拉丁美洲選舉廢票之研究 (1916-2018)

Abstract

為什麼有些國家的選舉會出現比較多的廢票、有些卻較少？本論文試圖從經濟、社會與制度的角度對於這個問題進行探討。與既有文獻不同的是，本論文的貢獻在於其實證分析包含超過一世紀的選舉資料。本研究以拉丁美洲各國總統選舉與下議院國會選舉（1916-1918）資料為基礎，得出四個研究發現。一、對於確實執行強制性投票制度的國家而言，其國會選舉的廢票率會比總統選舉的廢票率來得高；二、國家體制的貪腐程度會增加一國國會選舉與總統選舉的廢票率，但這個增強效果對於國會選舉的影響較大；三、當總統選舉與國會選舉同時舉行時，總統選舉的廢票率會比國會選舉的廢票率來得高；四、對於經濟發展程度較高的國家而言，其國會選舉的廢票率會比總統選舉的廢票率來得高。

What explains the variation in invalid votes across different countries? This thesis extends our knowledge about factors that impact voters’ propensity to cast invalid ballots by testing economic, sociological, and institutional explanations. Unlike previous studies, this thesis contributes to the literature by providing systemic empirical analyses that cover samples of elections across a century. Drawing on evidence from presidential elections and lower chamber elections in Latin America between 1916 and 2018, this study demonstrates four findings. First, a country with an enforced compulsory voting system tends to have higher levels of invalid vote for lower chamber elections than presidential elections. Second, while the level of regime corruption has a positive effect on increasing invalid votes, such an effect is stronger for lower chamber elections than presidential elections. Third, concurrent elections tend to increase invalid vote for presidential elections but not for lower chamber elections. Fourth, a higher level of economic development tends to increase invalid vote for lower chamber elections but not for presidential elections.