薪酬委員會品質是否影響核心代理問題 與薪酬績效敏感性間的關聯？

Abstract

本研究探討核心代理問題、薪酬委員會品質與薪酬績效敏感性三者之關聯。其中，核心代理問題係指控制股東所擁有之決策權利與所需承擔的經營風險不對稱之下，倘若控制股東有追求私利的誘因，於是便很可能會罔顧小股東的權益，使得小股東之利益因此而遭受到損害（郭翠菱與王志洋 2017；Shleifer and Vishny 1997; La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer 1999; Claessens, Djankov, Fan and Lang 2002）。實證結果顯示在電子產業中，核心代理問題會負向影響公司會計績效與高階經理人薪酬間的關係；而在非電子產業中，核心代理問題對於上述關係的影響則為正向。其次，在電子產業中，薪酬委員會品質愈高，高階經理人薪酬與公司會計績效間的連結愈弱；但是對於非電子產業，薪酬委員會品質愈高，高階經理人薪酬與公司會計績效的連結則愈強。最後，在電子產業中，薪酬委員會品質可調節核心代理問題與高階經理人薪酬績效敏感性之間的關係。

This study investigates the association among core agency problems, compensation committee quality, and pay-performance sensitivity. Core agency problems refer to the asymmetry between controlling shareholders’ decision-making rights and the operational risks they need to manage. If controlling shareholders have incentives to pursue their own interests, they may ignore and jeopardize the rights and interests of the minority shareholders (Guo and Wang 2017; Shleifer and Vishny 1997; La Porta et al. 1999; Claessens et al. 2002). Empirical results indicate that in the electronics industry, core agency problems will adversely impact the relationship between the company’s accounting performance and top manager compensation; while in the non-electronics industry, core agency problems positively impact the above-mentioned relationship. In addition, in the electronics industry, the higher the quality of the compensation committee is, the weaker the link between top manager compensation and the company’s accounting performance will be; on the other hand, in the non-electronics industry, the higher the quality of the compensation committee is, the stronger the relationship between top manager compensation and accounting performance will be. Finally, in the electronics industry, the quality of the compensation committee can moderate the relationship between core agency problems and top managers’ pay-performance sensitivity.