| dc.contributor | 地政系 | en_US |
| dc.creator (作者) | 張金鶚; 朱芳妮 | zh_TW |
| dc.creator (作者) | Chang,Chin-oh; Chu, Fang-Ni | zh_TW |
| dc.creator (作者) | Sing, Tien Foo | - |
| dc.date (日期) | 2012-08 | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | 1-Sep-2014 17:47:51 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.date.available | 1-Sep-2014 17:47:51 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.date.issued (上傳時間) | 1-Sep-2014 17:47:51 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.identifier.uri (URI) | http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/69510 | - |
| dc.description.abstract (摘要) | Condominium residents are reluctant to join the management committees (MCs) and contribute to the management of local public goods because of free-riding problems. In studying a sample of condominiums in Taipei, it is found that some degree of outsourcing to third party managers (TPMs) is necessary when the scale of local public goods increases. However, higher management fees paid to TPMs are not directly related to higher utilities derived by the residents in the use of local public goods. When self-selectivity in the outsourcing decision is controlled, the results show that the efficiency in the provision of local public goods increases with the effort levels of the MC members. The MC members who adopt a hands-off approach by fully delegating the management responsibilities to TPMs deliver lower pay-offs in the provision of public goods. | en_US |
| dc.format.extent | 400365 bytes | - |
| dc.format.mimetype | application/pdf | - |
| dc.language.iso | en_US | - |
| dc.relation (關聯) | Urban Studies, 50(1), 128-147 | en_US |
| dc.title (題名) | Collective Action Dilemmas in Condominium Management | en_US |
| dc.type (資料類型) | article | en |
| dc.identifier.doi (DOI) | 10.1177/0042098012452327 | en_US |
| dc.doi.uri (DOI) | http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0042098012452327 | en_US |
