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題名 探討犯罪公司定罪前後銀行貸款利率之差異
The Impact of Corporate Convictions on Syndicated Bank Loan Prices作者 黃聖雯
Huang, Sheng Wen貢獻者 張元晨
Chang, Yuan Chen
黃聖雯
Huang, Sheng Wen關鍵詞 公司定罪
公司不法行為
借款利率
借款合約
資料庫連結
聯貸
Corporate Conviction
Corporate Misconduct
Loan Spread
Loan Contract
Database Challenges
Syndicated Loan日期 2015 上傳時間 3-八月-2015 13:19:34 (UTC+8) 摘要 近年來知名公司面臨起訴或遭到定罪的消息層出不窮，然而在公司定罪的相關研究中，多數文獻著重於探究遭受定罪之事實對公司價值的影響，較少研究聚焦於定罪事實對公司所參與之聯貸案契約條件的影響，有鑑於此，本篇文章旨在探討犯罪公司於定罪前後其聯貸借款條件之借款利率是否有顯著差異。本篇研究發現事件前後犯罪公司之借款利率差異並不顯著。當我們試以修正資料庫登錄與犯罪新聞時間差的問題後，結果顯示犯罪公司之借款利率於犯罪相關新聞發布後顯著上升，除此之外，考量交乘作用後發現犯罪公司間，犯罪罪刑為詐欺類以及受判罰金較高的犯罪公司於事件後，相較於其他犯罪公司，該類公司更傾向面臨較高的借貸成本。
A number of well-known corporate prosecutions have been raised in recent years. Previous literature focuses more on the valuation impact of corporate convictions. Empirical evidence on how corporate convictions affect the contract terms of syndicated loan is sparse. We examine how corporate misconducts affect the pricing of bank debt after corporate convictions. We find that the difference of loan spreads between facilities initiated before and after conviction are insignificant. Taking potential lag of initial announcement time into consideration, we find significant evidence that the effect of corporate conviction is positively associated with the increases of loan spreads. Moreover, interaction terms with conviction variable show that firms with large fines or convicted of fraud-related crimes tend to face higher loan spread after convictions.參考文獻 Alexander, Cindy R. "On the Nature of the Reputational Penalty for Corporate Crime: Evidence*." The Journal of Law and Economics 42, no. S1 (1999): 489-526.Alexander, Cindy R, Jennifer Arlen and Mark A Cohen. "Regulating Corporate Criminal Sanctions: Federal Guidelines and the Sentencing of Public Firms*." The Journal of Law and Economics 42, no. S1 (1999): 393-422.Arlen, Jennifer. "Corporate Criminal Liability: Theory and Evidence." Research Handbook on the Economics of Criminal Law, A. Harel & K. Hylton, eds., Edward Elgar (2012), (2012): 11-25.Armstrong, Christopher S, Wayne R Guay and Joseph P Weber. "The Role of Information and Financial Reporting in Corporate Governance and Debt Contracting." Journal of Accounting and Economics 50, no. 2 (2010): 179-234.Ashcraft, Adam B and Joao AC Santos. "Has the Cds Market Lowered the Cost of Corporate Debt?" Journal of Monetary Economics 56, no. 4 (2009): 514-523.Costello, Anna M. "The Impact of Financial Reporting Quality on Debt Contracting: Evidence from Internal Control Weakness Reports." Journal of Accounting Research 49, no. 1 (2011): 97-136.Diamond, Douglas W and Robert E Verrecchia. "Disclosure, Liquidity, and the Cost of Capital." The journal of Finance 46, no. 4 (1991): 1325-1359.Garrett, Brandon L. "Globalized Corporate Prosecutions." Virginia Law Review, (2011): 1775-1875.Graham, John R, Si Li and Jiaping Qiu. "Corporate Misreporting and Bank Loan Contracting." Journal of Financial Economics 89, no. 1 (2008): 44-61.Karpoff, JM and JR Lott. "The Reputational Penalty Firms Bear from Committing Criminal Fraud`." International LIbrary Of Critical Writings In Economics 195, no. 3 (2006): 36.Karpoff, Jonathan M, Allison Koester, D Scott Lee and Gerald S Martin. "Database Challenges in Financial Misconduct Research." Georgetown McDonough School of Business Research Paper, no. 2012-15 (2014).Karpoff, Jonathan M, D Scott Lee and Gerald S Martin. "The Economics of Foreign Bribery: Evidence from FCPA Enforcement Actions." Working Paper. (2014).Karpoff, Jonathan M and John R Lott Jr. "Reputational Penalty Firms Bear from Committing Criminal Fraud." Journal of Law and Economics 36, (1993): 757.Karpoff, Jonathan M, John R Lott Jr and Eric W Wehrly. "The Reputational Penalties for Environmental Violations: Empirical Evidence*." Journal of Law and Economics 48, no. 2 (2005): 653-675.Lee, Sang Whi and Donald J Mullineaux. "Monitoring, Financial Distress, and the Structure of Commercial Lending Syndicates." Financial management, (2004): 107-130.Lin, Huidan and Daniel Paravisini. "What`s Bank Reputation Worth? The Effect of Fraud on Financial Contracts and Investment." The Effect of Fraud on Financial Contracts and Investment (June 1, 2011), (2011).Moot, John S. "Compliance Programs, Penalty Mitigation and the Ferc." Energy LJ 29, (2008): 547.Qian, Jun and Philip E Strahan. "How Laws and Institutions Shape Financial Contracts: The Case of Bank Loans." The Journal of Finance 62, no. 6 (2007): 2803-2834.Scherr, Frederick C and Heather M Hulburt. "The Debt Maturity Structure of Small Firms." Financial management, (2001): 85-111.Sufi, Amir. "Information Asymmetry and Financing Arrangements: Evidence from Syndicated Loans." Journal of Finance 62, no. 2 (2007): 629-668. 描述 碩士
