Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
https://ah.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/124951
DC Field | Value | Language |
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dc.contributor.advisor | 何怡澄<br>郭振雄 | zh_TW |
dc.contributor.author | 陳彥儒 | zh_TW |
dc.creator | 陳彥儒 | zh_TW |
dc.date | 2019 | en_US |
dc.date.accessioned | 2019-08-07T08:51:03Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2019-08-07T08:51:03Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2019-08-07T08:51:03Z | - |
dc.identifier | G0106255011 | en_US |
dc.identifier.uri | http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/124951 | - |
dc.description | 碩士 | zh_TW |
dc.description | 國立政治大學 | zh_TW |
dc.description | 財政學系 | zh_TW |
dc.description | 106255011 | zh_TW |
dc.description.abstract | 本研究參考Jennings, Weaver, Mayew (2012)衡量隱租稅的模型,使用間接和直接兩種方式評估公司承擔的隱租稅。先以最小平方法檢測有效稅率和稅前報酬率之關聯性,間接證明台灣的公司反映出Scholes and Wolfson (1992)隱租稅理論;再利用最大概似法直接估計隱租稅程度,用以比較高科技產業和傳統產業在稅改前後所承擔隱租稅之差異。本研究以台灣上市櫃公司為樣本,運用財報資料評估公司負擔的隱租稅,檢視2010年稅改後,調降營利事業所得稅稅率和實施產業創新條例對高科技產業與傳統產業的衝擊,藉此瞭解是否達到稅改降低產業之間可享受的租稅優惠分配不均的政策目標。\n從本文的實證結果得到以下結論:第一,享有租稅優惠公司因為負擔隱租稅使得稅前報酬率降低,表示如果僅考量顯租稅未必能真實反映公司實際的租稅負擔。第二,在2010年稅改前高科技產業負擔的隱租稅顯著高於傳統產業,與稅改以前高科技產業享有較高租稅優惠的批評相符。第三,在2010年稅改以後,高科技產業的有效稅率高於傳統產業,但是兩者所負擔的隱租稅無顯著差異,與實施產業創新條例的消除產業之間租稅優惠分配不均的政策目的一致,顯示2010年稅改有達到其效果。 | zh_TW |
dc.description.abstract | This study follows the Implicit Taxes model in Jennings, Weaver, Mayew (2012), using the ‘indirect’ and ‘direct’ two ways to evaluate corporate implicit taces burden. First, I examine the relationship between effective tax rate and before-tax return to indirectly prove that Taiwan corporations reflect implicit tax theory from Scholes and Wolfson (1992). Second, I use maximum likelihood estimation to directly estimate implicit tax extent, and compare the difference of high-technology industries and traditional industries. This study uses implicit taxes to examine the impact of the Tax Reform Act of 2010 (TRA2010) in Taiwan, to understand whether TRA2010 decrease the tax preferences difference through the industries.\nThe results show that, first, tax preference corporation have higher implicit taxes burden, which means that if only considering the explicit taxes might not reflect corporation’s real tax burden. Second, before TRA2010, the implicit tax of high-tech industry is higher than traditional industry, in correspondence to the criticism of high-tech corporations have more tax preferences. Third, after the TRA2010, the implicit tax extent between two industries doesn’t have significant difference, which means that TRA2010 effectively decrease the tax preference distribution problem. | en_US |
dc.description.tableofcontents | 第一章 緒論 1\n第一節 研究動機與目的 1\n第二節 研究架構 4\n第二章文獻回顧 5\n第一節隱租稅理論 6\n第二節公司隱租稅相關文獻 13\n第三節2010年稅改和產業租稅優惠相關文獻 14\n第四節建立研究假說 17\n第三章研究方法 20\n第一節樣本範圍 20\n第二節變數的選擇與研究模型 21\n第四章 實證結果及分析 29\n第一節 敘述統計分析 29\n第二節 實證結果分析 35\n第三節 額外測試 43\n第五章 結論與建議 58\n第一節 研究結論 58\n第二節 研究限制與建議 59\n參考文獻 61 | zh_TW |
dc.format.extent | 1335106 bytes | - |
dc.format.mimetype | application/pdf | - |
