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題名 Naturalism’s Perils, Naturalism’s Promises: A Comment on Appiah’s Experiments in Ethics/Neuroethics
作者 王華
Weinberg, Jonathan M. ; Wang, Ellie
貢獻者 哲學系
關鍵詞 Intuitions ; Naturalism ; Virtue ethics ; Situationism ; Experimental philosophy
日期 2010.11
上傳時間 17-四月-2014 16:24:53 (UTC+8)
摘要 In his Experiments in Ethics, Appiah focuses mostly on the dimension of naturalism as a naturalism of deprivation - naturalism’s apparent robbing us of aspects of the world that we had held dear. The aim of this paper is to remind him of that naturalism has a dimension of plenitude as well - its capacity to enrich our conception of the world as well. With regard to character, we argue that scientific psychology can help provide a conception of character as dynamic, in a way that may preserve many key aspects of eudaimonistic ethics from the situationists’ challenge. With regard to intuition, we address Appiah’s worry that naturalistic explanations of the sources of our intuitions may leave us feeling that those intuitions have been thereby debunked. We suggest that it may be that feeling of debunking that should itself be debunked.
關聯 Neuroethics, 3(3), 215-222
資料類型 article
dc.contributor 哲學系en_US
dc.creator (作者) 王華zh_TW
dc.creator (作者) Weinberg, Jonathan M. ; Wang, Ellieen_US
dc.date (日期) 2010.11en_US
dc.date.accessioned 17-四月-2014 16:24:53 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.available 17-四月-2014 16:24:53 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.issued (上傳時間) 17-四月-2014 16:24:53 (UTC+8)-
dc.identifier.uri (URI) http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/65464-
dc.description.abstract (摘要) In his Experiments in Ethics, Appiah focuses mostly on the dimension of naturalism as a naturalism of deprivation - naturalism’s apparent robbing us of aspects of the world that we had held dear. The aim of this paper is to remind him of that naturalism has a dimension of plenitude as well - its capacity to enrich our conception of the world as well. With regard to character, we argue that scientific psychology can help provide a conception of character as dynamic, in a way that may preserve many key aspects of eudaimonistic ethics from the situationists’ challenge. With regard to intuition, we address Appiah’s worry that naturalistic explanations of the sources of our intuitions may leave us feeling that those intuitions have been thereby debunked. We suggest that it may be that feeling of debunking that should itself be debunked.en_US
dc.format.extent 138794 bytes-
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf-
dc.language.iso en_US-
dc.relation (關聯) Neuroethics, 3(3), 215-222en_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) Intuitions ; Naturalism ; Virtue ethics ; Situationism ; Experimental philosophyen_US
dc.title (題名) Naturalism’s Perils, Naturalism’s Promises: A Comment on Appiah’s Experiments in Ethics/Neuroethicsen_US
dc.type (資料類型) articleen