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## A Study of the 2007-2008 Electoral Cycle in Russia

The 2007-2008 parliamentary and presidential elections in Russia have maintained the existing political order created by a hegemonic executive power, legal and administrative regulations, a clientalist party system, and a managed and co-opted civil society. A floating and fragmented party system in the Yeltsin era gave way to a centralized and clientalist party system under Putin. The fragmented social forces have not coalesced into a stable opposition and have been unable to engage in effective and sustained collective action. Incapable of checking state power, civil society remained weak, fragmented, and uninstitutionalized in the Medvedev-Putin era.

What were the implications of the seemingly insignificant 2007-2008 election cycle for power relations and political order under the Medvedev-Putin tandem? Were there any pre-electoral power sharing agreements among Russian elites? Will preserving the status quo and strengthening democratic institutions become conflicting logics? This study explores the impact of the 2007-2008 election results on Russia's prospects for democracy, and is divided into the following sections. In the first section, the paper applies an institutionalist approach to Russian politics

embedded in the specific national context. A hegemonic executive power has shaped political strategies and influenced political outcomes. The second section focuses on the dominant party of power—United Russia. The third section, from a top-down state-centered perspective, explains and analyzes dilemmas of the development of Russian civil society in the context of state-building and protracted democratization. The concluding section assesses the prospects for Russia’s democratic transition.

### *A Hegemonic Executive Power*

Despite Russia survives where the USSR disintegrated,<sup>1</sup> there was a decline in political order, an undermining of the political authority, effectiveness, and legitimacy of the Yeltsin regime. The state was suffering from capture by financial oligarchs and from regional segmentation during the Yeltsin period. Therefore, the restoration of state autonomy and capacity has become the top priority when Putin succeeded Yeltsin as Russia’s President. Many literatures have analyzed how Putin has

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<sup>1</sup> For a review on a wide variety of case-specific explanations as to why Russia survives where the USSR disintegrated, such as levels of regional autonomy, ideology, payoffs, foreign borders, size of minority populations, history of independence, patterns of economic development, and a core ethnic region majority-focused theory (in terms of dual power, security threats and community imagining), see Henry E. Hale, “the Makeup and Breakup of Ethnofederal States: Why Russia Survives Where the USSR Fell,” *Perspectives on Politics*, Vol. 3, no. 1 (March 2005), pp. 55-70.

recentralized power in a steep vertical authoritarian structure.<sup>2</sup> Putin's popularity has given Russia's political life a rare quality: authoritarianism with the consent of the governed.<sup>3</sup>

Political order, which has acquired popular consensus and legitimacy, encompasses the set of political arrangements and institutions surrounding the elections. As Samuel P. Huntington mentioned, "The stability of any given polity depends upon the relationship between the level of political participation and the level of political institutionalization," that is political order depends upon the ratio of institutionalization to participation.<sup>4</sup> Putin has enjoyed high and stable popularity

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<sup>2</sup> See, for example, Cameron Ross, "Federalism and Electoral Authoritarianism under Putin," *Demokratizatsiya*, Vol. 13, no. 3 (Summer 2005), pp. 347-371; Kathryn Stoner-Weiss, "Russia: Authoritarianism without Authority," *Journal of Democracy*, Vol. 17, no. 1 (January 2006), pp. 104-118; and Michael McFaul and Kathryn Stoner-Weiss, "The Myth of the Authoritarian Model," *Foreign Affairs* (January/February 2008), pp. 68-84.

<sup>3</sup> Dmitri Trenin, "The Legacy of Vladimir Putin," *Current History*, Vol. 106, no. 702 (October 2007), pp. 346-348.

