| dc.contributor | 哲學系 | en_US |
| dc.creator (作者) | 王鍾山 | zh_TW |
| dc.creator (作者) | Wang, Chung-Shan | en_US |
| dc.date (日期) | 2012-01 | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | 7-一月-2014 17:17:14 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.date.available | 7-一月-2014 17:17:14 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.date.issued (上傳時間) | 7-一月-2014 17:17:14 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.identifier.uri (URI) | http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/63340 | - |
| dc.description.abstract (摘要) | 在本文中，筆者主要針對〈應以何者為科學之開端？〉一文中的一個段落（十七至二十三段）全文加以詮釋、分析，並最後依義理傾向作出考證。依據筆者的詮釋，在這個段落中，黑格爾批評了某種以柏拉圖辯證法之「出於假設」的向上之路的哲學方法，對之加以應用在純粹科學之「無預設的開端」問題的處理。依照這種辯證法，在處理開端問題時，它對「開端的表象」來加以分析，最後得出了「有與非有的統一」的首要原則。這個原則雖看似與黑格爾的「有─無─變」的辯證法所得出之觀點一致，但由於整個分析的開始乃出於與主體感性經驗有關的表象，其本身包含了中介，因而便不能作為純粹思想的絕對開端，以致於整個得出的存有學結構將只是「關於純粹概念的思想」，而不是黑格爾對純粹科學所要求的那種「思想自身自行運動的思想」。如果我們對這個段落的解讀是正確的，那麼這個段落不但能顯示黑格爾對於古代辯證法的批判，更可以進一步和下一個段落，黑格爾對費希特之主體論以智性直觀作為開端的批判，否定性地呈顯出──黑格爾慣常使用的修辭──整部《邏輯學》企圖：對古代的相論與現代的主體論之形上學加以接合並分別克服其各自的問題。 | en_US |
| dc.description.abstract (摘要) | In this article, I mainly treat the section (§17-§23) in the text “Womit muss der Anfang der Wissenschaft gemacht werden?” by interpreting, analyzing, and finally textually criticizing it based on theoretical tendency. According to my interpretation, Hegel consciously aims to criticize Platonic dialectics of “the upward path” — ex hypothesis to arche anhypothetos, by which the problem of beginning in pure science could be solved. By this dialectics, when it deals with the problem of beginning, it analyzes “the representation of beginning,” and finally we can get “the unity of being and non-being” as the first principle without presuppositions. Though the principle seems to be the same with the view of the Hegel’s dialectics: “Being—Nothing—Becoming”, all analysis is derived from the representation which is related with subjective experience. Accordingly, the principle contains a medium and cannot be the absolute beginning in pure science, so that the whole ontology deduced from it is merely the thoughts of pure concept, not the thoughts that thoughts itself move by itself, which Hegel requires for pure science. If my interpretation is correct, the section can not only explicate Hegel’s critic of antique dialectics, but with next section that Hegel criticizes Fichte’s theory of subjectivity that he uses intellectual intuition as the beginning, both sections can also implicate — Hegelian rhetoric — the whole purpose of Wissenschaft der Logik: to unite the metaphysics of antique idealism and of modern subjectivism and to overcome their own problems. | en_US |
| dc.format.extent | 356642 bytes | - |
| dc.format.mimetype | application/pdf | - |
| dc.language.iso | en_US | - |
| dc.relation (關聯) | 政治大學哲學學報, 27, 117-145 | en_US |
| dc.relation (關聯) | The national Chengchi university philosophical, 27, 117-145 | en_US |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | 黑格爾;邏輯學;形上學存有論;柏拉圖;開端問題 | en_US |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | G.W.F. Hegel;Wissenschaft der Logik;Metaphysical Ontology;Plato;The problem of beginning | en_US |
| dc.title (題名) | 從假設開始？： 對黑格爾《邏輯學》 開端的一個段落的詮釋 | zh_TW |
| dc.title.alternative (其他題名) | Begin from Hypothesis ? : An Interpretation of a Section in Beginning of Hegel’s Science of Logic | en_US |
| dc.type (資料類型) | article | en |
