學術產出-學位論文
文章檢視/開啟
書目匯出
-
題名 臺灣上市櫃董監事薪酬影響因子與投資組合
Determinants of Board Compensation of Taiwan Listed Companies and Investment Portfolios作者 李宛諭
Li, Wan Yu貢獻者 盧敬植
Liu, Ching Chih
李宛諭
Li, Wan Yu關鍵詞 董監薪酬
董事會特性
公司特性
經營績效
投資組合
board compensation
board characteristics
firm characteristics
corporate performance
portfolio日期 2015 上傳時間 1-三月-2016 10:27:31 (UTC+8) 摘要 本研究主要探討我國上市櫃公司的董監薪酬影響因素，採用新制董監薪酬揭露制度，將董監事兼任經理人、兼任員工的薪酬與分紅排除後，以董監薪酬合計和平均董監薪酬作為研究對象。本研究以2005年至2013年所有上市上櫃(含下市下櫃)的公司為研究樣本，並使用普通最小平方法則和固定效果模型進行檢測影響董監薪酬因子。 研究結果發現我國上市櫃公司的董監薪酬確實受到董事會特性、公司特性以及公司經營績效影響。董事會特性中以董事會規模、董監事持股比例和董事兼任經理人比例具有顯著之影響；公司特性以公司規模、負債比例、股價日報酬波動度和投資機會均對董監薪酬具顯著影響；最後，公司經營績效指標中以Tobin`s Q、資產報酬率、營業收入淨額與股利殖利率與董監薪酬呈顯著正向影響。這表示我國公司在制定公司董監薪酬時，確實會考量其董事會特性、公司特性以及公司之經營績效。最後，本研究使用迴歸式的殘差項由大至小組合投資組合以觀察其績效表現，殘差項最大(小)投資組合表示支付過高(低)董監薪酬的公司，研究發現並無法從投資組合的績效表現看出支付過高(低)董監薪酬對公司股價報酬表現之影響，本研究認為這可能是因為支付過高董監薪酬可能同時包含因為該公司的董監事之能力佳而支付較高的薪酬亦可能該公司的董監事僅為坐領高薪的肥貓。
This study empirically examines variables that influence director compensation of Taiwanese companies. With new disclosure rule for board compensation, we exclude the salaries and bonus of concurrently serving as managers or employees, and divide board compensation as total director compensation and average director compensation. We collect 2005 to 2013 listed companies on Taiwan Stock Exchange and Taipei Exchange as research samples. In our regression analysis, we distinguish three types of determinants: board characteristics, firm characteristics and corporate performance. Using ordinary least squares estimator method and fixed effect method, our results show that board characteristics, firm characteristics and corporate performance do affect board compensation. We find board size, directors’ equity holding ratio and the ratio of director concurrently serving as manager that significant influence director compensation. From the aspect of firm characteristics, results show that firm size, leverage ratio, daily stock returns volatility and investment opportunity also significant influence director compensation. We also provide evidence that higher Tobin’s Q, ROA, sales and dividend yield, higher director compensation.Finally, we use residuals from the regression to construct portfolios and observe their performance. The portfolio with highest (lowest) residuals considers as companies overpaying (underpaying) their directors. However, from performance of portfolios, we cannot conclude that directors are overpaid or underpaid can reflect companies future performance, since directors are overpaid may because of their extraordinary ability or simply because they are fat cats.參考文獻 一、 中文文獻江俞庭，《橡膠股》股東批董監酬勞太高，正新：已下調，上網日期104年7月7日，檢自：http://ctee.com.tw/LiveNews/Content.aspx?nid=20150611002731-260410&ch=aj 周昭平，日月光董監報酬完勝台積電 員工卻淪科技勞工，上網日期104年7月7日，檢自：http://www.appledaily.com.tw/realtimenews/article/new/20150427/600057/周振鋒，(2014)。美國Say-on-pay制度介紹與引進可行性之分析。法學評論，第137期，頁217-266。林郁馨，(2014)。公開發行公司經營者薪酬決定機制之實證分析—兼論薪資報酬委員會新制。中研院法學期刊，第14期，頁245-317。 林穎芬，(2012)。臺灣上市公司董事薪酬影響因子之研究。臺大管理論叢，第23卷，第1期，頁175-208。陳春山、李彥興、陳清祥，(2011)。強制設置薪酬委員會之影響。出版者：新學林。 蔡昌憲，(2012)。評我國強制設置薪酬委員會之立法政策—從經濟分析及美國金融改革法談起。中研院法學期刊，第11期，頁249-340。 賴英照，(2011)。股市遊戲規則—最新證券交易法解析。出版者：元照總經銷。 