| dc.contributor | 哲學系 | en_US |
| dc.creator (作者) | 林從一 | zh_TW |
| dc.creator (作者) | Lin, Chung-I. | en_US |
| dc.date (日期) | 2013-01 | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | 20-十月-2014 18:23:48 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.date.available | 20-十月-2014 18:23:48 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.date.issued (上傳時間) | 20-十月-2014 18:23:48 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.identifier.uri (URI) | http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/70683 | - |
| dc.description.abstract (摘要) | The Mohist conceives the dao-following issue as “how we can put dao in words and speeches into practice.” The dao-following issue is the Mohist counterpart of Wittgenstein’s rule-following problem. This paper aims to shed light on the rule-following issue in terms of the Mohist answer to the dao-following problem.The early Mohist takes fa（法, standard）and the later Mohist takes lei（類, analogy）as the key to the dao-following issue. I argue that the way of fa is not viable. Fa comes in various forms, but all of them are regarded as being cut off from everyday life and therefore subject to various interpretations and, hence, incapable of action-guiding. On the other hand, the Mohist lei represents a kind of life world action drama. A lei situates various elements of action in the context of an everyday life scene. I argue that lei is more qualified than fa in answering to the dao-following issue. I also show that lei substantializes what McDowell calls the “course between a Scylla and a Charybdis” hinted in terms of Wittgenstein’s idea of “custom,” “practice,” and “institution” in regard to the rule-following problem. | en_US |
| dc.format.extent | 306072 bytes | - |
| dc.format.mimetype | application/pdf | - |
| dc.language.iso | en_US | - |
| dc.relation (關聯) | Comparative Philosophy, 4(1), 40-65 | en_US |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | rule-following;dao-following;McDowell;Mohist; lei;fa | en_US |
| dc.title (題名) | Mohist Approach to the Rule-Following Problem | en_US |
| dc.type (資料類型) | article | en |
