學術與實務面之貢獻。
Common property belonging to all owners of a condominium may cause usage conflicts or collective action dilemmas, due to the characteristic of quasi-public goods diminishing most residents` utility or benefits. Besides, agency problems derived from different management modes established by management committees may have unfavorable influence on management performance to some extent ccording to the delegation degree of decision control and management.
     
     Therefore, the main topics of this dissertation are as follows: First, analyzing and cectifying the collective action dilemmas through the self-organized CPR regimes;
     Secondly, redefining condominium management modes through delegation or outsourcing degrees of decision control according to agency theory and corporate governance framework and analyzing the effects of these modes on management performance; Thirdly, discovering the relationship between usage conflicts derived from the features of housing mix and usage mix and management performance of condominiums. Data collected from a postal questionnaire survey in Taipei city was used in several empirical analyses based on the main topics. Clarify the potential problems of condominium management and proposing appropriate management modes and approaches according to various features of condominiums are expected to be both academic and practical contributions.
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描述 博士
國立政治大學
地政研究所
95257502
100
資料來源 http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0095257502
資料類型 thesis
dc.contributor.advisor 張金鶚zh_TW
dc.contributor.advisor Chang, Chin ohen_US
dc.contributor.author (Authors) 朱芳妮zh_TW
dc.contributor.author (Authors) Chu, Fang Nien_US
dc.creator (作者) 朱芳妮zh_TW
dc.creator (作者) Chu, Fang Nien_US
dc.date (日期) 2011en_US
dc.date.accessioned 1-May-2013 11:51:12 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.available 1-May-2013 11:51:12 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.issued (上傳時間) 1-May-2013 11:51:12 (UTC+8)-
dc.identifier (Other Identifiers) G0095257502en_US
dc.identifier.uri (URI) http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/57969-
dc.description (描述) 博士zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 國立政治大學zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 地政研究所zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 95257502zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 100zh_TW
dc.description.abstract (摘要) 集合住宅社區共同使用部份屬於住戶分別共有的「共有資產」，具有類似公共財的特性，可能會因為相關使用衝突課題，或集體行動困境，而減損多數願意配合社區事務的住戶之使用效益。此外，代理問題可能衍生自管理委員會所建立的管理模式，其影響程度可能因決策控制權及管理權不同程度的委外而有異。
      因此，本論文主要有三個探討課題：第一，從集體行動困境角度分析並釐清管理委員會自治管理問題；第二，依據代理理論、公司治理機制，從決策控制權移轉的程度來重新定義集合住宅社區的事務管理模式，分析事務管理模式對於管理維護效率的影響；第三，了解使用混合與面積混合所產生的使用衝突與管理維護績效間的相互關係。本文使用台北集合住宅管理維護現況調查的問卷資料進行實證研究，期望透過上述課題的探討，釐清管理維護潛在問題，並對不同類型社區提出適宜管理維護方式的建議，產生兼具學術與實務面之貢獻。		zh_TW
dc.description.abstract (摘要) Common property belonging to all owners of a condominium may cause usage conflicts or collective action dilemmas, due to the characteristic of quasi-public goods diminishing most residents` utility or benefits. Besides, agency problems derived from different management modes established by management committees may have unfavorable influence on management performance to some extent ccording to the delegation degree of decision control and management.
     
     Therefore, the main topics of this dissertation are as follows: First, analyzing and cectifying the collective action dilemmas through the self-organized CPR regimes;
     Secondly, redefining condominium management modes through delegation or outsourcing degrees of decision control according to agency theory and corporate governance framework and analyzing the effects of these modes on management performance; Thirdly, discovering the relationship between usage conflicts derived from the features of housing mix and usage mix and management performance of condominiums. Data collected from a postal questionnaire survey in Taipei city was used in several empirical analyses based on the main topics. Clarify the potential problems of condominium management and proposing appropriate management modes and approaches according to various features of condominiums are expected to be both academic and practical contributions.		en_US
dc.description.tableofcontents 第一章 緒論 1
     第一節 研究緣起與動機 1
     第二節 研究問題與目的 3
     第三節 研究範圍與方法 4
     第四節 研究架構與流程 6
     第二章文獻回顧與理論基礎 8
     第一節 集合住宅管理維護模式、代理理論與公司治理 8
     第二節 財產權理論、外部性、衝突管理 12
     第三節 績效評估 19
     第三章研究設計 22
     第一節 核心影響因素界定 22
     第二節 管理維護績效衡量方式 28
     第三節 實證分析設計 34
     第四章集合住宅社區公共財與集體行動困境 38
     第一節 研究背景概述 38
     第二節 模型推導與敘述統計 41
     第三節 實證分析 49
     第五章集合住宅管理維護模式與代理關係之探討 54
     第一節 研究背景概述 54
     第二節 敘述統計 56
     第三節 實證分析 58
     第六章集合住宅使用衝突與管理維護績效之關係 64
     第一節 研究背景概述 64
     第二節 模型建立與敘述統計 66
     第三節 實證分析 71
     第七章結論與建議 77
     第一節 集合住宅社區公共財與集體行動之連結 77
     第二節 集合住宅管理維護模式與代理關係 79
     第三節 集合住宅使用衝突與管理維護績效 81
     參考文獻82
     
     表 目 錄
     表3-1 投入與產出項內容說明 30
     表3-2 投入與產出項敘述統計 31
     表4-1 委外程度與管理維護效率 47
     表4-2 樣本敘述統計 48
     表4-3 集合住宅社區公共財供給效率之Tobit複迴歸模型估計結果 50
     表4-4 委外程度二元變數之Probit迴歸模型估計結果 51
     表4-5 選擇性偏誤修正之Tobit複迴歸模型估計結果 52
     表5-1 管理維護面向及事務管理模式 56
     表5-2 樣本敘述統計 57
     表5-3 管理維護效率估計值與效率型態 58
     表5-4 集合住宅社區管理維護效率之Tobit拔靴複迴歸結果 63
     表6-1 變數說明與基本敘述統計 70
     表6-2 管理維護效率評估類型與社區特性之分析 72
     表6-3 三階段聯立模型（3SLS）估計結果 75
     
     圖 目 錄
     圖1-1 研究流程圖 7
     圖3-1以代理理論與公司治理機制所界定的事務管理模式概念圖 25
     圖6-1使用衝突、管理維護績效與影響因素之關係 74		zh_TW
dc.language.iso en_US-
dc.source.uri (資料來源) http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0095257502en_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 集合住宅管理維護模式zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 代理理論zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 公司治理zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 集體行動zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 公共財zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 使用衝突zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 績效指標zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) Condominium management modesen_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) principal-agent theoryen_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) corporate governanceen_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) collective actionen_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) public goodsen_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) usage conflictsen_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) indicators of management performanceen_US
dc.title (題名) 集合住宅管理維護績效之研究：集體行動、管理模式、使用衝突之影響探討zh_TW
dc.title (題名) Performance Evaluation of Property Management Services for Condominiums: A Research of Collective Action, Management Modes, and Usage Conflictsen_US
dc.type (資料類型) thesisen
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