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題名 上市公司邊際債務策略之探討
Probing the Marginal-Debt Corporate Finance Strategy作者 孔設毅
Cyril Couplet貢獻者 扈企平
Hu, Joseph
孔設毅
Cyril Couplet關鍵詞 邊際債務
策略
Marginal-Debt
Strategy日期 2013 上傳時間 14-七月-2014 14:00:47 (UTC+8) 摘要 上市公司邊際債務策略之探討
This thesis aims at understanding the corporate finance strategy of companies which have no or an extremely low debt to equity ratio. For this thesis, companies that have a debt-to-equity ratio less than 5% are defined as “marginal-debt” companies. We identify 167 U.S. public companies which could easily access to the financial market for debt. In order to find some explanations for the phenomenon of marginal-debt, we first examine the trade-off theory. According to the theory, it can be hypothesized that an extremely low corporate tax rate or a high marginal cost of bankruptcy could explain the minimal presence of debt for those marginal-debt companies. However, we find no evidence to accept this hypothesis. Marginal-debt companies have an average tax rate of 31.4%, compared to 29.8% for our sample of indebted companies. They also have a generally better financial health, even when deleveraging their financial ratios. Owing to that, neither bankruptcy cost explains the financial management strategy of marginal-debt. Hence, we expect this phenomenon to be purely behavioral. We therefore propose a survey questionnaire to better analyze the incentives for managers to adopt a marginal-debt strategy.. Keywords: Marginal-debt, Capital structure, Low leverage, Trade-off theory, Debt aversion參考文獻 Agrawal, A., Nagarajan, N. (1990), Corporate capital structure, agency costs, and ownership control: the case of all-equity firms,. Journal of Finance, Vol. 45, 1325–1331.Altman E. (2000), Predicting financial distress of companies: Revisiting the z-score and zeta® modelsBarclay, M. and Smith, C. (2005), The Capital Structure Puzzle: The Evidence Revisited, Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, 17: 8-17.Becker, G., 1981. Altruism in the family and selfishness in the market place. Economica 48, 1–15.Bertrand, M., Schoar, A., 2006. The role of family in family firms. Journal of Economic Perspective 20, 73–96.Cotei C., and Farhat J. (2009), The Trade-off Theory and the Pecking Order Theory: Are They Mutually Exclusive?, North American Journal of Finance and Banking Research, Vol. 3(3), 1-16Devos E., et. Al. (2012), Why are firms unlevered?, Journal of Corporate Finance, Vol. 18, 664-682Donaldson G. (1961) Corporate Debt Capacity: A study of Corporate Debt Policy and the Determination of Corporate Debt Capacity, Boston, Division of Research, Harvard Graduate School of Business Administration Graham, J., 2000. How big are the tax benefits of debt?, Journal of Finance, Vol. 55, 1901–1941.Korteweg A. (2010), The net benefits to leverage, Journal of Finance, Vol. 65 (6), 2137-2170.MacKie-Mason, Jeffrey, 1990, Do taxes affect corporate financing decisions? Journal of Finance 45, 1471–1493.Malmendier, U., Tate, G., Yan, J., 2011. Overconfidence and early-life experiences: the effect of managerial traits on corporate financial policies. Journal of Finance 66, 1687–1733.Modigliani F., and Miller M. (1958), The Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance and the Theory of Investment. American Economic Review, Vol. 48 (3), 261–297. Modigliani F., and Miller M. (1963), Corporate income taxes and the cost of capital: a correction, American Economic Review, Vol. 53 (3), 433–443Morellec E., Nikolov B., and Schurhoff N. (2012), Corporate Governance and Capital Structure Dynamics, Journal of Finance, Vol. 67 (3), 803-848Mukherjee S., and Mahakud, J. (2012), Are Trade-off and Pecking Order Theories of Capital Structure Mutually Exclusive? Evidence from Indian Manufacturing Companies, Journal of Management Research, Vol. 12, 41-55Myers, S. (1984), The Capital Structure Puzzle, Journal of Finance, 39: 575-592.Myers, S. and Majluf, N. (1984), Corporate Financing and Investment Decisions When Firms Have Information that Investors Do Not Have, Journal of Financial Economics, 13: 187-224.Novaes W., and Zingales L. (1995), Capital Structure Choice when Managers are in Control: Entrenchment versus Efficiency, NBER working paper number 5384.Strebulaev I., and Yang B. (2013), The mystery of zero-leverage firms, Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 109, 1-23.http://www.reuters.com/article/2008/10/27/us-financial-inditex-idUSTRE49Q01R20081027 描述 碩士
國立政治大學
國際經營管理英語碩士學位學程(IMBA)
102933062
102資料來源 http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0102933062 資料類型 thesis dc.contributor.advisor 扈企平 zh_TW dc.contributor.advisor Hu, Joseph en_US dc.contributor.author (作者) 孔設毅 zh_TW dc.contributor.author (作者) Cyril Couplet en_US dc.creator (作者) 孔設毅 zh_TW dc.creator (作者) Cyril Couplet en_US dc.date (日期) 2013 en_US dc.date.accessioned 14-七月-2014 14:00:47 (UTC+8) - dc.date.available 14-七月-2014 14:00:47 (UTC+8) - dc.date.issued (上傳時間) 14-七月-2014 14:00:47 (UTC+8) - dc.identifier (其他 識別碼) G0102933062 en_US dc.identifier.uri (URI) http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/67512 - dc.description (描述) 碩士 zh_TW dc.description (描述) 國立政治大學 zh_TW dc.description (描述) 國際經營管理英語碩士學位學程(IMBA) zh_TW dc.description (描述) 102933062 zh_TW dc.description (描述) 102 zh_TW dc.description.abstract (摘要) 上市公司邊際債務策略之探討 zh_TW dc.description.abstract (摘要) This thesis aims at understanding the corporate finance strategy of companies which have no or an extremely low debt to equity ratio. For this thesis, companies that have a debt-to-equity ratio