<sup>4</sup> Samuel P. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1968), p. 79. Offering a theory of coalitional politics at the level of top leadership, Philip G. Roeder argues for the central causal effect of political institutions, which became constraints on the state power in responding to a demanding society, to explain the stagnation and demise of the Soviet Union. See Philip G. Roeder, *Red Sunsets: The Failure of Soviet Politics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993). Arguing for "political change in ordered societies," Steven L. Solnick looks within the hierarchies that constituted the Soviet system to explain when and why Soviet bureaucracies lost the capacity to govern. Focusing on the dynamics *within* institutions of state administration, he explains that the source of Soviet hierarchical breakdown came from the opportunism from within, with the mid-level and local bureaucrats playing a vital role, rather than from the stalemate at the top or

ratings by presenting an image of “stability and order.” The huge margins of electoral victory through effective mobilization of voters served to deter potential elite opponents within the regime and to divide and marginalize the opposition.

A deeply entrenched “Iron Triangle” of interests, namely “the confluence of political power with the commanding heights of industry, along with the security service,” has ensured a Putin-dominated succession scenario to maintain the status quo.<sup>5</sup> Under a soft successor scenario, the preservation of the status quo is “a continuation of the uncertainty of existence of Putinism with an ever-corrupt and sprawling bureaucracy dominated by the siloviki.”<sup>6</sup> Given the majority of Russians has adapted to major social changes and accepted the current regime as a lesser evil to alternatives, Medvedev as Putin’s successor has benefited from the political equilibrium that has been developed through the passage of time.<sup>7</sup>

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a revolution from below. See Steven L. Solnick, *Stealing the State; Control and Collapse in Soviet Institutions* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998).

<sup>5</sup> Christopher Walker and Jeannette Goehring, “Nations in Transit 2008: Petro-Authoritarianism and Eurasia’s New Divides,” p. 29. *Freedom House*, <http://www.freedomhouse.org>

<sup>6</sup> Joel M. Ostrow, Georgiy A. Satarov, and Irina M. Khakamada, *The Consolidation of Dictatorship in Russia: An Inside View of the Demise of Democracy* (Westport, Conn.: Praeger Security international, 2007), pp. 132-133.

<sup>7</sup> See Richard Rose, “Learning to Support New Regimes in Europe,” *Journal of Democracy*, Vol. 18, no. 3 (July 2007), pp. 111-125; and Richard Rose, William Mishler, and Neil Munro, *Russia Transformed: Developing Popular Support for A New Regime* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2006).

Policy making by executive decree is evidence that legislatures are being marginalized and that democratic institutions are ineffectual.<sup>8</sup> The Russian 1993 constitution allowed the president to bypass the parliament and dominate the political process through the extensive legislative degree powers mainly during the Yeltsin period.<sup>9</sup> In the longer term, presidential decrees do not offer a sustainable basis for governing because of their subordinate status in the hierarchy of legislation and the commitment problems they entail.<sup>10</sup>

The idea of a law-governed state initiated by Mikhail Gorbachev when he became General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union was to strengthen the legitimacy and authority of legal institutions. After the collapse of the

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<sup>8</sup> John M Carey and Matthew Soberg Shugart, *Executive Decree Authority* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge U. Press, 1998).

<sup>9</sup> Scott Parrish, "Presidential Decree Authority in Russia," in John M. Carey and Matthew Soberg Shugart, eds., *Executive Decree Authority* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1998), pp. 62-103; Eugene Huskey, *Presidential Power in Russia* (Armonk, New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1999); and Petra Schleiter and Edward Morgan-Jones, "Russia: The Benefits and Perils of Presidential Leadership," in Robert Elgie and Sophia Moestrup, eds., *Semi-Presidentialism in Central and Eastern Europe* (Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, 2008), pp. 159-179.

<sup>10</sup> Schleiter and Morgan-Jones, "Russia: The Benefits and Perils of Presidential Leadership," pp. 166-169. For the varying impact of the different forms of semi-presidentialism (in terms of strong presidents; strong prime ministers and ceremonial presidents; and a balance of presidential and prime ministerial powers) on democratic transition process, the prospects for longer-term democratic consolidation, and government performance (notably in terms of government stability and policy-making capacity), see Elgie and Moestrup, eds., *Semi-Presidentialism in Central and Eastern Europe*.

