| dc.contributor | 政大財政系 | en_US |
| dc.creator (作者) | Hsu, Li-Chen;Yang, C.C;Yang, Chun-Lei | en_US |
| dc.date (日期) | 2008-12 | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | 26-Aug-2013 16:10:36 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.date.available | 26-Aug-2013 16:10:36 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.date.issued (上傳時間) | 26-Aug-2013 16:10:36 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.identifier.uri (URI) | http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/59142 | - |
| dc.description.abstract (摘要) | Politics can involve a movement from a position off the Pareto frontier to a point on it (a positive-sum game as exemplified in the classic [Buchanan, J.M., Tullock, G., 1962. The Calculus of Consent. University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor] work), or a movement along the Pareto frontier (a zero-sum game as exemplified in the classic [Riker, W., 1962. The theory of political coalitions. Yale University Press, New Haven] work). In this paper we shed light on their differentiation experimentally by making a comparison between a positive-sum and a zero-sum majoritarian ultimatum game. Our main findings include (i) the fraction of subjects who adopted minimum winning rather than oversized coalitions increases significantly as the game form varies from positive-sum to zero-sum, (ii) oversized coalitions are attributable to non-strategic considerations, and (iii) subjects who choose to adopt the minimum winning coalition have a tendency to seek cheaper responders as their partners in the zero-sum game, but there is no evidence of such a tendency in the positive-sum game. Overall, the weight of the evidence revealed by our experimental data indicates that relative scarcity (embodied in the zero-sum game) promotes behavior more in line with the predictions of economics. | en_US |
| dc.language.iso | en_US | - |
| dc.relation (關聯) | Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 68(3-4), 498-510 | en_US |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | Majoritarian bargaining;Minimum winning coalition;Experiment | en_US |
| dc.title (題名) | Positive- versus Zero-Sum Majoritarian Ultimatum Games: An Experimental Study | en_US |
| dc.type (資料類型) | article | en |
| dc.identifier.doi (DOI) | 10.1016/j.jebo.2007.01.004 | en_US |
| dc.doi.uri (DOI) | http://dx.doi.org/http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2007.01.004 | en_US |