國立政治大學
財務管理研究所
102357008資料來源 http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0102357008 資料類型 thesis dc.contributor.advisor 張元晨 zh_TW dc.contributor.advisor Chang, Yuan Chen en_US dc.contributor.author (作者) 黃聖雯 zh_TW dc.contributor.author (作者) Huang, Sheng Wen en_US dc.creator (作者) 黃聖雯 zh_TW dc.creator (作者) Huang, Sheng Wen en_US dc.date (日期) 2015 en_US dc.date.accessioned 3-八月-2015 13:19:34 (UTC+8) - dc.date.available 3-八月-2015 13:19:34 (UTC+8) - dc.date.issued (上傳時間) 3-八月-2015 13:19:34 (UTC+8) - dc.identifier (其他 識別碼) G0102357008 en_US dc.identifier.uri (URI) http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/77170 - dc.description (描述) 碩士 zh_TW dc.description (描述) 國立政治大學 zh_TW dc.description (描述) 財務管理研究所 zh_TW dc.description (描述) 102357008 zh_TW dc.description.abstract (摘要) 近年來知名公司面臨起訴或遭到定罪的消息層出不窮，然而在公司定罪的相關研究中，多數文獻著重於探究遭受定罪之事實對公司價值的影響，較少研究聚焦於定罪事實對公司所參與之聯貸案契約條件的影響，有鑑於此，本篇文章旨在探討犯罪公司於定罪前後其聯貸借款條件之借款利率是否有顯著差異。本篇研究發現事件前後犯罪公司之借款利率差異並不顯著。當我們試以修正資料庫登錄與犯罪新聞時間差的問題後，結果顯示犯罪公司之借款利率於犯罪相關新聞發布後顯著上升，除此之外，考量交乘作用後發現犯罪公司間，犯罪罪刑為詐欺類以及受判罰金較高的犯罪公司於事件後，相較於其他犯罪公司，該類公司更傾向面臨較高的借貸成本。 zh_TW dc.description.abstract (摘要) A number of well-known corporate prosecutions have been raised in recent years. Previous literature focuses more on the valuation impact of corporate convictions. Empirical evidence on how corporate convictions affect the contract terms of syndicated loan is sparse. We examine how corporate misconducts affect the pricing of bank debt after corporate convictions. We find that the difference of loan spreads between facilities initiated before and after conviction are insignificant. Taking potential lag of initial announcement time into consideration, we find significant evidence that the effect of corporate conviction is positively associated with the increases of loan spreads. Moreover, interaction terms with conviction variable show that firms with large fines or convicted of fraud-related crimes tend to face higher loan spread after convictions. en_US dc.description.tableofcontents 1. Introduction 012. Literature Review 06 2.1 Corporate Misconduct 06 2.2 How Banks Manage Risks Using Loan Contract 10 2.3 Hypothesis 113. Data and Methodology 13 3.1 Sample Selection 13 3.2 Methodology 174. Empirical Analysis 19 4.1 Effect of Corporate Conviction on the Cost of Bank Debt 19 4.2 Specific Conviction Terms on the Cost of Bank Debt 21 4.2.1 The Impact of Legal Penalty－Fined or not 21 4.2.2 Compliance Program 22 4.2.3 State of Registry 22 4.2.4 Conviction Type and the cost of Bank Debt 235. The Announcement Effects 25 5.1 Effect of Corporate Conviction on the Cost of Bank Debt 26 5.2 Specific Conviction Terms on the Cost of Bank Debt 27 5.2.1 The Impact of Legal Penalty－Fined or not 27 5.2.2 Compliance Program 28 5.2.3 State of Registry 28 5.2.4 Conviction Type and the cost of Bank Debt 28 5.3 Suggestions on Further Studies 296. Conclusion 31Table 1 Summary Statistics 33Table 2 Summary Statistics (Pre/Post-conviction loans) 33Table 3 Regression Results (Conviction, Firm Characteristics and Features of Loans) 34Table 4 Regression Results (Characteristics of Convictions, Firms and Loans) 35Table 5 Summary Statistics (Adjustment on release time of news) 36Table 6 Summary Statistics (Pre/Post-conviction loans) 36Table 7 Regression Results (Conviction, Firm Characteristics and Loan Features) 37Table 8 Regression Result (Characteristics of Convictions, Firms and Loans) 38Table 9 Regression Results (Conviction, Firm Characteristics and Loan Features) 39Table 10 Regression Result (Characteristics of Convictions, Firms and Loans) 40References 41Appendix A 43Appendix B 44Appendix C 46Appendix D 48 zh_TW dc.format.extent 1361960 bytes - dc.format.mimetype application/pdf - dc.source.uri (資料來源) http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0102357008 