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題名 Reciprocity and downward wage rigidity
作者 Lin,Chung-Cheng;Yang,C.C.
貢獻者 政大財政系
關鍵詞 Reciprocity;Downward wage rigidity;Social norm;Efficiency wage
日期 2010-12
上傳時間 26-八月-2013 16:10:31 (UTC+8)
摘要 The employment relationship is to a large extent characterized by incomplete contracts, in which workers have a considerable degree of discretion over the choice of their work effort. This discretion at work kicks in the potential importance of “gift exchange” or reciprocity between workers and employers in their employment relationship. Built on the seminal work of Akerlof (1980), this paper adopts a social norm approach to model reciprocity in labor markets and theoretically derives two versions of downward wage rigidity. The first version explains why employers may adopt a high wage policy far above the competitive level. This version is not a novel finding in the existing literature and is mainly served as a benchmark for later comparison in the current paper. Our main contribution lies in the second version in which not only may employers adopt a high wage policy far above the competitive level, but one can also account for the asymmetric behavior of wages and explain why employers are hesitant about wage cuts in the presence of negative shocks. We argue that this second and stronger version of downward wage rigidity has moved the efficiency wage theory a step forward.
關聯 Journal of Macroeconomics, 32(4), 1155-1168
資料類型 article
DOI http://dx.doi.org/http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jmacro.2010.07.002
dc.contributor 政大財政系en_US
dc.creator (作者) Lin,Chung-Cheng;Yang,C.C.en_US
dc.date (日期) 2010-12en_US
dc.date.accessioned 26-八月-2013 16:10:31 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.available 26-八月-2013 16:10:31 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.issued (上傳時間) 26-八月-2013 16:10:31 (UTC+8)-
dc.identifier.uri (URI) http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/59139-
dc.description.abstract (摘要) The employment relationship is to a large extent characterized by incomplete contracts, in which workers have a considerable degree of discretion over the choice of their work effort. This discretion at work kicks in the potential importance of “gift exchange” or reciprocity between workers and employers in their employment relationship. Built on the seminal work of Akerlof (1980), this paper adopts a social norm approach to model reciprocity in labor markets and theoretically derives two versions of downward wage rigidity. The first version explains why employers may adopt a high wage policy far above the competitive level. This version is not a novel finding in the existing literature and is mainly served as a benchmark for later comparison in the current paper. Our main contribution lies in the second version in which not only may employers adopt a high wage policy far above the competitive level, but one can also account for the asymmetric behavior of wages and explain why employers are hesitant about wage cuts in the presence of negative shocks. We argue that this second and stronger version of downward wage rigidity has moved the efficiency wage theory a step forward.en_US
dc.language.iso en_US-
dc.relation (關聯) Journal of Macroeconomics, 32(4), 1155-1168en_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) Reciprocity;Downward wage rigidity;Social norm;Efficiency wageen_US
dc.title (題名) Reciprocity and downward wage rigidityen_US
dc.type (資料類型) articleen
dc.identifier.doi (DOI) 10.1016/j.jmacro.2010.07.002en_US
dc.doi.uri (DOI) http://dx.doi.org/http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jmacro.2010.07.002en_US