殭屍企業養出董監肥貓？兼論薪酬委員會角色

Abstract

本文探討殭屍企業存在董監肥貓之可能性，亦測試薪酬委員會的開會次數多寡，是否影響公司存在董監肥貓之機率。以2013年至2019年，10,237筆臺灣上市櫃公司為樣本，實證結果顯示殭屍企業發生董監肥貓的可能性高於非殭屍企業，代表政府或銀行對殭屍企業的資金援助，不僅無法改善殭屍企業長期獲利不足以支付利息的窘境，還可能成為董監自肥的利益來源；此外，研究結果也指出薪酬委員會的參與程度愈高，愈能減少董監肥貓發生的可能性，不過家族企業或公司治理評分等級較低的公司一旦淪為殭屍企業，薪酬委員會即使有較高的參與程度，也無法減少董監肥貓存在的概率，因此反映出企業公司治理的重要性；最後，本文並未發現我國殭屍企業與非主管職員工低薪之間具有關聯性。

This study explores the probability of zombie firms with fat cat directors or supervisors, and also examines whether the frequency of compensation committee meetings affects the incidence of directors or supervisors becoming fat cats. Using 10,237 firm-year observations of Taiwanese listed firms from 2013 to 2019, empirical evidence indicates that directors or supervisors of zombie firms are more likely to be fat cats than non-zombie firms. This means that the government or banks that provided funding to zombie firms not only failed to increase their profitability but also ran the risk of creating a conflict of interest for the directors or supervisors. In addition, the results show that the higher the frequency of compensation committee meetings, the more likely it is to reduce the chances of directors or supervisors becoming fat cats. However, we also point out that in the sub-samples of family-owned businesses or firms with poor corporate governance ratings, even if the compensation committee of zombie firms has more meetings, it cannot reduce the possibility of directors or supervisors as fat cats. These results emphasize the significance of corporate governance. Lastly, there is no relationship between zombie firms and the low salaries of non-executive full-time employees.