en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) 公司定罪 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) 公司不法行為 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) 借款利率 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) 借款合約 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) 資料庫連結 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) 聯貸 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) Corporate Conviction en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) Corporate Misconduct en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) Loan Spread en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) Loan Contract en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) Database Challenges en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) Syndicated Loan en_US dc.title (題名) 探討犯罪公司定罪前後銀行貸款利率之差異 zh_TW dc.title (題名) The Impact of Corporate Convictions on Syndicated Bank Loan Prices en_US dc.type (資料類型) thesis en dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Alexander, Cindy R. "On the Nature of the Reputational Penalty for Corporate Crime: Evidence*." The Journal of Law and Economics 42, no. S1 (1999): 489-526.Alexander, Cindy R, Jennifer Arlen and Mark A Cohen. "Regulating Corporate Criminal Sanctions: Federal Guidelines and the Sentencing of Public Firms*." The Journal of Law and Economics 42, no. S1 (1999): 393-422.Arlen, Jennifer. "Corporate Criminal Liability: Theory and Evidence." Research Handbook on the Economics of Criminal Law, A. Harel & K. Hylton, eds., Edward Elgar (2012), (2012): 11-25.Armstrong, Christopher S, Wayne R Guay and Joseph P Weber. "The Role of Information and Financial Reporting in Corporate Governance and Debt Contracting." Journal of Accounting and Economics 50, no. 2 (2010): 179-234.Ashcraft, Adam B and Joao AC Santos. "Has the Cds Market Lowered the Cost of Corporate Debt?" Journal of Monetary Economics 56, no. 4 (2009): 514-523.Costello, Anna M. "The Impact of Financial Reporting Quality on Debt Contracting: Evidence from Internal Control Weakness Reports." Journal of Accounting Research 49, no. 1 (2011): 97-136.Diamond, Douglas W and Robert E Verrecchia. "Disclosure, Liquidity, and the Cost of Capital." The journal of Finance 46, no. 4 (1991): 1325-1359.Garrett, Brandon L. "Globalized Corporate Prosecutions." Virginia Law Review, (2011): 1775-1875.Graham, John R, Si Li and Jiaping Qiu. "Corporate Misreporting and Bank Loan Contracting." Journal of Financial Economics 89, no. 1 (2008): 44-61.Karpoff, JM and JR Lott. "The Reputational Penalty Firms Bear from Committing Criminal Fraud`." International LIbrary Of Critical Writings In Economics 195, no. 3 (2006): 36.Karpoff, Jonathan M, Allison Koester, D Scott Lee and Gerald S Martin. "Database Challenges in Financial Misconduct Research." Georgetown McDonough School of Business Research Paper, no. 2012-15 (2014).Karpoff, Jonathan M, D Scott Lee and Gerald S Martin. "The Economics of Foreign Bribery: Evidence from FCPA Enforcement Actions." Working Paper. (2014).Karpoff, Jonathan M and John R Lott Jr. "Reputational Penalty Firms Bear from Committing Criminal Fraud." Journal of Law and Economics 36, (1993): 757.Karpoff, Jonathan M, John R Lott Jr and Eric W Wehrly. "The Reputational Penalties for Environmental Violations: Empirical Evidence*." Journal of Law and Economics 48, no. 2 (2005): 653-675.Lee, Sang Whi and Donald J Mullineaux. "Monitoring, Financial Distress, and the Structure of Commercial Lending Syndicates." Financial management, (2004): 107-130.Lin, Huidan and Daniel Paravisini. "What`s Bank Reputation Worth? The Effect of Fraud on Financial Contracts and Investment." The Effect of Fraud on Financial Contracts and Investment (June 1, 2011), (2011).Moot, John S. "Compliance Programs, Penalty Mitigation and the Ferc." Energy LJ 29, (2008): 547.Qian, Jun and Philip E Strahan. "How Laws and Institutions Shape Financial Contracts: The Case of Bank Loans." The Journal of Finance 62, no. 6 (2007): 2803-2834.Scherr, Frederick C and Heather M Hulburt. "The Debt Maturity Structure of Small Firms." Financial management, (2001): 85-111.Sufi, Amir. "Information Asymmetry and Financing Arrangements: Evidence from Syndicated Loans." Journal of Finance 62, no. 2 (2007): 629-668. zh_TW
