Deregulation and the Theory of Regulation: An Application of the Core in the Game Theory

Abstract

此文試圖建立一個同時能解釋管制與解除管制的競局理論模型。假設政策變動需要此一競局裏全部參與者的同意，透過對核心解存在與否的檢定，我們發現對於解除管制的形成與否，需求的成長既不是充分，也不是必要條件；技術的進步是必要條件；但，唯有很顯著的技術進步才是充分必要條件。

This paper presents a game-theoretical model which seeks to account for both regulation and deregulation in a single model. By assuming that a policy change requires the unanimous consent of all players in the game and through checking the existence of the core, we conclude that an increase in demand is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for deregulation; an improvement in technology condition is a necessary condition for deregulation; however, only a significant improvement in technology condition is a necessary and sufficient condition for deregulation.