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Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://ah.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/120337
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dc.contributor.advisor王信實<br>李文傑zh_TW
dc.contributor.advisorWang, Shinn-Shyr<br>Lee, Wen-Chiehen_US
dc.contributor.author葉祖昀zh_TW
dc.contributor.authorYeh, Tsu-Yunen_US
dc.creator葉祖昀zh_TW
dc.creatorYeh, Tsu-Yunen_US
dc.date2018en_US
dc.date.accessioned2018-10-01T04:23:39Z-
dc.date.available2018-10-01T04:23:39Z-
dc.date.issued2018-10-01T04:23:39Z-
dc.identifierG1032660051en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/120337-
dc.description碩士zh_TW
dc.description國立政治大學zh_TW
dc.description應用經濟與社會發展英語碩士學位學程(IMES)zh_TW
dc.description1032660051zh_TW
dc.description.abstractIn the paper, we are going to figure out what factor has the most significant influence on firm’s performance. Based on the pervious definition of educational link method, there are additional variables about changes on board and management team members. The result shows that the higher rate the members change, the better chance of IPO firms has. In other words, the changes of board and team members have a significantly positive effect on firms’ performance. Before going public, firms would like to reform their team structure to make the funding easier. It implied that it is also very crucial for firms to hire better human capital. As firms become greater and greater, they can attract more and more talented people to work for them so that it will increase the possibility to go public.en_US
dc.description.tableofcontentsAbstract\r\nChapter 1 Introduction3\r\n1.1 The Nature of the Firm3\r\n1.2 The Origin of a New Business 4\r\n1.3 Information Asymmetry and Social Network Link 5\r\n1.4 Political Related Issue in Taiwan 6\r\n1.5 Should Investors Bet on the Jockey or the Horse? 7\r\nChapter 2 Literature Review9\r\n2.1 Information Asymmetric Problem9\r\n2.2 Social Network Link10\r\n2.2.1 Educational Link10\r\n2.2.2 Background Link10\r\n2.2.3 Political Link11\r\n2.3 Distinctive Power11\r\n2.3.1 Human Capital11\r\n2.3.2 Reputation12\r\n2.3.3 Political Power12\r\n2.4 Board Turnover13\r\nChapter 3 Data Sources and Descriptive Statistics14\r\n3.1 Social Network Database15\r\n3.2 Dependent Variable16\r\n3.3 Independent Variables16\r\n3.4 Other Control Variables18\r\n3.5 Descriptive Statistics20\r\nChapter 4 Hypothesis and Regression21\r\n4.1 Hypothesis21\r\n4.2 Regression22\r\nChapter 5 Methodology and Result23\r\n5.1 Methodology23\r\n5.2 Results23\r\n5.2.1 Regression 123\r\n5.2.2 Regression 224\r\n5.2.3 Regression 325\r\n5.2.4 Regression 425\r\nChapter 6 Conclusion27\r\nReference28zh_TW
dc.source.urihttp://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G1032660051en_US
dc.subject教育連結zh_TW
dc.subject董監事席次變動zh_TW
dc.subject新創公司zh_TW
dc.subject創業投資zh_TW
dc.subject國發基金zh_TW
dc.subjectEducational linken_US
dc.subjectBoard member turnoveren_US
dc.subjectNew ventureen_US
dc.subjectVenture capitalen_US
dc.subjectNational development funden_US
dc.title公司董監事席次變動對IPO的影響zh_TW
dc.titleBoard Member Turnover and Business Milestoneen_US
dc.typethesisen_US
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zh_TW
dc.identifier.doi10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMES.008.2018.F06en_US
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item.openairecristypehttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_46ec-
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