Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://ah.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/134446
題名: 中共軍用長航無人機發展與威脅—兼論我空軍因應策略
The study on development and threat of PRC’s military long endurance UAV - Discussion of the TAF`s strategy
作者: 林靖國
Lin, Ching-Kuo
貢獻者: 連賢明<br>楊婉瑩
Lien, Hsien-Ming<br>Yang, Wang-Ying
林靖國
Lin, Ching-Kuo
關鍵詞: 長航無人機
灰色地帶
無人化戰場
軍事嚇阻
Long-endurance UAV
Grey-zone
Unmanned battlefield
Military deterrence
日期: 2021
上傳時間: 1-Apr-2021
摘要: 中共深知掌握軍事權力方能實現未來政治目的,軍隊現代化的程度,亦關乎軍事目標實踐的可能,故強烈從政策面主導解放軍的各式武器發展,使軍事嚇阻力量,達到足以維護國家利益的強度,近年藉由在臺海周邊,乃至第一島鏈區域實施遠海長航及繞島航訓,極積消耗我空防軍事資源、加深軍事脅迫力道已是顯而易見。\n本研究在此架構下探討長航無人機在中共軍事布局中的角色及威脅推論。首先,無人機隨著科技演進,滯空時間增加、情報偵察功能強化,於軍事領域應用更為廣泛,憑藉零傷亡風險、政治衝擊程度低與軍事成本少的特性,在戰場上的價值逐漸嶄露頭角,可在不引發戰爭前提,有別於傳統軍事思維,改以頻次高、質量少的型態,成為灰色地帶衝突的最佳軍事選項。其次,無人化的戰場經營已成趨勢,先進國家紛紛以長航無人機取代長時間的情報偵察任務,中共亦將逐步仿效,以鬥而不破方式展現對臺脅迫決心,形成臺海周邊上空常態性的事實,意圖探我軍事底線、提高我擦槍走火風險。最後,長航無人機並非是主導戰役的要角,但足以對我空軍在軍事對應上,產生不對等的資源消耗情況,挑釁我方、增加對「第一擊」處置程序的決策複雜難度。\n綜觀各層面因素,本研究結果認為,佈建具嚇阻性的情報偵察網絡、盡早籌獲國軍長航無人機隊能量,多元化我方作戰手段,警愓中共長航無人機在臺海周邊軍事活動將有所受制;同時,面對中共在灰色地帶的模糊性軍事壓迫、抵近,應跳脫刺激—反應框架,思考調整對長航無人機的行動準據與交戰規則,妥慎預應以面對此新興威脅型態。
The PRC is well aware that the control of military power can only achieve political goals, and the degree of military modernization is also related to the possibility of fulfilling military objectives. Therefore, it strongly leads the development of various weapons of the PLA from the policy side, made its military deterrence strong enough to protect national in-terests. By executing long-distance voyages and circum-island training in the vicinity of the Taiwan Strait and the first island chain, PRC has greatly consumed Taiwan’s air defense re-sources and enhanced the military coercion to Taiwan.\nUnder the situation we mentioned before, this article will discuss the role and threat lev-el of long-endurance UAV in the PRC`s military. First of all, with the advancement of tech-nology, UAV have prolonged endurance ability and enhanced ISR capabilities, that increase its application in military. With the characteristics of casualty-free, low political impact, and low military costs, UAV showed its value during the war time. Different from traditional mil-itary thinking, it doesn’t need to trigger the war. Instead, by high frequency and low unit mil-itary actions, long-endurance UAV has become the best military option for conflicts in the gray-zone. Second, unmanned battlefield management has become a trend. Many countries have replaced long-term ISR missions with long-endurance UAV. The PRC will follow this progress and show its determination of coercing Taiwan, to make it normal that their UAV flying in the Taiwan Strait. Thus, testing Taiwan’s military capabilities, and increasing the risk of misfire. Finally, the long-endurance UAV is not a key player in the battle, but it is good enough to cause unequal resource consumption in military correspondence, provoking and increasing the complexity of the decision-making process for the first shot.\nTo sum up, the results of this study believe that there are three ways to monitor PRC`s long-endurance UAV around the Taiwan Strait: establishing deterrent intelligence detection network, acquiring Taiwan’s own long-endurance UAV force and diversify our combat methods. Meanwhile, to counter PRC’s ambiguous military oppression in the gray zone, it is necessary to break away from the stimulate-response mode and consider adjusting the opera-tional criteria and rules of engagement to long-endurance UAV to deal with such new threats.
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描述: 碩士
國立政治大學
行政管理碩士學程
108921313
資料來源: http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0108921313
資料類型: thesis
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