Repeated Protection for Sale | NCCU Academic Hub

題名	Repeated Protection for Sale
作者	Tung, Chris Y.;Yang, C. C. 楊建成
貢獻者	財政系
日期	2014-10
上傳時間	3-九月-2015 14:47:53 (UTC+8)
摘要	This paper addresses whether the efficient equilibria characterized by Grossman and Helpman`s one-shot protection-for-sale game are renegotiation-proof in an infinitely repeated setting. We propose a simple strategy profile that can support the efficient, truthful equilibrium in each period as a strongly renegotiation-proof subgame perfect equilibrium. This result provides another plausible reason to explain why the truthful equilibrium may be focal in the game of protection-for-sale. In addition, when the timing of the contributions is specified explicitly, the special interest groups should minimize the upfront payment to the government before policy implementation to reduce the possibility of the collapse of such relational contracts.
關聯	Pacific Economic Review, 19(4), 466-482
資料類型	article
DOI	http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1468-0106.12074

dc.contributor	財政系
dc.creator (作者)	Tung, Chris Y.;Yang, C. C.
dc.creator (作者)	楊建成	zh_TW
dc.date (日期)	2014-10
dc.date.accessioned	3-九月-2015 14:47:53 (UTC+8)	-
dc.date.available	3-九月-2015 14:47:53 (UTC+8)	-
dc.date.issued (上傳時間)	3-九月-2015 14:47:53 (UTC+8)	-
dc.identifier.uri (URI)	http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/78224	-
dc.description.abstract (摘要)	This paper addresses whether the efficient equilibria characterized by Grossman and Helpman`s one-shot protection-for-sale game are renegotiation-proof in an infinitely repeated setting. We propose a simple strategy profile that can support the efficient, truthful equilibrium in each period as a strongly renegotiation-proof subgame perfect equilibrium. This result provides another plausible reason to explain why the truthful equilibrium may be focal in the game of protection-for-sale. In addition, when the timing of the contributions is specified explicitly, the special interest groups should minimize the upfront payment to the government before policy implementation to reduce the possibility of the collapse of such relational contracts.
dc.format.extent	226811 bytes	-
dc.format.mimetype	application/pdf	-
dc.relation (關聯)	Pacific Economic Review, 19(4), 466-482
dc.title (題名)	Repeated Protection for Sale
dc.type (資料類型)	article	en
dc.identifier.doi (DOI)	10.1111/1468-0106.12074
dc.doi.uri (DOI)	http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1468-0106.12074