| dc.contributor | 金融系 | en_US |
| dc.creator (作者) | 廖四郎 | zh_TW |
| dc.creator (作者) | Huang, Yi-Ting; Wu, Ming-Cheng; Liao, Szu-Lang | en_US |
| dc.date (日期) | 2012.08 | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | 25-六月-2014 16:12:53 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.date.available | 25-六月-2014 16:12:53 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.date.issued (上傳時間) | 25-六月-2014 16:12:53 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.identifier.uri (URI) | http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/66917 | - |
| dc.description.abstract (摘要) | The authors analyze the impact of equity-based compensation on managerial risk-taking behavior in Chinese listed firms from January 2006 to July 2011. They find that greater risk-taking incentives lead executives to invest more in research and development (R&D) projects and less in capital expenditures. Greater managerial risk-taking incentive increases firm focus. Managerial risk-taking incentives have positive effects on firms` leverage. Overall, increasing the sensitivity of chief executive officers` portfolio value to stock return volatility helps incentivize executives to work harder, as sharing gains and losses with shareholders aligns the interests of executives and shareholders. In addition, the results indicate that state control of firms has a negative effect on R&D investment, and this suggests that state-controlled firms should take more initiative to innovate | en_US |
| dc.format.extent | 131888 bytes | - |
| dc.format.mimetype | application/pdf | - |
| dc.language.iso | en_US | - |
| dc.relation (關聯) | Emerging Markets Finance and Trade, 49(March suppl.), 107-125 | en_US |
| dc.title (題名) | The Relation between Equity-based Compensation and Managerial Risk-taking: Evidence from China | en_US |
| dc.type (資料類型) | article | en |
| dc.identifier.doi (DOI) | 10.2753/REE1540-496X4902S206 | en_US |
| dc.doi.uri (DOI) | http://dx.doi.org/10.2753/REE1540-496X4902S206 | en_US |
