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題名 An Empirical Analysis of the Effects of Increasing Deductibles on Moral Hazard
作者 Jennifer L.Wang;Chung,Ching-Fan ;Larry Y. Tzeng
王儷玲;鍾經樊;曾郁仁
貢獻者 風管系
日期 2008-09
上傳時間 27-二月-2014 16:18:28 (UTC+8)
摘要 Using information on timing and number of claims in a unique data set pertaining to comprehensive automobile insurance with the increasing deductible provision in Taiwan, the authors provide new evidence for moral hazard. Time-varying correlations between the choice of the insurance coverage and claim occurrence are significantly positive and exhibit a smirk pattern across policy months. This empirical finding supports the existence of asymmetric information. A subsample estimation depicts insured drivers` significant responses to increasing deductibles, which implies the existence of moral hazard. According to the probit regression results, the increasing deductible makes policyholders who have ever filed claims less likely to file additional claims later in the policy year. The empirical findings strongly support the notion that the increasing deductible provision helps control moral hazard.
關聯 Journal of Risk and Insurance, 75(3), 551-566
資料類型 article
DOI http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1539-6975.2008.00274.x
dc.contributor 風管系en_US
dc.creator (作者) Jennifer L.Wang;Chung,Ching-Fan ;Larry Y. Tzengen_US
dc.creator (作者) 王儷玲;鍾經樊;曾郁仁zh_TW
dc.date (日期) 2008-09en_US
dc.date.accessioned 27-二月-2014 16:18:28 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.available 27-二月-2014 16:18:28 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.issued (上傳時間) 27-二月-2014 16:18:28 (UTC+8)-
dc.identifier.uri (URI) http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/64281-
dc.description.abstract (摘要) Using information on timing and number of claims in a unique data set pertaining to comprehensive automobile insurance with the increasing deductible provision in Taiwan, the authors provide new evidence for moral hazard. Time-varying correlations between the choice of the insurance coverage and claim occurrence are significantly positive and exhibit a smirk pattern across policy months. This empirical finding supports the existence of asymmetric information. A subsample estimation depicts insured drivers` significant responses to increasing deductibles, which implies the existence of moral hazard. According to the probit regression results, the increasing deductible makes policyholders who have ever filed claims less likely to file additional claims later in the policy year. The empirical findings strongly support the notion that the increasing deductible provision helps control moral hazard.en_US
dc.format.extent 125396 bytes-
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf-
dc.language.iso en_US-
dc.relation (關聯) Journal of Risk and Insurance, 75(3), 551-566en_US
dc.title (題名) An Empirical Analysis of the Effects of Increasing Deductibles on Moral Hazarden_US
dc.type (資料類型) articleen
dc.identifier.doi (DOI) 10.1111/j.1539-6975.2008.00274.xen_US
dc.doi.uri (DOI) http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1539-6975.2008.00274.xen_US