Soviet Union, Russia has been in the status of legal nihilism and “war of laws.” Despite the Kremlin’s efforts to increase the autonomy and efficiency of the judicial system vis-à-vis regional and business interests by a dictatorship of law, Russia has remained closer to a legal system of rule-by-law (“a powerful elite concentrating political power uses law to protect its prerogatives) than to the rule-of-law (“to make the enforcement of law independent of the will of the political authorities).<sup>11</sup> The enormous power of the federal president and local political authorities, along with corrupted courts and police, have impeded the emergence of a genuinely independent judicial branch.

Modern and new democracy needs a functioning state bureaucracy with the effective capacity to command, regulate, and extract, especially after the disintegration of the intertwined party-state in former Communist countries.<sup>12</sup> However, resistance to Putin’s modernization agenda came from the state bureaucracy. Administrative reform, which was implemented in March 2004, turned out to be a failure. The reform failed to restructure the procedures for recruiting, training and

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<sup>11</sup> Thomas F. Remington, *Politics in Russia*, 4<sup>th</sup> edition (New York: Pearson Education, Inc., 2006), pp. 226-262.

<sup>12</sup> Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe* (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), p. 11.

promoting federal civil servants, enforce discipline and accountability within the bureaucracy, and rationalize the organizational structure of the executive branch by eliminating redundancies.<sup>13</sup>

### *A Dominant Party of Power*

Two chief axes of the study of non-competitive elections are the electoral control exerted by the state, and the clientelist phenomena.<sup>14</sup> In the Fourth (2003-2007) and Fifth (2007-2011) State Duma, the party of power United Russia has commanded a two-thirds majority and served as a mechanism for extracting rents and distributing patronage. During the two terms of Vladimir Putin's presidency, as Thomas Remington pointed out, Russia has created an authoritarian dominant party regime, which is a giant patronage machine fuelled by the state's control over productive resources.<sup>15</sup> Three structural changes in the Duma gave deputies from United Russia new institutional resources and created opportunities for legislation to advocate on behalf of the organized interests (state or private businesses, industries or sectors;

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<sup>13</sup> Thomas Remington, "Patronage and Party of Power: President-Parliament Relations Under Vladimir Putin," *Europe-Asia Studies*, Vol. 60, no. 6 (August 2008), pp. 973-974.

<sup>14</sup> Guy Hermet, Richard Rose and Alain Rouquie, eds., *Elections without Choice* (London, UK: The MacMillan Press Ltd., 1978).

<sup>15</sup> Thomas Remington, "Patronage and Party of Power: President-Parliament Relations Under Vladimir Putin," pp. 959-987.

administrative agencies; or regional political establishments) that support them: increasing the number of legislative committees, increasing the number of deputy chairman positions, and the formation of internal groups replacing deputy groups within the United Russia faction itself.<sup>16</sup>

Party of power can be described as closely tied to the executive, lack any definite ideology, preserving the status quo, and heavily dependent on administrative resources for perpetuating its hold on power.<sup>17</sup> The shared values among Party elites are patriotism, political and social stability, a strong state, and revival of Russia's great power status. By 2008 United Russia reported a membership of over 1.5 million with over 53,000 regional, local, and primary branches, held a majority of seats in all regional legislatures, and 78 of Russia's 83 regional administration heads were party members.<sup>18</sup>

### *A Managed and Co-opted Civil Society*

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<sup>16</sup> Ibid., pp. 961-965.

<sup>17</sup> V. Gel'man, "From 'Feckless Pluralism' to Dominant Power Politics? The Transformation of Russia's Party System," *Democratization*, Vol. 13, no. 4 (2006), pp. 545-561; Yung-Fang Lin, "Russia's Party System and Democratization," *Journal of Russian Studies*, No. 5 (December 2006), pp. 25-50; and Ирина Глебова, «Партия власти», *ПОЛИС*, № 2, 2004, сс. 85-92.

<sup>18</sup> Ora John Reuter and Thomas F. Remington, "Dominant Party Regimes and the Commitment Problem: The Case of United Russia," *Comparative Political Studies*, Vol. 42, no. 4 (April 2009), p. 502.