二、 英文文獻Agrawal, A. and G. N. Mandelker (1987). "Managerial Incentives and Corporate Investment and Financing Decisions." The Journal of Finance 42(4): 823-837. Becher, D. A., et al. (2005). "Incentive Compensation for Bank Directors: The Impact of Deregulation." The Journal of Business 78(5): 1753-1778. Brick, I. E., et al. (2006). "CEO compensation, director compensation, and firm performance: Evidence of cronyism?" Journal of Corporate Finance 12(3): 403-423. Bryan, S., et al. (2000). "CEO Stock‐Based Compensation: An Empirical Analysis of Incentive‐Intensity, Relative Mix, and Economic Determinants." The Journal of Business 73(4): 661-693. Bryan, S., et al. (2000). "Compensation of Outside Directors: An Empirical Analysis of Economic Determinants." Bryan, S., et al. (2006). "Can the agency costs of debt and equity explain the changes in executive compensation during the 1990s?" Journal of Corporate Finance 12(3): 516-535. Bryan, S. H., et al. (2000). "Compensation of outside directors: An empirical analysis of economic determinants." Coles, J. L., et al. (2008). "Boards: Does one size fit all?" Journal of Financial Economics 87: 329-356. Conyon, M. J. (1997). "Corporate governance and executive compensation." International Journal of Industrial Organization 15(4): 493-509. E., H. B. and W. M. S. (1998). "Endogenously chosen boards of directors and their monitoring of the CEO." American Economic Review: 96-118. Fama, E. F. and M. C. Jensen (1983). "Separation of Ownership and Control." Journal of Law and Economics 26(2): 301-325. Ferreira, R. B. A. D. (2009). "Women in the boardroom and their impact on governance and performance." Journal of Financial Economics 94(2): 291-309. Fich, E. M. and A. Shivdasani (2006). "Are Busy Boards Effective Monitors?" The Journal of Finance 61(2): 689-724. Finkelstein, S. and D. C. Hambrick (1989). "Chief Executive Compensation: A Study of the Intersection of Markets and Political Processes." Strategic Management Journal 10(2): 121. Gaver, J. J. and K. M. Gaver (1995). "Compensation Policy and the Investment Opportunity Set." Financial Management 24(1): 19-32. Gillette, A. B., et al. (2003). "Corporate board composition, protocols, and voting behavior: experimental evidence." The Journal of Finance 58: 1997-2031. Gompers, P. A., et al. (2003). "Corporate Governance and Equity Prices." The Quarterly Journal of Economics 118(1): 107-155. Jensen, M. C. (1986). "Agency cost of free cash flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers." American Economic Review 76(2). JENSEN, M. C. (1993). "The Modern Industrial Revolution, Exit, and the Failure of Internal Control Systems." The Journal of Finance 48(3): 831-880. John, K. and L. W. Senbet (1998). "Corporate governance and board effectiveness." Journal of Banking & Finance 22: 371-403. Jr., H. E. R. and R. A. W. III (2004). "Who is in whose pocket? Director compensation, board independence, and barriers to effective monitoring." Journal of Financial Economics 73: 497-524. Linn, S. C. and D. Park (2005). "Outside director compensation policy and the investment opportunity set." Journal of Corporate Finance 11: 680-715. Lipton, M. and J. W. Lorsch (1992). "A Modest Proposal for Improved Corporate Governance." The Business Lawyer 48(1): 59-77. Maug, E. (1997). "Boards of directors and capital structure: Alternative forms of corporate restructuring " Journal of Corporate Finance 3: 113-139. Mehran, H. (1995). "Executive compensation structure, ownership, and firm performance." Journal of Financial Economics 38: 163-184. Michael, J. and M. William H. (1976). "Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure." Journal of Financial Economics 3(4): 305-360. Perfecta, S. B. and K. W. Wiles (1994). "Alternative constructions of Tobin`s q: An empirical comparison." Journal of Empirical Finance 1(3): 313-341. Prendergast, C. (2000). "What trade-off of risk and incentives?" American Economic Review: 421-425. Prendergast, C. (2002). "Uncertainty and Incentives." Journal of Labor Economics 20(2): S115-S137. W., C., et al. (1992). "The investment opportunity set and corporate financing, dividend, and compensation policies." Journal of Financial Economics 32(3): 263-292. Williamson, O. E. (1988). "Corporate Finance and Corporate Governance." The Journal of Finance 43(3): 567-591. Yermack, D. (1996). "Higher market valuation of companies with a small board of directors." Journal of Financial Economics 40: 185-211. Yermack, D. (2004). "Remuneration, Retention, and Reputation Incentives for Outside Directors." The Journal of Finance 59(5): 2281-2308. (5). 描述 碩士
國立政治大學
財務管理研究所
102357011資料來源 http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G1023570112 資料類型 thesis dc.contributor.advisor 盧敬植 zh_TW dc.contributor.advisor Liu, Ching Chih en_US dc.contributor.author (作者) 李宛諭 zh_TW dc.contributor.author (作者) Li, Wan Yu en_US dc.creator (作者) 李宛諭 zh_TW dc.creator (作者) Li, Wan Yu en_US dc.date (日期) 2015 en_US dc.date.accessioned 1-三月-2016 10:27:31 (UTC+8) - dc.date.available 1-三月-2016 10:27:31 (UTC+8) - dc.date.issued (上傳時間) 1-三月-2016 10:27:31 (UTC+8) - dc.identifier (其他 識別碼) G1023570112 en_US dc.identifier.uri (URI) http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/81463 - dc.description (描述) 碩士 zh_TW dc.description (描述) 國立政治大學 zh_TW dc.description (描述) 財務管理研究所 zh_TW dc.description (描述) 102357011 zh_TW dc.description.abstract (摘要) 本研究主要探討我國上市櫃公司的董監薪酬影響因素，採用新制董監薪酬揭露制度，將董監事兼任經理人、兼任員工的薪酬與分紅排除後，以董監薪酬合計和平均董監薪酬作為研究對象。本研究以2005年至2013年所有上市上櫃(含下市下櫃)的公司為研究樣本，並使用普通最小平方法則和固定效果模型進行檢測影響董監薪酬因子。 研究結果發現我國上市櫃公司的董監薪酬確實受到董事會特性、公司特性以及公司經營績效影響。董事會特性中以董事會規模、董監事持股比例和董事兼任經理人比例具有顯著之影響；公司特性以公司規模、負債比例、股價日報酬波動度和投資機會均對董監薪酬具顯著影響；最後，公司經營績效指標中以Tobin`s Q、資產報酬率、營業收入淨額與股利殖利率與董監薪酬呈顯著正向影響。這表示我國公司在制定公司董監薪酬時，確實會考量其董事會特性、公司特性以及公司之經營績效。最後，本研究使用迴歸式的殘差項由大至小組合投資組合以觀察其績效表現，殘差項最大(小)投資組合表示支付過高(低)董監薪酬的公司，研究發現並無法從投資組合的績效表現看出支付過高(低)董監薪酬對公司股價報酬表現之影響，本研究認為這可能是因為支付過高董監薪酬可能同時包含因為該公司的董監事之能力佳而支付較高的薪酬亦可能該公司的董監事僅為坐領高薪的肥貓。 zh_TW dc.description.abstract (摘要) This study empirically examines variables that influence director compensation of Taiwanese companies. With new disclosure rule for board compensation, we exclude the salaries and bonus of concurrently serving as managers or employees, and divide board compensation as total director compensation and average director compensation. We collect 2005 to 2013 listed companies on Taiwan Stock Exchange and Taipei Exchange as research samples. In our regression analysis, we distinguish three types of determinants: board characteristics, firm characteristics and corporate performance. Using ordinary least squares estimator method and fixed effect method, our results show that board characteristics, firm characteristics and corporate performance do affect board compensation. We find board size, directors’ equity holding ratio and the ratio of director concurrently serving as manager that significant influence director compensation. From the aspect of firm characteristics, results show that firm size, leverage ratio, daily stock returns volatility and investment opportunity also significant influence director compensation. We also provide evidence that higher Tobin’s Q, ROA, sales and dividend yield, higher director compensation.Finally, we use residuals from the regression