台灣的1.5軌軍事製備： 軍民HA/DR整合對臺灣綜合國家韌性架構的重要性

Abstract

中華民國（ROC），今天更廣為人知的名字是臺灣，主要通過1.5軌道或“反向管道”外交運作。 以非官方身份參與的政府官員和非政府專家的混合，使臺灣能夠成功地參與國際社會，否則官方同行無法參與。\n這項工作將同樣的“反向管道”原則歸因於臺灣軍隊，作為一種行之有效的方法，在通過人道主義援助和救災（HA / DR）建立國際結締組織的同時，將國內的公民復原力結合起來。以烏克蘭文軍抵抗努力的成功為模型，並適應台灣的獨特情況，在文官組織和軍事能力之間進行協調的統一抵抗對國防至關重要。在開始整合民防組織的後期，烏克蘭未能阻止民族統一主義的俄羅斯。如果台灣要避免與中國重蹈覆轍，就必須建立一個全面的復原力框架，並建立一個軍民聯合組織。\n利用其目前的自然災害 HA / DR 能力，臺灣可以建立一個國民警衛隊，統一民防工作，以應對目前分散在政府，軍隊和私人組織之間的類似人為災難。通信、危機管理、角色和責任、共同行動圖景和部隊結構可以通過這個新的國民警衛隊進行協調。他們將在內政部（MOI）下運作，在和平時期作為一個兼職的民間組織，執法權力集中在HA / DR，以及一個國有化的軍事組織，專注於戰時的民防和抵抗。作為一個平民志願組織，台灣國民警衛隊可以參加目前台灣軍隊無法參加的外國訓練、交流和實際行動。\n烏克蘭特種作戰部隊（SOF）在軍民復原力方面同樣發揮著重要作用。烏克蘭特種作戰部隊比常規部隊訓練有素，裝備精良，幫助訓練、裝備和陪同國民警衛隊和民防團體開展支援常規部隊的行動。今天的臺灣特種作戰部隊缺乏非常規戰爭、反叛亂和特種偵察的關鍵技能。它們在陸軍、海軍和空軍之間分開，並在每個軍種的層次結構中解散。通過將特種作戰部隊整合為新的聯合指揮總部，並更新其核心任務和能力以應對中國的混合威脅，臺灣特種作戰部隊可以成為臺灣國民警衛隊軍民部分培訓、整合和專業化不可或缺的一部分。\n臺灣的1.5軌道軍事模式填補了國防部（MND）今年3月制定的《全面防禦的部隊結構調整》中概述的駐軍防禦力量和民防系統的作用，但從未澄清。它在戰爭時期提供與國防部的軍事聯繫，同時在和平時期的HA / DR任務中建立社會信任和價值。\n目前美國和臺灣的威懾努力主要集中在改善徵兵和預備役訓練，同時增加常規武器銷售。本文將展示這種努力的短視性，因為它忽視了最大和最有能力的人口，即36至55歲的臺灣人。他們社會富裕，但超過被徵召預備役的年齡，約佔人口的1/3，佔可自由支配的財富和權力的大多數。中年臺灣人被軍方忽視，如果訓練和組織得當，對整體防禦概念構成了重要的價值主張。多個私人組織已經建立了培訓來填補這一空白，因為中年臺灣人有辦法和願望自掏腰包用於準備工作。\n將私人、內務部和運動神經元病志願者組織結合成一項全面的復原力工作，使台灣能夠利用其最寶貴和未開發的自然資源——中年人口。臺灣重新設計的特種作戰部隊和新的國民警衛隊是這一全面復原力框架的基石，當它們結合在一起時，可以作為對中國的綜合威懾。

The Republic of China (ROC), better known today as Taiwan, operates primarily through track 1.5 or “back channel” diplomacy. A mixture of government officials participating in an unofficial capacity and non-governmental experts allows Taiwan to successfully participate in the international community where official counterparts otherwise could not.\nThis work ascribes the same “back channel” principle to Taiwan’s military as a proven method to incorporate civil resilience domestically while building international connective tissue through Humanitarian Aid and Disaster Relief (HA/DR). Taking the success of Ukraine’s civil-military resistance efforts as a model and adapting them to Taiwan’s unique situation, a unified resistance coordinated between civilian organizations and military capabilities is essential to national defense. Late in starting this consolidation of civil defense organizations, Ukraine failed to deter irredentist Russia. If Taiwan is to avoid the same fate with China, a comprehensive resilience framework must be in place and a joint civil-military organization created.\nCapitalizing on its current HA/DR capabilities for natural disasters, Taiwan can create a National Guard that unifies civil-defense efforts for similar man-made disasters that are currently fragmented between government, military, and private organizations. Communications, crisis management, roles and responsibilities, common operating picture, and force structure can be coordinated through this new National Guard. They would operate under the Ministry of Interior (MOI) as a part-time civilian organization in peacetime with law enforcement powers focusing on HA/DR, and a nationalized military organization focusing on civil defense and resistance in times of war. As a civilian volunteer organization, Taiwan’s National Guard could attend foreign training, exchanges, and real-world operations currently denied to Taiwan’s military.\nUkraine’s Special Operations Forces (SOF) played an equally vital role in civil-military resilience. Better trained and equipped than conventional forces, Ukraine’s SOF helped train, equip, and accompany National Guard and civil defense groups in operations supporting conventional forces. Taiwan’s SOF today lacks the critical skills of unconventional warfare, counterinsurgency, and special reconnaissance. They are separated between the Army, Navy, and Airforce and defanged in the hierarchy of each service. By consolidating SOF into a new joint command headquarters and updating their core tasks and capabilities to counter China’s hybrid threat, Taiwan’s SOF can be integral to the training, integration, and professionalization of the civil-military component of Taiwan’s National Guard.\nTaiwan’s track 1.5 military model fills the role of the Garrison Defense Force and Civil Defense System outlined in the Force Structure Adjustment of All-Out Defense made by the Ministry of Defense (MND) in March of this year – but never clarified. It provides military linkage to the MND in times of war while building societal trust and value in peace-time HA/DR missions.\nCurrent US and Taiwanese deterrence efforts focus primarily on improving conscription and reservist training while increasing conventional arms sales. This paper will demonstrate the shortsightedness of this endeavor as it neglects the largest and most capable demographic, 36 to 55 year-old Taiwanese. Affluent in society but over the age to be called-up for reserve service, they account for roughly 1/3 of the population and the majority of discretionary wealth and power. Overlooked by the military, middle-aged Taiwanese pose a significant value proposition to an overall defense concept if properly trained and organized. Multiple private organizations have instituted training to fill this void as middle-aged Taiwanese have the means and desire to pay out-of-pocket for preparedness.\nCombining private, MOI, and MND volunteer organizations into a comprehensive resilience effort allows Taiwan to harness it’s most valuable and untapped natural resource – its middle-aged population. Taiwan’s redesigned SOF and new National Guard are cornerstones to this comprehensive resilience framework that when combined, stand as an integrated deterrence against China.