Following the collapse of the Communist regime in 1991, the establishment of Yeltsin's hybrid regime in the 1990s, and the so-called electoral authoritarianism,<sup>19</sup> a new form of authoritarian regime behind electoral façade, under Putin and Medvedev, Russia has been at a sequence of critical junctures of path-dependent institutional choices.<sup>20</sup> The decisions made at one juncture have shaped and constrained options available at future junctures.

As for my research focus, I follow Philip G. Roeder's methodological suggestions: "The decision to begin research with a focus on state, society, or the state-society nexus should be a pragmatic choice influenced by one's dependent variable and empirical cases. Most important, an analyst must identify the primary actors who can affect the outcome. Once it has been made, however, this choice of focus should have a powerful impact on the structure of one's analysis."<sup>21</sup> With this

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<sup>19</sup> Andreas Schedler, ed., *Electoral Authoritarianism: the Dynamics of Unfree Competition* (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc.: 2006).

<sup>20</sup> Adapting the concept of critical juncture to comparative historical research, Ruth Berins Collier and David Collier have defined the term as "a period of significant change, which typically occurs in distinct ways in different countries (or in other units of analysis) and which is hypothesized to produce distinct legacies." See Ruth Berins Collier and David Collier, *Shaping the Political Arena: Critical Junctures, The Labor Movement, and Regime Dynamics in Latin America* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991), p. 29.

<sup>21</sup> Philip G. Roeder, "Transitions from Communism: State-Centered Approaches," in Harry Eckstein, et al., eds., *Can Democracy Take Root in Post-Soviet Russia?: Explorations in State-Society Relations* (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 1998), p. 205.

in mind, due to the state-dominant structure of Communism and the undertaking of state-building in post-Soviet Russia, this study focuses on state actors and institutional arrangements which structure the development of civil society within the dynamic context of state-society relations.

There are more than 240,000 NGOs registered in Russia in 2007 according to Federal Registration Service data. Despite a significant number of NGOs, the levels of organizational membership and participation have declined significantly. Most literature on Russian democratization indicates that civil society has been weak, underdeveloped, and uninstitutionalized since the fall of communism in post-Soviet Russia.<sup>22</sup>

Despite the regime's proclaimed efforts to promote the growth of civil society as a response to one of Yeltsin's major legacies – the weakness of civil society, a robust pro-democracy civil society has not taken root in Putin's Russia, given the regime's inclination toward authoritarian consolidation. Putin's efforts of building civil society from above with the support of the state have ironically produced a managed and

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<sup>22</sup> See, for example, Marc Morje Howard, *The Weakness of Civil Society in Post-Communist Europe* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003); and Alfred B. Evans, Jr., Laura A. Henry, and Lisa McIntosh Sundstrom, eds., *Russian Civil Society: A Critical Assessment* (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 2006).

co-opted civil society, which is in contradiction to the notion of horizontal networks of independent groups autonomous from the state. A statist development approach has resulted in a highly centralized national executive at the expense of other branches and levels of government, such as the legislature, the judiciary, and the regional and local governments. The direction of state policy and institutional designs can have a profound impact upon the resilience and density of civil society. The legacies of the past and the politics of the present have contributed to a weak civil society. The state, politics, and society are inevitably intertwined. There are at least three obstacles to the development of Russian civil society: an electoral authoritarian regime; legal and administrative regulations; and a clientalist party system.

