| dc.contributor | 政大財政系 | en_US |
| dc.creator (作者) | 王智賢;劉郁潔 | zh_TW |
| dc.creator (作者) | Jue-Shyan Wang;Yu-Jieh Liu | en_US |
| dc.date (日期) | 2009-07 | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | 26-八月-2013 09:11:52 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.date.available | 26-八月-2013 09:11:52 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.date.issued (上傳時間) | 26-八月-2013 09:11:52 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.identifier.uri (URI) | http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/59088 | - |
| dc.description.abstract (摘要) | 政府在制定政策的過程中，往往會受到利益團體影響。我們藉由Grossman and Helpman (1994) 所發展的政治獻金模型為架構，討論在國內生產具有負面外部性的情況下，政府決定是否開放具有生產優勢的外國廠商進入本國生產的決策。我們發現開放外人直接投資與否，受到政府對社會福利重視的程度所影響。在政府相對較不重視社會福利且生產完全無生產技術外溢時，政府將不會選擇開放國外廠商進入本國投資，而一般情況下，當市場規模夠大且政府重視社會福利有一定程度時，生產時所造成的負面外部性愈大，本國政府將傾向不開放外國廠商進入本國直接生產。 | en_US |
| dc.description.abstract (摘要) | Since a domestic government can make choices between alternative policy instruments to maximize its citizens` welfare, this paper analyzes how a domestic government formulates policy on foreign direct investment (FDI), employing Grossman and Helpman`s (1994) political contribution model. Our analysis reveals that the decision whether or not to open to FDI is affected by the weight the domestic government places on social welfare. We found that domestic governments tend not to open to FDI when they place little weight on social welfare. In cases where the weight and market are large enough, domestic governments are increasingly likely to open to FDI as the pollution externality increases. | en_US |
| dc.language.iso | en_US | - |
| dc.relation (關聯) | 經社法制論叢, 44, 61-96 | en_US |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | 外人直接投資;政治獻金;技術外溢效果;污染外部性 | en_US |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | Foreign direct investment;Political contributions;Spillover effect;Pollution externality | en_US |
| dc.title (題名) | 外人直接投資或關稅遊說— 污染外部性模型 | zh_TW |
| dc.title.alternative (其他題名) | Foreign Direct Investment or Lobbying for Tariffs－Pollution Externality Model | en_US |
| dc.type (資料類型) | article | en |
