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題名 Directors’ & Officers’ Insurance Corporate Governance and Firm Performance
作者 陳彩稚
Chen, Tsai-Jyh ; Li, Shu-Hsing
貢獻者 風管系
日期 2010-08
上傳時間 6-三月-2015 16:14:37 (UTC+8)
摘要 The purpose of this article is to investigate the effects of directors’ and officers’ liability insurance (D&O) on corporate governance and firm performance. D&O insurance demand reflects the firm’s internal evaluation of its exposure to litigation risk. From the investors’ point of view, the D&O insurance purchase data can provide valuable information to assess the underlying risk of the firm, corporate governance quality and its future performance. Thus, this article studies the information implications of D&O insurance on the following questions. (1) Does D&O insurance demand reflect the litigation risk and corporate governance? (2) Does D&O insurance create moral hazard or provide incentives of care to directors and officers, which subsequently affect the firm’s performance? We empirically test the data by using companies listed in Taiwan Security Exchanges and find that (1) the demand for D&O insurance is positively related to the firm’s litigation risk and the motivation of its board of directors; (2) there is no evidence supporting that D&O insurance does have a significant impact on the directors’ care incentives and the subsequent firm’s performance. We further provide some suggestions for corporate governance based on these empirical results.
關聯 International Journal of Disclosure and Governance  7, 244-261
資料類型 article
DOI http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/jdg.2010.9
dc.contributor 風管系-
dc.creator (作者) 陳彩稚-
dc.creator (作者) Chen, Tsai-Jyh ; Li, Shu-Hsing-
dc.date (日期) 2010-08-
dc.date.accessioned 6-三月-2015 16:14:37 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.available 6-三月-2015 16:14:37 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.issued (上傳時間) 6-三月-2015 16:14:37 (UTC+8)-
dc.identifier.uri (URI) http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/73702-
dc.description.abstract (摘要) The purpose of this article is to investigate the effects of directors’ and officers’ liability insurance (D&O) on corporate governance and firm performance. D&O insurance demand reflects the firm’s internal evaluation of its exposure to litigation risk. From the investors’ point of view, the D&O insurance purchase data can provide valuable information to assess the underlying risk of the firm, corporate governance quality and its future performance. Thus, this article studies the information implications of D&O insurance on the following questions. (1) Does D&O insurance demand reflect the litigation risk and corporate governance? (2) Does D&O insurance create moral hazard or provide incentives of care to directors and officers, which subsequently affect the firm’s performance? We empirically test the data by using companies listed in Taiwan Security Exchanges and find that (1) the demand for D&O insurance is positively related to the firm’s litigation risk and the motivation of its board of directors; (2) there is no evidence supporting that D&O insurance does have a significant impact on the directors’ care incentives and the subsequent firm’s performance. We further provide some suggestions for corporate governance based on these empirical results.-
dc.format.extent 133 bytes-
dc.format.mimetype text/html-
dc.relation (關聯) International Journal of Disclosure and Governance  7, 244-261-
dc.title (題名) Directors’ & Officers’ Insurance Corporate Governance and Firm Performance-
dc.type (資料類型) articleen
dc.identifier.doi (DOI) 10.1057/jdg.2010.9en_US
dc.doi.uri (DOI) http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/jdg.2010.9en_US