In the situation of a co-opted civil society and a soft authoritarian state, state corporatism, in the form of a populist and developmental regime and state-led organization of societal interests, has become an alternative to civil society.<sup>23</sup> Neither business nor labor interests have developed enough to engage the state in meaningful

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<sup>23</sup> Corporatism is defined by Philippe C. Schmitter as “a system of interest representation in which the constituent units are organized into a limited number of singular, compulsory, noncompetitive, hierarchically ordered and functionally differentiated categories, recognized or licensed (if not created) by the state and granted a deliberate representational monopoly within their respective categories in exchange for observing certain controls on their selection of leaders and articulation of demands and support.” Philippe C. Schmitter, “Still the Century of Corporatism?” in Fredrick B. Pike and Thomas Stritch, eds., *The New Corporatism* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1974), pp. 93-94.

dialogue leading to an institutional framework of social partnership on state-labor-management relations. Structured by an electoral authoritarian regime, legal and administrative regulations, and a clientelist party system, civil society organizations serve as an instrument of social control rather than a mechanism of collective empowerment. The trend of the concentration of executive power and the rampant corruption in post-Soviet Russia has been possible because of the low degree of institutionalization of civil society.

Putin has bequeathed a legacy of institutions that are highly personalized.<sup>24</sup> The trajectory of Russian regime type has evolved from Gorbachev's post-totalitarian communist regime, followed by Yeltsin's hybrid regime without legitimacy, to Putin's electoral authoritarian regime with public consent. During Yeltsin's presidency, a divided minority government, i.e. neither the president nor the prime minister had the majority, contributed to permanent constitutional conflict in the context of a fragmented party system.<sup>25</sup> Yeltsin's legacies of social disorder, political instability,

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<sup>24</sup> Russian political system bears not so much institutional character as personalized characteristic inculcated by historically autocratic tradition. See К. Г. Холодковский, "К вопросу о политической системе современной России," *ПОЛИС*, № 2 (2009), с. 7; Ю. С. Пивоваров, "Русская власть и публичная политика. Заметки история о причинах неудачи демократического транзита," *ПОЛИС*, № 1 (2006).

<sup>25</sup> Timothy J. Colton and Cindy Skach, "The Russian Predicament," *Journal of Democracy*, Vol. 16, no. 3 (July 2005), pp. 113-126.

and malfunctioning democratic institutions compelled his successor's authoritarian retrenchment as the "necessary evil" to deal with crises. The main features of the current regime include controlled elections and media, legitimacy based on economic growth and political stability, and co-optation instead of massive repression within the framework of a managed and sovereign democracy.

The comprehensive measures needed to tackle the security issue caused by organized crime groups, extreme nationalist groups, and terrorist organizations, which are parts of uncivil society, have led to a reduction in political rights and civil liberties. Reacting to the terrorist attack in Beslan in September 2004, three changes initiated by Putin have further increased the presidential vertical power. First, the president nominates governors and republican presidents and have them confirmed by regional parliaments to replace the directly elected governors. This allows the president to place regional chief executives and half of the Federation Council's senators nominated by them under his control. Second, a mixed electoral system for State Duma's 450 seats was replaced by a PR (proportional representation) system with 7% threshold to diminish the influence of independent or local candidates elected by SMD (single-member districts) and to benefit the already majority party of power controlled by the Kremlin. The change of electoral rules should have provided

incentives to coordinate, but perhaps policy differences and personal rivalries among the opposition parties of *Yabloko* and *Union of Right Wing Forces* impeded the formation of a united coalition to overcome the hurdle of 7% threshold. Third, a national Public Chamber was created to filter and review legislative proposals and articulate social demands.

A genuine civil society, which is strong, autonomous, stable, and capable of checking state power, has not been realized in Putin's Russia. According to *Human Rights Watch* (February 2008) based on interviews conducted in six Russian cities, Russian government has subjected civil society to greater scrutiny and control through the 2006 NGO Law, the amended 2002 anti-extremism law, and a variety of administrative regulations. The selective enforcement of these legal and administrative regulations has profoundly weakened critical voices and undermined civic activism. As the Public Chamber's annual report for 2007 indicated, there is an increase in state funding, a rise in funding by Russian sources, and a decline in foreign funding as a consequence of the 2006 NGO law. Human rights groups and ecological groups, which receive funding mainly from foreign sources, are struggling with survival. Those who expose corruption or human rights abuses in Chechnya and fight for accountability, like the late journalist Anna Politkovskaia, who was murdered in

October 2006, are especially vulnerable.