less than 5% are defined as “marginal-debt” companies. We identify 167 U.S. public companies which could easily access to the financial market for debt. In order to find some explanations for the phenomenon of marginal-debt, we first examine the trade-off theory. According to the theory, it can be hypothesized that an extremely low corporate tax rate or a high marginal cost of bankruptcy could explain the minimal presence of debt for those marginal-debt companies. However, we find no evidence to accept this hypothesis. Marginal-debt companies have an average tax rate of 31.4%, compared to 29.8% for our sample of indebted companies. They also have a generally better financial health, even when deleveraging their financial ratios. Owing to that, neither bankruptcy cost explains the financial management strategy of marginal-debt. Hence, we expect this phenomenon to be purely behavioral. We therefore propose a survey questionnaire to better analyze the incentives for managers to adopt a marginal-debt strategy.. Keywords: Marginal-debt, Capital structure, Low leverage, Trade-off theory, Debt aversion en_US dc.description.tableofcontents 1. Introduction 12. Survey of Literature 32.1. Capital Structure Theories 32.1.1. The Modigliani Miller Theory 32.1.2. The Trade-Off Theory 62.1.3. The Pecking Order Theory 72.1.4. Summary 82.2. Previous Research on “Marginal Debt” Companies 93. Hypothesis and Methodology 133.1. Definition of Marginal-Debt Companies 143.2. GICS Sectors Distribution of the Sample 143.3. The Parameters 163.3.1. The Tax Rate 183.3.2. The Bankruptcy Cost 183.4. Statistical Method 234. Data and Analysis 254.1. Defining the sample 254.2. Analysis of the Sample Data 294.2.1. Tax Rate 294.2.2. Cost of Bankruptcy 304.3. Findings and Conclusion of the Analysis 365. Suggestions on a Survey Questionnaire 385.1. Relationship between the Manager and Shareholders 385.2. Benefits of Leverage 405.3. Value of Flexibility and Control 415.4. Risk-Averse Inclination 426. Summary and Conclusions 44References 45Appendix 48 zh_TW dc.format.extent 460396 bytes - dc.format.mimetype application/pdf - dc.language.iso en_US - dc.source.uri (資料來源) http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0102933062 en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) 邊際債務 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) 策略 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) Marginal-Debt en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) Strategy en_US dc.title (題名) 上市公司邊際債務策略之探討 zh_TW dc.title (題名) Probing the Marginal-Debt Corporate Finance Strategy en_US dc.type (資料類型) thesis en dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Agrawal, A., Nagarajan, N. (1990), Corporate capital structure, agency costs, and ownership control: the case of all-equity firms,. Journal of Finance, Vol. 45, 1325–1331.Altman E. (2000), Predicting financial distress of companies: Revisiting the z-score and zeta® modelsBarclay, M. and Smith, C. (2005), The Capital Structure Puzzle: The Evidence Revisited, Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, 17: 8-17.Becker, G., 1981. Altruism in the family and selfishness in the market place. Economica 48, 1–15.Bertrand, M., Schoar, A., 2006. The role of family in family firms. Journal of Economic Perspective 20, 73–96.Cotei C., and Farhat J. (2009), The Trade-off Theory and the Pecking Order Theory: Are They Mutually Exclusive?, North American Journal of Finance and Banking Research, Vol. 3(3), 1-16Devos E., et. Al. (2012), Why are firms unlevered?, Journal of Corporate Finance, Vol. 18, 664-682Donaldson G. (1961) Corporate Debt Capacity: A study of Corporate Debt Policy and the Determination of Corporate Debt Capacity, Boston, Division of Research, Harvard Graduate School of Business Administration Graham, J., 2000. How big are the tax benefits of debt?, Journal of Finance, Vol. 55, 1901–1941.Korteweg A. (2010), The net benefits to leverage, Journal of Finance, Vol. 65 (6), 2137-2170.MacKie-Mason, Jeffrey, 1990, Do taxes affect corporate financing decisions? Journal of Finance 45, 1471–1493.Malmendier, U., Tate, G., Yan, J., 2011. Overconfidence and early-life experiences: the effect of managerial traits on corporate financial policies. Journal of Finance 66, 1687–1733.Modigliani F., and Miller M. (1958), The Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance and the Theory of Investment. American Economic Review, Vol. 48 (3), 261–297. Modigliani F., and Miller M. (1963), Corporate income taxes and the cost of capital: a correction, American Economic Review, Vol. 53 (3), 433–443Morellec E., Nikolov B., and Schurhoff N. (2012), Corporate Governance and Capital Structure Dynamics, Journal of Finance, Vol. 67 (3), 803-848Mukherjee S., and Mahakud, J. (2012), Are Trade-off and Pecking Order Theories of Capital Structure Mutually Exclusive? Evidence from Indian Manufacturing Companies, Journal of Management Research, Vol. 12, 41-55Myers, S. (1984), The Capital Structure Puzzle, Journal of Finance, 39: 575-592.Myers, S. and Majluf, N. (1984), Corporate Financing and Investment Decisions When Firms Have Information that Investors Do Not Have, Journal of Financial Economics, 13: 187-224.Novaes W., and Zingales L. (1995), Capital Structure Choice when Managers are in Control: Entrenchment versus Efficiency, NBER working paper number 5384.Strebulaev I., and Yang B. (2013), The mystery of zero-leverage firms, Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 109, 1-23.http://www.reuters.com/article/2008/10/27/us-financial-inditex-idUSTRE49Q01R20081027 zh_TW