to construct portfolios and observe their performance. The portfolio with highest (lowest) residuals considers as companies overpaying (underpaying) their directors. However, from performance of portfolios, we cannot conclude that directors are overpaid or underpaid can reflect companies future performance, since directors are overpaid may because of their extraordinary ability or simply because they are fat cats. en_US dc.description.tableofcontents 第壹章 緒論 1第貳章 文獻回顧 5第一節 公司治理與董事會 5第二節 董監事薪酬結構與揭露 6第三節 董事會特性與董監事薪酬 7第四節 公司特性與董監事薪酬 10第五節 公司績效與董監事薪酬 10第參章 研究方法 12第一節 資料與樣本 12第二節 研究變數定義與說明 13第三節 研究方法與模型 19第肆章 實證結果與分析 22第一節 敘述統計 22第二節 董監事酬勞合計、平均董監事酬勞與各項變數之關聯分析 25第三節 健全性考量 ( Robustness Check) 31第四節 投資組合與績效表現 35第伍章 結論及建議 38第一節 結論 38第二節 研究限制及未來研究建議 40參考文獻 51 zh_TW dc.source.uri (資料來源) http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G1023570112 en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) 董監薪酬 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) 董事會特性 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) 公司特性 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) 經營績效 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) 投資組合 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) board compensation en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) board characteristics en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) firm characteristics en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) corporate performance en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) portfolio en_US dc.title (題名) 臺灣上市櫃董監事薪酬影響因子與投資組合 zh_TW dc.title (題名) Determinants of Board Compensation of Taiwan Listed Companies and Investment Portfolios en_US dc.type (資料類型) thesis en_US dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) 一、 中文文獻江俞庭，《橡膠股》股東批董監酬勞太高，正新：已下調，上網日期104年7月7日，檢自：http://ctee.com.tw/LiveNews/Content.aspx?nid=20150611002731-260410&ch=aj 周昭平，日月光董監報酬完勝台積電 員工卻淪科技勞工，上網日期104年7月7日，檢自：http://www.appledaily.com.tw/realtimenews/article/new/20150427/600057/周振鋒，(2014)。美國Say-on-pay制度介紹與引進可行性之分析。法學評論，第137期，頁217-266。林郁馨，(2014)。公開發行公司經營者薪酬決定機制之實證分析—兼論薪資報酬委員會新制。中研院法學期刊，第14期，頁245-317。 林穎芬，(2012)。臺灣上市公司董事薪酬影響因子之研究。臺大管理論叢，第23卷，第1期，頁175-208。陳春山、李彥興、陳清祥，(2011)。強制設置薪酬委員會之影響。出版者：新學林。 蔡昌憲，(2012)。評我國強制設置薪酬委員會之立法政策—從經濟分析及美國金融改革法談起。中研院法學期刊，第11期，頁249-340。 賴英照，(2011)。股市遊戲規則—最新證券交易法解析。出版者：元照總經銷。 二、 英文文獻Agrawal, A. and G. N. Mandelker (1987). "Managerial Incentives and Corporate Investment and Financing Decisions." The Journal of Finance 42(4): 823-837. Becher, D. A., et al. (2005). "Incentive Compensation for Bank Directors: The Impact of Deregulation." The Journal of Business 78(5): 1753-1778. Brick, I. E., et al. (2006). "CEO compensation, director compensation, and firm performance: Evidence of cronyism?" Journal of Corporate Finance 12(3): 403-423. Bryan, S., et al. (2000). "CEO Stock‐Based Compensation: An Empirical Analysis of Incentive‐Intensity, Relative Mix, and Economic Determinants." The Journal of Business 73(4): 661-693. Bryan, S., et al. (2000). "Compensation of Outside Directors: An Empirical Analysis of Economic Determinants." Bryan, S., et al. (2006). "Can the agency costs of debt and equity explain the changes in executive compensation during the 1990s?" Journal of Corporate Finance 12(3): 516-535. Bryan, S. H., et al. (2000). "Compensation of outside directors: An empirical analysis of economic determinants." Coles, J. L., et al. (2008). "Boards: Does one size fit all?" Journal of Financial Economics 