Compared with those regime changes caused by color revolutions in the post-communist countries like Serbia, Georgia, and Ukraine, in Russia the fragmented social forces have not coalesced into a stable and united opposition. The opposition has been confronted with coordination dilemmas at the elite and mass levels, making democratic transition much more difficult. The imperatives of state building and anti-terrorism have been used to justify the strengthening of the executive branch and to curb spontaneous civic activism. When the 2007-2008 election cycle approached, the Russian authorities cracked down on a series of *dissenters' marches* held in Moscow, St. Petersburg, and other provincial capitals, and on protests organized by an opposition coalition called *Other Russia*, concerning about the setbacks in democracy and human rights. At the local level the horizontal ties and autonomous participation of democratic citizenship have been blocked by the vertical dependence of the informal networks of bureaucratic clientalism.

### *Conclusion*

The rule of law embodied in a spirit of constitutionalism guarantees the civility

and openness of civil society, which in turn combats antisocial behavior and criminal or underground undertakings. The predicament of state building based on hegemonic executive power is the absence of political accountability. The Russian state under Putin through “presidential vertical” and “the dictatorship of law” has performed much better than the political and socioeconomic order that took shape in the 1990s, but it still has not been able to govern effectively in terms of tackling the problems of legal nihilism, rampant corruption within state institutions, organized crime, especially hatred crime, and widespread reliance on personal authority in politics. As Russian president Medvedev in his first state-of-the-nation address mentioned, an ineffective and mistrusted state bureaucracy creates corruption and mass legal nihilism, and hinders the development of innovative economy and democratic institutions. He is right to point out that “A strong state and omnipotent bureaucracy are not the same thing. A civil society needs the former as a tool to develop and support order, to protect and strengthen political institutions, while the latter is mortally dangerous for it.”

Nevertheless, the role of the state in the development of civil society has to be supporting (not the retreat of the state) and self-limiting (not the overstretch of the state). The interaction between Russian regime and civil society through institutional

arrangements, such as Public Forum, Presidential Council for Facilitating the Development of Civil Society Institutions and Human Rights, Public Chamber, Youth Chamber, etc., has triggered debate on the nature of cooperation and co-optation. Putin's plan of tightening the vertical power structure by designing and managing civil society from the top down has to be strongly supplemented by fostering civic initiatives from the bottom up. The mutual empowering of state capacity and grassroots civic forces can contribute to the sustainable development of democracy over the long term.

If a strong and institutionalized civil society is an important indicator of the completed democratic transitions and consolidation as most theoretical and empirical research on democracy has confirmed, then the prospect of democracy is bleak in Russia. The concentration of executive power in the absence of vertical accountability, meaning horizontal networks of an institutionalized civil society capable of checking state power, has inevitably contributed to Russia's authoritarian tendency. If social capital produced by civil society is the key to making democracy work as neo-Tocquevilleans suggest, then in the case of Russia the question that needs to be asked in the first place is how to strengthen civil society to increase social capital. For civil society to be an essential bulwark against authoritarian revival, in the situation of

state dominance it is necessary to build and maintain a linkage between foreign engagement and civic activism. The trend of the relationship between the state and civil society in the Soviet and post-Soviet periods has evolved from suppression, infiltration, benign tolerance, dialogue, cooperation, to management and co-optation. Even constrained by a web of legal and administrative regulations, the powerless civil society can still enhance its power leverage through appealing to European Court of Human Rights, seeking advice from foreign NGOs engaged in democracy assistance, and building alliance with opposition parties.

After the 2007-2008 parliamentary and presidential election cycle, the party of power – *United Russia* has continually become the dominant party in national and regional executive and legislative branches of governments. *United Russia* has sustained an oversized governing coalition with another party of power *Just Russia* and pro-Kremlin *Liberal Democratic Party*, rather than a minimally winning one, to obtain legislative supermajorities to control institutional and constitutional change.<sup>26</sup>

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<sup>26</sup> Medvedev in his first state-of-the-nation address made two proposals “to strengthen democratic institutions and maintain stability” by way of amending constitution: “First, to broaden the constitutional rights of the Federal Assembly and give functions of control over the executive power to the State Duma, under Article 103, by stipulating a constitutional norm that will obligate the government of Russia to report to the State Duma annually on the results of its activity and on the issues directly set by the parliament. And the second proposal is to extend the constitutional terms of office of the president and the State Duma to six and five years respectively.”

