Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://ah.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/125106
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dc.contributor.advisor吳文傑zh_TW
dc.contributor.advisorWu, Wen-Chiehen_US
dc.contributor.author李義善zh_TW
dc.contributor.authorLee, Yi-Shanen_US
dc.creator李義善zh_TW
dc.creatorLee, Yi-Shanen_US
dc.date2019en_US
dc.date.accessioned2019-08-07T09:20:36Z-
dc.date.available2019-08-07T09:20:36Z-
dc.date.issued2019-08-07T09:20:36Z-
dc.identifierG1062660091en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/125106-
dc.description碩士zh_TW
dc.description國立政治大學zh_TW
dc.description應用經濟與社會發展英語碩士學位學程(IMES)zh_TW
dc.description106266009zh_TW
dc.description.abstract本研究使用美國職棒大聯盟資料,旨在探究運動市場裡的勞動經濟學。即使目前已有諸多研究探討美國職棒大聯盟裡的勞動市場,本論文之研究方法有別於過往文獻。隨者美國職棒大聯盟的歷史發展所延伸出的制度變化提供研究者充分的資源運用。\n\n本研究採用實證研究之方式探討MLB的球員表現與薪資之間的均衡並納入球員不同階段的身分。過往諸多文獻皆指出球員傾向於在合約年表現會特別突出,此及合約效果並於簽訂合約後表現將下滑,此即為怠惰與拿喬。\n\n有別於過往研究,在納入球員身分因素考量後本研究估計球員過往的表現是如何影響未來下一階段身分的薪資並同樣檢視美國職棒大聯盟的投手是否如打者一樣存在者合約要果。\n\n本研究主要發現: 當球團在與選手簽訂契約時依照球員過去表現的時間具有不同參考價值且愈趨近於合約年之表現其參考價值愈高;此外本研究發現球員的身分限制使得薪資具有僵固性,因而無法達成勞動市場的薪資與表現的均衡。zh_TW
dc.description.abstractThis thesis conducts research using Major League Baseball (MLB) data. Though so far numerous researches have been using MLB data to discover the sports labor economics theoretically and empirically, these researches have been conducted on different points. With the long history of the MLB, institutions have changed as time changes, and thus offering the researcher abundant sources to conduct different researches.\n\nThis thesis uses empirical research to explore the relationship between performance and wage considering different athlete statuses. The past empirical literature’s main finding is athletes tend to perform better in the contract year and to reveal the shirk effect in line with the terms of the contract.\n\nUnlike the methodology of previous literature and findings, this thesis estimates how the past pitcher ERA (Earned Run Average) affects their wage in the future and examines the contract effect.\n\nThe main findings are when a sports team is making a decision to sign a new contract, it should value the performance more as it approaches the contract year, that is the different time value of reference. The empirical research gives the reason why the contract effect always exists by considering the performance of time reference value and the present institution makes it hard to reach performance and wage equilibrium.en_US
dc.description.tableofcontentsTABLE OF CONTENTS\n\nAbstract I\n1. Introduction 1\n1.1 Background 1\n1.2 Historical evolution in MLB institution 4\n1.3 Methodology 5\n1.4 Research Limitations 6\n1.5 Framework 7\n2.Literature review 8\n3.Models and Estimation 12\n3.1.1 Panel Data and Fixed-Effects Regression Model 14\n4.Data Source and Sample 15\n4.1 Variables and expected signs 15\n4.1.1 Dependent variable (WAGE) 15\n4.1.2 Explanatory variables and dummy variables for outcome variable wage 16\n4.1.3 Dependent variable (perf) 18\n4.1.4 Explanatory variables and Dummy variables for outcome variable perf 19\n5.Empirical results 23\n6.Conclusion and suggestions 28\n7.References 30zh_TW
dc.format.extent638206 bytes-
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf-
dc.source.urihttp://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G1062660091en_US
dc.subject合約效果zh_TW
dc.subject拿喬zh_TW
dc.subject理性預期zh_TW
dc.subject時間參考價值zh_TW
dc.subjectContract effecten_US
dc.subjectShirken_US
dc.subjectRational expectationen_US
dc.subjectTime value of referenceen_US
dc.title合約表現與薪資差異-以美國職棒大聯盟投手為例zh_TW
dc.titleContract effect, athlete performance and wage difference using MLB pitcheren_US
dc.typethesisen_US
dc.relation.referenceRottenberg, Simmon (1956). "The Baseball Players` Labor Market". Journal of Political Economy Vol.64, No.3,242-258.\nO`Neill, Heather M. and Hummel, Matthew J (2011). "Do Major League Baseball Hitters Come Up Big in Their Contract Year?". Business and Economics Faculty Publications.8.\nO`Neill, Heather M.(2013). Do Major League Baseball Hitters Engage in Opportunistic Behavior?.\nInternational Atlantic Economic Society 2013\nSloane J. Peter(2006). Rottenberg and the Economics of Sport after 50 Years: An Evaluation. IZA Discussion Paper No. 2175\nStankiewicz, Katie (2009). "Length of Contracts and the Effect on the Performance of MLB Players,"\nThe Park Place Economist: Vol. 17\nCharles R. Link1 and Martin Yosifov1 (2012). Contract Length and Salaries Compensating Wage Differentials in Major League Baseball.\nJournal of Sports Economics 13(1) 3-19\nTurner Chad and Jahn Hakes (2007). Pay, productivity and aging in Major League Baseball MPRA Paper No. 4326\nScully W. Gereald (1974). Pay and performance in Major League Baseball.\nThe American Economic Review, Volume 64, Issue 6, 915-930.\nStiroh J. Kevin (2007). PLAYING FOR KEEPS: PAY AND PERFORMANCE IN THE NBA\nEconomic Inquiry November 27, 2006 Vol. 45, No. 1, 145–161\nSolow L. John and Anthony Charles Krautmann (2009). The Dynamics of Performance Over the Duration of Major League Baseball Long-Term Contracts Journal of Sports economics 10(1)\nTao Yu-Li (2014). Three essays on Pay and Performance in Major League Baseball.\nLeeds, Sakata and Allmen (2012). Determinants of Attendance at Nippon Professional Baseball Games. Journal of sports economics. doi.org/10.1177/1527002510394294\nFindlay A. Hilary A. Rachell Corbat. The rights of athletics, Coaches and Participant in Sport (2000)zh_TW
dc.identifier.doi10.6814/NCCU201900334en_US
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