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題名 The Effect of Executive Stock Options on Corporate Innovative Activities
作者 陳嬿如
Chen, Y.R.;C.R. Chen;C.K. Chu
貢獻者 財管系
日期 2014-06
上傳時間 22-十月-2014 12:25:51 (UTC+8)
摘要 This study investigates whether the implicit optionality of executive stock options (ESOs) induce managers to undertake innovative activities associated with various types of risk. We find ESO risk incentive (vega) to be positively correlated with all types of corporate innovations. We also find greater ESO risk incentive effects for the product-related innovative activities that are associated more with systematic risk than idiosyncratic risk. Finally, we document the following pecking order for the ESO risk incentive effects: improved product, new product, alliance, and new research and development. Our results suggest that executives have more incentive to invest in projects with higher systematic risk.
關聯 Financial Management, 43(2), 271-290
資料類型 article
DOI http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/fima.12036
dc.contributor 財管系en_US
dc.creator (作者) 陳嬿如zh_TW
dc.creator (作者) Chen, Y.R.;C.R. Chen;C.K. Chuen_US
dc.date (日期) 2014-06en_US
dc.date.accessioned 22-十月-2014 12:25:51 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.available 22-十月-2014 12:25:51 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.issued (上傳時間) 22-十月-2014 12:25:51 (UTC+8)-
dc.identifier.uri (URI) http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/70690-
dc.description.abstract (摘要) This study investigates whether the implicit optionality of executive stock options (ESOs) induce managers to undertake innovative activities associated with various types of risk. We find ESO risk incentive (vega) to be positively correlated with all types of corporate innovations. We also find greater ESO risk incentive effects for the product-related innovative activities that are associated more with systematic risk than idiosyncratic risk. Finally, we document the following pecking order for the ESO risk incentive effects: improved product, new product, alliance, and new research and development. Our results suggest that executives have more incentive to invest in projects with higher systematic risk.en_US
dc.format.extent 192504 bytes-
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf-
dc.language.iso en_US-
dc.relation (關聯) Financial Management, 43(2), 271-290en_US
dc.title (題名) The Effect of Executive Stock Options on Corporate Innovative Activitiesen_US
dc.type (資料類型) articleen
dc.identifier.doi (DOI) 10.1111/fima.12036en_US
dc.doi.uri (DOI) http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/fima.12036 en_US