Dependent on personal authority, backed by administrative resources, and lack of a stable social base, an increasingly consolidated party of power and the resulted less competitive party system has caused the disconnection between civil society and political society.

Russia's 2007-2008 electoral cycle has followed the path-dependent trajectory of Putin's institutional and informal network of authority. For Russia's ruling political and economic elites, the costs of deviating from this political order, which is maintained by a hegemonic executive power, a dominant party of power, and a managed and co-opted civil society, are much higher than they were a decade ago when the Yeltsin era was coming to an end. The failure to deal with legal nihilism, which took the form of corruption in the authorities, has undermined the autonomy and accountability of the state. Russia's political status quo might have been stabilized, but its democratic transition has been derailed.

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## 出席國際會議心得報告

計畫主持人應日本北海道大學斯拉夫研究中心 (Slavic Research Center, Hokkaido University, Kita-9, Nishi-7, Kita-Ku, Sapporo, Japan 060-0809) Prof. Kimitaka Matsuzato 教授之邀，參加 2009 年 2 月 5-6 日，於日本北海道大學舉辦的東亞國家第一屆斯拉夫歐亞研究學術會議 (First East Asian Conference for Slavic Eurasian Studies 2009: Resurgence of Russia and the Future of Eurasia—Views from the East)，並於 2 月 6 日的第五場之二發表論文。

Session V-2 , Was Russia Un-democratized? Regime, Elections and Political Culture  
Friday (February 6), 10:45 a.m.–0:45 p.m.

Chair: Chuman, Mizuki, Keio University

Papers: Guan, Guihai, Peking University

“Political Culture and the Falls of Democrats in Post-Soviet Russia”

**Lin, Yung-Fang Lin, National Chengchi University**

**“The 2007-2008 Elections and Political Order in Russia”**

Nikolayenko, Olena, Stanford University

“Citizens in the Making: Adolescents and Patriotic Upbringing in Russia and Ukraine”

Disc.: Miwa, Hiroki, Tsukuba University

Kang, Yoo Hee, Kookmin University

論文摘要如下：

The 2007-2008 parliamentary and presidential elections in Russia have maintained the political order created by a hegemonic executive power, legal and administrative regulations, a clientalist party system, and a managed and co-opted civil society. The imperatives of state-building and anti-terrorism have been used to justify the strengthening of the executive branch and to curb spontaneous civic activism. A floating and fragmented party system in the Yeltsin era gave way to a centralized and clientalist party system under Putin and Medvedev. The fragmented social forces have not coalesced into a stable opposition, and have been unable to engage in effective and sustained collective action.

此次會議由中、日、韓三個國家的斯拉夫研究協會 (Chinese Association for East European, Russia, and Central Asian Studies; Japanese Council for Russia and East European Studies; Korean Association of Slavic Studies) 歷經 10 年的籌畫終於成功

召開，每年由一個國家主辦，依次輪替，2010 年將於韓國舉行。東亞國家研究斯拉夫問題的主要學者專家幾乎出席了此次會議，英文和俄文成爲此次會議的主要語文。由於台灣不在籌畫單位之列，因此能蒙 Prof. Kimitaka Matsuzato 教授邀請與會，計畫主持人深感榮幸，並利用兩天會議期間與各國學者進行學術交流請益，深感獲益良多。此次會議在閉幕前，特別安排了一場中、日、韓三國的資深俄國問題專家的經驗傳承，各自講述該國斯拉夫研究的歷史進程。最後大會期許與會者，能立足東亞，提升國際級的研究水準，引領斯拉夫研究風潮，反饋並超越西方國家的理論指引。