87: 329-356. Conyon, M. J. (1997). "Corporate governance and executive compensation." International Journal of Industrial Organization 15(4): 493-509. E., H. B. and W. M. S. (1998). "Endogenously chosen boards of directors and their monitoring of the CEO." American Economic Review: 96-118. Fama, E. F. and M. C. Jensen (1983). "Separation of Ownership and Control." Journal of Law and Economics 26(2): 301-325. Ferreira, R. B. A. D. (2009). "Women in the boardroom and their impact on governance and performance." Journal of Financial Economics 94(2): 291-309. Fich, E. M. and A. Shivdasani (2006). "Are Busy Boards Effective Monitors?" The Journal of Finance 61(2): 689-724. Finkelstein, S. and D. C. Hambrick (1989). "Chief Executive Compensation: A Study of the Intersection of Markets and Political Processes." Strategic Management Journal 10(2): 121. Gaver, J. J. and K. M. Gaver (1995). "Compensation Policy and the Investment Opportunity Set." Financial Management 24(1): 19-32. Gillette, A. B., et al. (2003). "Corporate board composition, protocols, and voting behavior: experimental evidence." The Journal of Finance 58: 1997-2031. Gompers, P. A., et al. (2003). "Corporate Governance and Equity Prices." The Quarterly Journal of Economics 118(1): 107-155. Jensen, M. C. (1986). "Agency cost of free cash flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers." American Economic Review 76(2). JENSEN, M. C. (1993). "The Modern Industrial Revolution, Exit, and the Failure of Internal Control Systems." The Journal of Finance 48(3): 831-880. John, K. and L. W. Senbet (1998). "Corporate governance and board effectiveness." Journal of Banking & Finance 22: 371-403. Jr., H. E. R. and R. A. W. III (2004). "Who is in whose pocket? Director compensation, board independence, and barriers to effective monitoring." Journal of Financial Economics 73: 497-524. Linn, S. C. and D. Park (2005). "Outside director compensation policy and the investment opportunity set." Journal of Corporate Finance 11: 680-715. Lipton, M. and J. W. Lorsch (1992). "A Modest Proposal for Improved Corporate Governance." The Business Lawyer 48(1): 59-77. Maug, E. (1997). "Boards of directors and capital structure: Alternative forms of corporate restructuring " Journal of Corporate Finance 3: 113-139. Mehran, H. (1995). "Executive compensation structure, ownership, and firm performance." Journal of Financial Economics 38: 163-184. Michael, J. and M. William H. (1976). "Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure." Journal of Financial Economics 3(4): 305-360. Perfecta, S. B. and K. W. Wiles (1994). "Alternative constructions of Tobin`s q: An empirical comparison." Journal of Empirical Finance 1(3): 313-341. Prendergast, C. (2000). "What trade-off of risk and incentives?" American Economic Review: 421-425. Prendergast, C. (2002). "Uncertainty and Incentives." Journal of Labor Economics 20(2): S115-S137. W., C., et al. (1992). "The investment opportunity set and corporate financing, dividend, and compensation policies." Journal of Financial Economics 32(3): 263-292. Williamson, O. E. (1988). "Corporate Finance and Corporate Governance." The Journal of Finance 43(3): 567-591. Yermack, D. (1996). "Higher market valuation of companies with a small board of directors." Journal of Financial Economics 40: 185-211. Yermack, D. (2004). "Remuneration, Retention, and Reputation Incentives for Outside Directors." The Journal of Finance 59(5): 2281-2308. (5). zh_TW