dc.source.uri | http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0106255011 | en_US |
dc.subject | 隱租稅 | zh_TW |
dc.subject | 2010年稅改 | zh_TW |
dc.subject | 產業創新條例 | zh_TW |
dc.subject | 租稅優惠 | zh_TW |
dc.subject | Implicit Tax | en_US |
dc.subject | Tax Reform Act of 2010 | en_US |
dc.subject | Statute for Industrial Innovation | en_US |
dc.subject | Tax Preference | en_US |
dc.title | 2010年稅制改革對企業隱租稅之影響 | zh_TW |
dc.title | Impact on the Corporate Implicit Taxes after the Tax Reform Act of 2010 | en_US |
dc.type | thesis | en_US |
dc.relation.reference | 周依潔,(2008)。中國大陸上市公司隱含稅之研究,國立政治大學會計學研究所碩士論文。\n洪榮華、郭怡萍與蕭雯華,(2006)。兩稅合一對公司資本結構影響之研究-高科技產業與傳統產業之比較。輔仁管理評論,第13卷第2期。\n孫克難,(2016)。租稅優惠與產業發展-台灣經驗評析」。財稅研究,第45卷第3期。\n孫克難,(2017)。臺灣三次賦稅改革之政經分析。財稅研究,第46卷第2期。\n陳明進,(2003)。我國租稅優惠對營利事業租稅負擔之影響。管理評論,第22卷第1期。\n陳明進與李桓伊,(2017)。產業創新條例限縮投資抵減對企業研究發展支出行為之影響。管理學報,第34卷第2期。\n黃美祝與李映茹,(2009)。最低稅負制對企業租稅負擔影響之研究-高科技產業與傳統產業之比較。當代會計,第10卷第2期。\n黃美珠、王媛慧與蔡玉琴,(2016)。稅制改革對企業有效稅率之影響-兼論產業特性與公司特性之調節效果。管理評論,第35卷第4期。\n黃建興與黃鈺茹,(2002)。租稅優惠與其他非租稅獎勵工具之比較研究。經濟研究,第2期。\n楊子江,(2013)。營利事業所得稅統計分析。當代財政,第34期。\n廖文揚,(2004)。台灣地區上市上櫃公司隱含稅負之研究,國立台灣大學會計學研究所碩士論文。\nCallihan, D., and R. White (1998). An application of the Scholes and Wolfson model to examine the relationship between implicit and explicit taxes and firm market structure. Journal of the American Taxation Association, 21(1), 1–19.\nChyz, James, LeAnn Luna, and Hannah Smith (2016). Implicit Taxes of U.S. Domestic and Multinational Firms Over the Past Quarter-Century. SSRN Scholarly Paper.\nDyreng, S., M. Hanlon, and E. Maydew (2008). Long-run corporate tax avoidance. The Accounting Review, 83 (1), 61–82.\nGupta, S., and K. Newberry (1997). Determinants of the variability in corporate effective tax rates:Evidence from longitudinal data. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, 16 (1), 1–34.\nHill, C. W. L. and S. A. Snell (1988). External Control, Corporate Strategy, and Firm Performance in Research-Intensive Industries. Strategic Management Journal, 9, 577-590.\nJennings, R., C. D. Weaver, and Mayew (2012). The Extent of Implicit Taxes at the Corporate Level and the Effect of TRA86. Contemporary Accounting Research, 29 (4), 1021-1059.\nMiller, M. (1977). Debt and Taxes. The Journal of Finance, 32(2).\nScholes, M., and M. Wolfson (1992). Implicit Taxes and Clienteles, Arbitrage, Restrictions, and Frictions. Taxes and Business Strategy: A Planning Approach, Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.\nShevlin, T., and S. Porter (1992). ‘The corporate tax comeback in 1987’: Some further evidence. Journal of the American Taxation Association, 14 (1), 58-79.\nWilkie, P (1992). Empirical Evidence of Implicit Taxes in the Corporate Sector. Journal of the American Taxation Association, 14 (1), 97–116. | zh_TW |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.6814/NCCU201900429 | en_US |
item.fulltext | With Fulltext | - |
item.cerifentitytype | Publications | - |
item.grantfulltext | open | - |
item.openairecristype | http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_46ec | - |
item.openairetype | thesis | - |
Appears in Collections: | 學位論文 |
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