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題名 Stock-Based Compensation in a Concentrated Ownership Setting: An Empirical Investigation
作者 梁嘉紋
LIANG, JIA-WEN;CHIN, CHEN-LUNG
貢獻者 會計系
關鍵詞 Stock-based compensation;concentrated ownership;controlling owners and minority shareholders;cash flow rights and voting rights
日期 2016
上傳時間 2-三月-2016 14:23:41 (UTC+8)
摘要 Stock-based compensation has been viewed as an important mechanism for tying managers’ wealth to firm performance, and thus alleviating the agency conflict between the shareholders and the managers when ownership is diffused. However, in a concentrated ownership structure, controlling owners are usually the management of the firm; they can engage in self-dealing activities to the detriment of minority shareholders’ interests. Yet, outside investors may anticipate the problem and discount the share price for the entrenchment behaviors they observe. In this study, we investigate how controlling owners trade off the benefits and the costs of using stock-based compensation. Based on a sample of Taiwanese firms, our evidence shows that stock-based compensation is negatively related to the agency problem embedded in a concentrated ownership structure. This relation is evident among firms with more frequent equity offerings. Overall, our empirical evidence suggests that controlling owners consider the negative price effects of stock-based compensation and trade off these costs with the benefits of expropriating minority shareholders’ interests, particularly when firms seek more external equity capital. Our results hold after controlling for selection bias and share collateral by controlling owners.
關聯 Journal of Business, Finance, and Accounting,
資料類型 article
DOI http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/jbfa.12167
dc.contributor 會計系
dc.creator (作者) 梁嘉紋zh_TW
dc.creator (作者) LIANG, JIA-WEN;CHIN, CHEN-LUNG
dc.date (日期) 2016
dc.date.accessioned 2-三月-2016 14:23:41 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.available 2-三月-2016 14:23:41 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.issued (上傳時間) 2-三月-2016 14:23:41 (UTC+8)-
dc.identifier.uri (URI) http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/81777-
dc.description.abstract (摘要) Stock-based compensation has been viewed as an important mechanism for tying managers’ wealth to firm performance, and thus alleviating the agency conflict between the shareholders and the managers when ownership is diffused. However, in a concentrated ownership structure, controlling owners are usually the management of the firm; they can engage in self-dealing activities to the detriment of minority shareholders’ interests. Yet, outside investors may anticipate the problem and discount the share price for the entrenchment behaviors they observe. In this study, we investigate how controlling owners trade off the benefits and the costs of using stock-based compensation. Based on a sample of Taiwanese firms, our evidence shows that stock-based compensation is negatively related to the agency problem embedded in a concentrated ownership structure. This relation is evident among firms with more frequent equity offerings. Overall, our empirical evidence suggests that controlling owners consider the negative price effects of stock-based compensation and trade off these costs with the benefits of expropriating minority shareholders’ interests, particularly when firms seek more external equity capital. Our results hold after controlling for selection bias and share collateral by controlling owners.
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dc.format.mimetype text/html-
dc.relation (關聯) Journal of Business, Finance, and Accounting,
dc.subject (關鍵詞) Stock-based compensation;concentrated ownership;controlling owners and minority shareholders;cash flow rights and voting rights
dc.title (題名) Stock-Based Compensation in a Concentrated Ownership Setting: An Empirical Investigation
dc.type (資料類型) article
dc.identifier.doi (DOI) 10.1111/jbfa.12167
dc.doi.uri (DOI) http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/jbfa.12167