| dc.contributor | 財政系 | |
| dc.creator (作者) | 賴育邦 | zh_TW |
| dc.date (日期) | 2014 | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 5-八月-2015 11:11:54 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.date.available | 5-八月-2015 11:11:54 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.date.issued (上傳時間) | 5-八月-2015 11:11:54 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.identifier.uri (URI) | http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/77371 | - |
| dc.description.abstract (摘要) | 廠商規避稅負的方式有多端，下焉者藉浮報成本等方式逃漏稅，而上焉者則可藉遊說政府給予租稅優惠。關於廠商租稅逃漏的文獻可說是汗牛充棟，而對於利益團體的遊說的相關探討亦不可勝數，卻鮮少有同時考慮租稅逃漏與遊說者。揆諸實際情況，企業很可能在遊說政府租稅政策的同時，亦進行租稅逃漏。本計畫即試圖結合兩者，以期能得到較全面的觀照。結合上述兩個面向，不單是為了彌補現有文獻的不足，更有其政策制定上的意義。在分析企業的逃稅決策時，大多數的文獻均假設租稅政策為外生變數。其重點多半為探討稅率變動對企業逃稅決策的影響。而與遊說相關的文獻，則忽略企業逃漏的決策。將這兩項決策分開討論，分析難免流於片面，忽略兩項決策間的交互影響，而這正是本研究的重點所在。此外，第一年期計畫將考慮獨占廠商，便於與現有文獻做比較。第二年期則擴展為寡占市場，以探討市場結構對於廠商的遊說與逃稅決策之效果。此外，更可以比較廠商在遊說活動上合作與不合作的差異。 | |
| dc.description.abstract (摘要) | Firms can escape tax burdens in various ways. For example, they can evade tax by exaggerating costs, or, even better, by lobbying government to provide them preferential tax treatments. Although there is vast literature on either the firms’ tax evasion or their lobbying, only few papers integrate these two facets. In the real world, it is very possible that firms engage into both the activities at the same time. This present project aims at providing a more comprehensive examination by combing firms’ tax evasion decision with lobbying activity. Doing so not only fills the gap of the existing literature, but also offers some policy implications. The tax-evasion literature generally assumes tax policy being given, while the lobbying literature ignores firms’ tax-evasion. Focusing only on single dimension easily leads to misguiding in policymaking. To overcome such shortcoming, this project emphasizes on the interaction effects between the two dimensions. The first-year part of the project considers a monopolist, which enables us to compare with the existing literature. In the second-year part of the project, we extend the basic setup to involve an oligopolistic market, so that we can investigate the effects of the market structure on the equilibrium outcomes. Moreover, we can examine the differences between the cooperative lobbing game and the non-cooperative lobbying game. | |
| dc.format.extent | 144 bytes | - |
| dc.format.mimetype | text/html | - |
| dc.relation (關聯) | NSC102-2410-H004-002-MY2 | |
| dc.relation (關聯) | PF10301-0896 | |
| dc.title (題名) | 遊說與租稅逃漏的交互效果分析 | zh_TW |
| dc.title.alternative (其他題名) | The Interaction Effect of Lobbying and Tax Evasion | |
| dc.type (資料類型) | report | en |
